ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ

184
P718eu

Eric M. North. '09.

1905-1906.

100

GREEK SERIES FOR COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS

EDITED

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

HERBERT WEIR SMYTH, PH.D.

ELIOT PROFESSOR OF GREEK LITERATURE IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/platoseuthyphro0000unse

PLATO'S

EUTHYPHRO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

WILLIAM ARTHUR HEIDEL, PH.D.
PROFESSOR IN IOWA COLLEGE



NEW YORK ·:· CINCINNATI ·:· CHICAGO
AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY

COPYRIGHT, 1902, BY
AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY.

ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL, LONDON.

HEIDEL. EUTHYPHRO.
W. P. I

184
P 718eu

TO

MY PARENTS

354423

PREFACE

Eight or nine years ago I was much impressed by the difficulties that beset the teacher who undertakes to introduce the student to Plato by offering him first the *Apology of Socrates*. There is no disputing the desirability of reading that noble defense of the typical sage. But when the Freshman begins the study of it, there occurs at once to his mind the inevitable question, why the Athenian dicasts should have tried and condemned so exemplary a citizen. Having at best a vague knowledge of the personality and method of Socrates, he obtains no intelligible answer to his questionings. For neither the *Apology* nor Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, which is sometimes read, affords the needed insight. After some experimenting with other works, I repeatedly tried the *Euthyphro*. The success of the attempt was highly gratifying, since it met with no serious obstacles but the difficulty of finding a suitable edition. Therefore I determined at once to do what I could to supply a book such as I had desiderated. The design, so long ago conceived and so often postponed to more urgent duties, is now accomplished. How well or ill I have done my work may be left to the judgment of the teachers into whose hands the book shall fall.

In the preparation of the notes, the editions of Wohlrab, Fritzsche, Schanz, and Adam were consulted with profit, and here and there a good suggestion was derived from Forman's *Selections from Plato*. But constant reading of the other dialogues of Plato and diligent use of Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum* supplied the materials from which it was my most difficult task to make the proper selection. For the bibliography, included in the Appendix, I am chiefly indebted to Fritzsche's edition; but I have been at great pains to supplement the list of works there cited and to make it fairly complete to the present year.

At an earlier stage in the evolution of the book, the notes profited by the generously offered suggestions of my friend, Dr. W. H. Wait, of the University of Michigan; and latterly, in preparing the manuscript for the printer, I have received much helpful criticism from the editor of the series, Professor Herbert Weir Smyth, of Harvard University. To these scholars and to other friends who have placed me under lasting obligations by their kind offices, I would express my sincere gratitude.

W. A. H.

Grinnell, Iowa.

INTRODUCTION

§ 1. PLATO

Plato was born in the year 427 B.C. In later times his disciples celebrated the 7th day of Thargelion (May 27) as his birthday. Whether he was born at Athens or on the island of Aegina, where his father possessed an estate, cannot now be determined. His father, Ariston, claimed descent from King Codrus; and his mother, Perictione, who was a sister of Charmides, traced her lineage back to Solon. He had two brothers, Adimantus and Glaucon, whom he introduces to us in his *Republic*, and a sister Potone, whose son, Speusippus, succeeded his uncle in the headship of the Academy.

In his youth Plato enjoyed all the educational advantages to be had in Athens, and distinguished himself in all branches. He excelled in gymnastics to such a degree that he won the prize in wrestling at the Isthmian games. In music also he was proficient, writing dithyrambs and tragedies, besides other forms of poetry. It is related of him that he abandoned poetry, to which he was disposed to devote his life, for the pursuit of philosophy, on the occasion of his meeting with Socrates, an event which occurred in his twentieth year. Although he valued his former teacher, Cratylus the Heraclitean, and afterward dedicated to his memory a dialogue that derived its title from his name, yet the enthusiastic devotion of his mature manhood was kindled by Socrates, with whom he was closely associated until his master's trial and death, in 399. For him also he erected a monument more enduring than bronze in his numerous dialogues; for in all but one he has introduced the genial and heroic character of Socrates, who was to him the embodiment of philosophy and philosophical method.

Shortly after the death of the master, according to an ancient report, Plato, with other disciples of Socrates, betook himself to

Megara, where there gathered about the person of Euclides, the philosopher, a circle of congenial companions. Subsequently he made journeys to Cyrene and Egypt, and three to Syracuse, in Sicily, in the years (approximately) 388, 367, and 360. The former were undertaken in pursuit of knowledge; the latter, made at the solicitation of Dion and Dionysius, in the hope of finding or preparing a fit soil in which to plant the political and social reforms on which Plato's heart was set. Aristocrat as he was by birth and temper, he could not sympathize with the headless democracy of Athens which had taken the life of Socrates; but the aristocracy of his day was hardly more to his liking. Thus cut off from participation in the actual conduct of affairs in his own city, he turned elsewhere for a field in which to exercise his political instincts. And though his efforts came to naught, his writings, notably the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, have been a power for political righteousness and moral reform in all ages.

After his return from the first voyage to Sicily, presumably about 385, Plato founded his school, first in the gymnasium in the precincts of the hero Academus, then in a garden of his own in the immediate vicinity. Here he gathered about himself many of the most promising youths of Greece, chief among them Aristotle, and instructed them, without exacting a fee, just as Socrates had done. Later, the exigencies of instruction led him to resort to the lecture method. Meanwhile, not only to fix the results of discourses held between master and disciples, but also to satisfy his artistic instincts and obtain a larger audience for his thoughts, he wrought assiduously at his dialogues, and published them from time to time.

All Plato's writings, by a lucky chance, have been preserved, and in them we possess the most important body of artistic prose bequeathed to posterity by the Greek people. Not only are his thoughts a perennial source of inspiration to philosophy, to which they constitute the best introduction, but they afford a powerful stimulus to right living. Nowhere are better-wrought characters to be met, not even in the masterpieces of the drama; and the evolution of the argument, conducted before our eyes, has all the fascination of one's own endeavors after truth. All the skill of the consummate artist is manifested also in the style, which varies with the mood and the theme, and possesses the

freedom of the well-bred man who does, as if by instinct, the proper thing. The poetic color with which Plato occasionally invests his thoughts adds freshness to the discourse, and is employed chiefly as an adjunct to the dramatic conduct of the plot.

Forty-two dialogues and thirteen letters have come down to us under the name of Plato; but all of the latter, and perhaps fifteen of the former, are not genuine. There remain enough to support the great reputation of Plato as a writer and a philosopher. He died, upward of eighty years of age, in 347 B.C.

§ 2. SOCRATES

Socrates, the son of the statuary Sophroniscus and the midwife Phaenarete, was born at Athens, presumably in 469 B.C. He learned, and for a time practised, the art of his father; but he soon became aware of a higher vocation, and thenceforward devoted himself to philosophy, which to his view was hardly to be distinguished from religion.

The ancient accounts of his personal presence present to us a singular figure in the midst of the stirring life of Athens. In spite of his singularities, he was in all respects a dutiful citizen. While he sought no distinction by political activity, he fought courageously at Potidaea, Delium, and Amphipolis in the Peloponnesian war; and as prytanis, or temporary chairman of the Senate, he resolutely blocked for a time the unconstitutional procedure in the case of the generals who were brought to trial after the battle at the Arginusan Islands, in 406 B.C. His judgment and his inner oracle (*δαιμόνιον σημεῖον*) told him that politics were not his proper sphere. He had a high calling, a divine mission to fulfil; it was his task to prepare the way for a social state founded on justice and unprejudiced insight, in which man should come to know his own vocation and to realize it in his life.

He was not a professed philosopher, neither was he a Sophist; but the unthinking did not discriminate. He had probably received little formal instruction; but he had certainly heard on occasion some of the foremost philosophers, such as Protagoras and Parmenides. On the other hand he declined to be known as a teacher, and hence received no fees. He professed indeed to have no knowledge that could be conveyed or purveyed. In his quaint manner, he said that he followed

the profession of his mother and practised intellectual midwifery (μαιευτική). That is to say, being only a man in quest of truth, he willingly availed himself of the privilege of the skilled practitioner to assist to the birth whatever germs of truth lay in the minds of his fellows.

He was fond of the Delphic injunction, γνῶθι σαυτόν, "Know thyself." Of all the men then living he had most perfectly taken his own intellectual measure. He knew his limitations, and this constituted him the wisest man of his age. This self-knowledge gave him a telling advantage in discussion, and by keeping him always well within the truth, led to habitual under-statement and to the habit of mind proverbially known as his "irony."

The Sophists, so far as they had a philosophical doctrine, taught that nothing universally or necessarily valid could be said of anything. In other words, they contended that there was no knowledge of things in their true natures. Socrates, who perceived the pernicious character of such teaching, was indeed willing to grant that there was no knowledge of things in their true natures, but he could not concede that such knowledge was impossible. "Granted that we have not the truth," we may fancy him saying to the Sophists, "then it behooves us to seek it; and we shall surely find it if we will only clarify our thinking and free our thoughts of inner contradiction. For, in this modified sense, man *is*, as you are fain to say, the measure of all truth and untruth." So he made, as Aristotle well said, two conspicuous contributions to philosophy: first, the *inductive procedure*, i.e. a method of ascertaining our true meanings by citing concrete examples, and of correcting our notions by adducing negative instances; second, *definitions*, the scientific statement of one's meaning in reference to a thing, by including all essential and excluding all non-essential marks. Convinced as he was that the true function of the intelligence is to ascertain the ends to which we should direct our conduct and the means by which they may best be attained, he believed that to do our duty we need only to *know* it. Hence he declared that virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance; or, more concretely, that no one is voluntarily bad. It is no wonder that, entertaining this belief, he devoted himself with singular enthusiasm to the God-given mission of awakening in men this saving insight.

This position has been fiercely assailed ever since the days of Aristotle, and by some it has even been regarded as a transparent sophism. So to consider it were, however, a wholly unpardonable misapprehension. It was manifestly true of Socrates himself that to know the truth was to live it. And the whole edifice of moral education is founded on this assumption. Unless morality may be inculcated by instruction, civilization does not bear within itself the seeds of moral progress. The real question is that which relates to the method of instruction; and it must be granted that present-day methods do fall far short of the ideal. Greek education, however, did, at least in theory, what we moderns do not even seriously attempt. It was calculated to cultivate equally the passive — *i.e.* the receptive or intellectual — nature, by *music*, which, as understood by the Greeks, comprehended also the arts and letters; and the active — *i.e.* the responsive or moral — nature, by *gymnastic*. And so this doctrine of Socrates and Plato, which indeed merely formulated the principles basic to Greek society, provoked no strong protest until Greek education, together with the whole framework of Greek society, had been undermined. And Aristotle, its first critic, was in his sympathies scarcely more than half a Greek.

It is unnecessary here to discuss the trial and death of Socrates. The conservative and unreflecting forces of society brought his activity to a sudden end, in a general reaction, in the year 399 B.C. Whether the men who sat in judgment on his life repented of their decision, we have no means of knowing; but succeeding generations have canonized him in a way that shows that his real significance for mankind was more nearly akin to that of the founder of a religion than to that of a philosopher.

It was meet that the greatest of his disciples should write the *Euthyphro*, a dialogue in which the master is made to discourse in a solemn hour on the problems involved in man's reverence for the Divine.

§ 3. EUTHYPHRO

Of Euthyphro, who is represented in our dialogue as meeting Socrates at the court of the King Archon and discoursing with him on the true nature of piety, we know ultimately only what may be learned

from Plato. Apart from our dialogue, he is mentioned also in the *Cratylus*. There he is characterized as a reckless etymologist, whose distinctions are often far-fetched and ridiculous. In the *Euthyphro* he is a μάντις, seer, devoted to matters of religion and orthodox to a fault. He says of himself that he is commonly ridiculed when he utters a prophecy in the public assembly; but such is his conceit of superior knowledge that he attributes their treatment of him to the ignorance of the people. It was, indeed, in consequence of his extreme orthodoxy and his disposition to govern his conduct in accordance with analogies derived from his exceptional knowledge of the behavior of the gods, that he was led to bring against his father the strange and fanatical action for manslaughter, which affords occasion for our dialogue.

Dramatically, he is, of course, employed primarily as a foil to set off the character and the conduct of Socrates. There is, first of all, the contrast between the intellectual slovenliness of Euthyphro and the acute philosophical method of Socrates. But this characteristic Euthyphro shares with many others whom Plato has sketched in his minor dialogues. There is, however, a second contrast which possesses for us far greater significance. Euthyphro represents the old-style piety which, founded on the traditions of the fathers, has not reflected upon its own sanctions and entertains no doubt of their validity. The piety of Euthyphro is well-intentioned, but it is unenlightened; and so, in the special case of his relations to his father, leads him into a course of conduct which seems to be the reverse of pious. Socrates, on the contrary, is the type of the new piety. Although he is punctilious in the observance of the forms of the religion of the Athenian state, he feels bound to scrutinize and question traditional ideals and sanctions, applying to them the standard of the higher moral ideal to which he has attained. To Socrates the conduct of Euthyphro seems inexcusable; but it is inevitable that the people, who share Euthyphro's views and ideals, should regard with grave suspicion Socrates's activity in unsettling the minds of the Athenian youth. Bigoted as Euthyphro is in other respects, he is generous in his regard for Socrates, and recognizes him, in spite of their difference, as the saving influence of the city (see 3 A).

§ 4. THE CONTENTS OF THE DIALOGUE

Socrates and Euthyphro are represented as meeting at the court of the King Archon. In response to a question, the former explains that he has come to this place, which lies so far from his accustomed haunts at the Lyceum, bent on business connected with the indictment lodged against him by Meletus. He speaks ironically of the impeachment and contemptuously of his accuser. As for Euthyphro, he professes to see in the indictment only additional evidence of the jealousy with which seers are regarded by the people; for they laugh at him whenever he prophesies in the assembly. But ridicule, Socrates avers, is not a matter of much consequence when compared with an indictment on a capital charge. Euthyphro is niggardly of his wisdom and keeps his own counsels without endeavoring to make proselytes, whereas Socrates has a benevolent way of pouring out his thoughts to all comers, and so incurs the suspicion of having obtained a following. This circumstance probably accounts for the difference in the people's attitude toward them: they laugh at Euthyphro, but strike at Socrates with intent to kill (2 A–3 E).

Euthyphro expresses his confident expectation that the matter will end in nothing, and that he himself will have equal success in his suit. Seeing his eagerness to tell of his own case, Socrates requests Euthyphro to explain its nature. We learn then that Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for manslaughter. A poor day-laborer on their farm in Naxus had, in a drunken quarrel, slain one of their slaves. Thereupon his father had bound the murderer and cast him into a ditch, intending to defer a final disposition of his case until instructions on that subject should be obtained from the interpreters of religion at Athens. Meanwhile, as was to have been expected, the man died of neglect and exposure, before the messenger returned. Euthyphro therefore holds his father responsible for his death and deals with him as with one defiled with bloodguiltiness (3 E–4 E). There is thus at once suggested the question whether it is consistent with piety for a son so to prosecute his father. Does Euthyphro so well know the nature of piety as to be assured of the propriety of his own conduct? In that event it were well for Socrates to become his disciple; for,

knowing what piety is, he must necessarily practise it; and therefore he would most naturally escape the prosecution of Meletus. What then is piety, and what is impiety? (4 E–5 D).

Euthyphro then responds with the *first definition:* "Piety is doing as I am doing, prosecuting any one who is guilty of any great crime, whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be; and not to prosecute him were impiety." The conduct of Zeus and Cronus in punishing their fathers affords, in his judgment, a striking proof of the correctness of his answer (5 D–6 A).

Socrates, who scruples to accept as true these tales of mythology, asks whether his failure to do so may not be the reason for his being considered guilty of impiety. Euthyphro assures him that he believes not only these stories, but others also which are far more wonderful than these, — tales of hatred and wars and much besides, that would fill Socrates with amazement. Socrates had rather defer the thrilling disclosures for the present, and follow up the question just now of so much consequence to him, what is piety? For, assuming the correctness of Euthyphro's contention that his conduct is pious, that is only an instance, and there must be other pious actions; we require not a special case, but a general definition (6 A–6 E).

Euthyphro essays a *second definition:* "Piety is that which is dear to the gods; that which is not dear to them is impious or unholy." Socrates remarks that Euthyphro has avoided the errors in form of which he had previously complained, but that it remains to be seen whether the definition is true in substance. The pious and the impious are diametrically opposed one to the other. That which is dear to the gods is pious, that which is not dear to them is impious. But Euthyphro has said that there are dissensions among the gods, and these quarrels must arise from differences of opinion. On what subjects? Not about number or weight; for such differences may be decided by referring to an easy test. These quarrels must have to do with such questions as those relating to right and wrong, which cannot be so readily adjudicated. Hence, as gods and men love that which they deem noble and just and hate the opposite, the gods may very likely be at variance here, some loving an action that others hate. It would not be surprising, therefore, if in prosecuting his father Euthy-

phro should be doing that which is agreeable to Zeus, but disagreeable to Cronus; and thus the pious and the impious, instead of being diametrically opposed, would seem to coincide and become identified. In order to obviate this difficulty, Socrates proposes an *amendment to the definition*, which Euthyphro willingly adopts: "Piety is that which *all* the gods love; and the contrary, that which *all* the gods hate, is impious" (6 E–9 E).

The second definition, thus amended, should be subjected to careful scrutiny. In order to test it Socrates propounds a significant question: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious; or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" Euthyphro is sorely perplexed, and Socrates undertakes to elucidate the problem by giving an illustration. It is a question of cause and effect, which terms are roughly identified with an act (= cause) and the resultant state (= effect). It is shown that the state does not precede the act, but follows it. By a series of substitutions of terms in admitted equations, it is inferred that the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious. The fact that the gods love piety does not, therefore, add anything to our knowledge of the nature of piety; and Socrates informs Euthyphro that, in defining piety as that which is loved by the gods, he has drawn attention to an accidental attribute rather than to the essence of the concept (9 E–11 B).

When Socrates exhorts him to renew the attempt, Euthyphro acknowledges his confusion, and complains that the argument wanders about, leaving its moorings. Socrates then, as Euthyphro despairs of his own powers, undertakes to guide the inquiry. He begins by asking the question, "Is not all that is pious necessarily right?" Yes. "Is, then, all that is right also pious? Or, is it indeed true that all that is pious is right, whereas the converse proposition is not true, viz. that all that is right is pious? And is one part of that which is right pious, and is another part something else?" Euthyphro does not quite grasp the question. Socrates then gives him an elementary course in defining terms by referring a species to a genus, illustrating the procedure by showing the relation between the concepts "reverence" and "fear." Euthyphro then concedes that "the right" is the genus and "the pious" the species; and, as there are other species, Euthyphro

is led to submit a *third definition*: "That part of the right which *attends to* the gods is pious; but the part that *attends to* men constitutes the remainder of the right" (11 B–12 E).

"Good," says Socrates; "but what do you mean by *tendance?* Surely you do not use the word as you would in speaking, say, of horses. For tendance has for its object the benefit and improvement of that which is tended." Euthyphro grants that piety does not improve the gods, and therefore interprets his definition as having in view such attention as servants bestow upon their masters. Socrates then styles it "ministration to the gods." Immediately there is raised a further question: What end do the gods seek to accomplish through the ministrations of men? Medicine ministers to the restoration of health, shipbuilding to the building of ships; but to what end does piety avail? "Many and fair," says Euthyphro, "are the objects which the gods effect by the ministrations of men." — "Yes," replies Socrates; "that may also be said of husbandry, for example, which, however, aims chiefly at producing food from the soil, and of generalship, which looks chiefly to victory in warfare. In like manner, I should like to know the chief end which the gods have in view in employing men's service." — "It were a rather long task to learn all about so great a matter," replies Euthyphro, and therewith returns to the commonplace view of daily life. "I should rather say that if one knows how to gratify the gods in word and deed, by prayer and sacrifice, such conduct is pious, and proves the salvation of private homes and commonwealths; whereas the reverse of that which is gratifying, is impious, and overturns and ruins everything" (12 E–14 B).

"You might have answered my question in fewer words," Socrates rejoins; "but you turned away precisely when you had reached the point. But as the questioner must follow where the answer leads, I must content myself with what you offer. Your *fourth definition* then, as I gather, is to the effect that piety is the science of prayer and sacrifice; that is to say, of asking and giving to the gods." This would make of it a science of commerce between gods and men. Unless the gods derive some benefit from the transaction, man must have the advantage of them in the bargaining; for we receive all true

blessings at their hands. Euthyphro explains that the gods receive *honor* alone from men. But honor, as Socrates remarks, is agreeable and dear to the gods. Hence, piety once more appears, on this view, to be that which is agreeable to the gods, — a statement which was dismissed before. Once more the argument is walking away. The two positions are incompatible. Either we were not right before, or else, if we were, we are now in error. Hence we must resume our inquiry afresh and ask, What is piety ?

But Euthyphro will have no more of it. He is in haste to depart, and Socrates cannot prevail upon him to stay. Thereupon Socrates gives utterance to his disappointment at not being able to learn what piety is, so that he might clear himself of the charge brought by Meletus (14 B–16 A).

§ 5. THE PLACE OF THE *EUTHYPHRO* IN THE ECONOMY OF PLATO'S WORKS

Dramatically, the position proper to the *Euthyphro* is between the *Theaetetus* and the *Apology*. At the close of the former dialogue Socrates says he must go to the court of the King Archon to answer the charge of Meletus. At the beginning of the *Euthyphro* we find him there meeting the seer. His business is to take the initial steps of the trial which is to call forth his *Apology*. It was evidently this fact that led Aristophanes of Byzantium (cf. Laert. Diog. 3. 62) to place the *Euthyphro* between the *Theaetetus* and the *Apology* in his fourth trilogy, and Thrasyllus (cf. Laert. Diog. 3. 58) so to arrange his first tetralogy as to make the *Euthyphro* precede the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*. Obviously, if one considers its dramatic setting and the argument as it has been sketched, our dialogue must be in some way closely related to the *Apology;* but scholars appear to have bestowed upon this question much less attention than it deserves.

The apologetic strain in the *Euthyphro* has been noted ever since the time of Schleiermacher, and of course its outward relation to the trial of Socrates is too evident to escape notice. But most scholars have thought that the *Euthyphro* was written at a time when the threat of bringing Socrates to trial was first made, before his friends fully realized the seriousness of his danger. This view finds its chief support in the difference in the emotional tone with which Plato refers to

the trial of Socrates in the *Euthyphro* as compared, for example, with the *Gorgias*. But this fact may be accounted for equally well on another hypothesis. Grote has already refuted this view; but we shall soon see that it becomes wholly untenable when the real relation between the *Euthyphro* and the *Apology* is perceived.

Let us first recall to mind that in the indictment brought against him Socrates was charged chiefly with irreligion and impiety. All the other counts specified were subordinated and reduced to this. However faulty the plea of the *Apology* may be, when considered from the legal point of view, Socrates, unquestionably, in his defense, puts forth every effort to meet this charge. He does not confine his argument to a rebuttal of the evidence presented by the prosecution; he endeavors to establish directly and by positive proof that his mode of life is not only passively conformable to the laws and religious observances of the state, but that it is aggressively pious and has received the signal approval of heaven. He refers to the oracle given by the Delphian Apollo in response to the question of his devoted Chaerephon, and is at especial pains to prove that he bears a commission to live and labor as he does, a commission expressly given by the god who reigned supreme in the hearts of the religious Greeks of that day. And it is this life of aggressive piety that he fondly calls "his ministration to the god" (*τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν*, *Apol.* 30 A).

In recent years a principle governing the interpretation of the dialogues of Plato has obtained among scholars almost universal recognition. It may be thus stated: In determining the positive doctrine which Plato desired the reader to infer from the argument of any dialogue, we must take for our point of departure the positions taken and left finally unrefuted. If now we address ourselves to the *Euthyphro*, we perceive that the third of the four definitions propounded was not refuted. On the contrary, Socrates called attention to it in the most dramatic way. When Euthyphro loses courage after his second definition has proved untenable, Socrates essays to guide the inquiry and leads up directly to the conclusion. But Euthyphro, who has defined piety as ministration to the gods, fails to answer the important question, to what end the gods direct the ministrations of men. Then Socrates rebukes him for taking refuge in a commonplace

instead of meeting the point upon which the success of the inquiry depends. All this conspires to prove that the third definition affords the key to the meaning of the dialogue. This, then, is the definition, 12 E: *τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅτιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν.* Socrates, however, draws attention to the vagueness of the term *θεραπεία* and Euthyphro substitutes *ὑπηρετική* for it. Later on (14 D) Socrates refers to it as *αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία τοῖς θεοῖς.*

If now one returns, with this definition in mind, to the *Apology*, one cannot but be struck by the phraseology in which Socrates there voices most forcibly the conviction on which he bases his claim to innocence and piety (30 A): *ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.* It should now be clear that Plato wrote the *Euthyphro* after the *Apology*, with a view to giving a theoretical statement of that which was merely implicit in the defense of Socrates.

Since, however, the date of the *Apology* cannot be definitely fixed, we thus gain only a relative *terminus post quem.* Attention has recently been directed afresh to a fact that may lead to somewhat more specific results. Euthyphro's indictment of his father is dramatically made contemporary with the trial of Socrates. Now the nature of this indictment was such that it must have been brought, if at all, almost immediately after the commission of the manslaughter with which his father was charged. But, as Euthyphro's father was presumably a cleruch on the island of Naxus, the alleged crime must have been committed at least four or five years earlier, since, with the loss of all the Athenian colonies in 404 B.C., the cleruchs also would be dispossessed. We have here, therefore, one of Plato's familiar anachronisms, admitted for dramatic effect. The anachronism would be all the greater if, as Bergk conjectured, Eupolis, in his comedy entitled Προσπάλτιοι, had satirized the litigious disposition of Euthyphro. The dramatic justification of this disregard of time is sufficiently apparent, but in either case the anachronism remains, and compels us to date our dialogue a considerable number of years after the trial of Socrates. Unless that be done, we destroy the artistic structure by emphasizing this untruth of detail.

The same general result is reached if we consider the tone in which Plato, in the *Euthyphro*, touches upon the trial of Socrates. So marked is the difference in this regard that it is quite probable that the *Gorgias* was written before our dialogue. Again, the reference of the ὅσιον to the δίκαιον and so to the later fourfold category of virtues, suggests that Plato had definitely advanced beyond the semipopular enumeration of five virtues in the *Protagoras* (349 B). It seems impossible to assign the *Euthyphro* a place after the *Republic*; but certain critics have pretended to find the text for the homily in our discourse in the famous utterance on the immoralities attributed to the gods, which is to be found in *Republic*, 378 A B. Other critics have dated the *Euthyphro* after the first books of the *Republic*. On the whole it seems wiser at the present stage of the inquiry to refrain from definite conclusions. So far as the study of style and the tabulation of certain characteristic particles have proceeded, they support the general view here presented. The *Euthyphro* is most intimately linked with such dialogues as *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Symposium*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, and the *Republic*.

§ 6. THE IMPORT OF THE *EUTHYPHRO*

The value of the dialogue has sometimes been called in question. It may therefore be proper here to consider what contribution it makes to philosophical problems. The upshot of the argument is, as we have seen, that piety is man's ministration to God directed to the accomplishment of some object supremely great and fair. This statement is open, in the abstract, to two interpretations: one from the point of view of Plato, the other on the basis of Socrates' own conceptions. As we turn to the *Apology* for some indication of the glorious object which man by his obedient service assists God in realizing, we think naturally of the impressive words to which we have already referred (*Apol.* 30 A): ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται. We are familiar with Socrates' cure of souls; it is his mission to clarify men's

passions and to right their lives by ridding their minds of false conceptions and by assisting the birth of true insight. This is for him the Kingdom of God for which he was called to prepare the way. This is the activity which Plato ascribes to Socrates in the *Gorgias*, 521 D, and pronounces to be the only exercise of true statesmanship to be witnessed at Athens. And at the close of that dialogue the myth clearly shows that this statesmanship is identical with the observance of the perfect piety.

For Socrates, then, this is as far as we may safely pursue the matter. But we are now concerned with Plato, as the author of the *Euthyphro*. The question as to the ἔργον (specific end) accomplished by the ministrations of man, which Socrates raises in *Euthyphro*, 13 E, when considered in its ultimate bearings, points unmistakably to the systematic development of Plato's thought. The only answer to Socrates' question is, therefore, that the ἔργον to be effected by man's service of God is the realization of the Good, — not the realization of this or that particular good. What to Socrates could have meant no more than preparing the way for the Kingdom of God, to Plato, with his constructive and legislative mind, meant a positive and definite attempt to lay the foundations and to establish the government of the City of God. For the Good, with Plato, is essentially the ideal of a life in a perfect social system, conducted on principles of true insight into the nature and meaning of things. Such an attempt was made in an ideal way in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, in a practical way in his visits to Syracuse.

Now, according to Plato, philosophy is the endeavor to realize the Good in all things. Philosophy and religion join in the demand that we flee from the evil and take refuge with the Good. We must approximate to Deity as nearly as we may, and this approximation is brought about by justice, piety, and insight (*Theaetetus*, 176 A B). This perfect philosophic life we have learned from the *Republic* to call the life of righteousness, the life of virtue in itself complete. In the *Euthyphro* piety is singled out as a special aspect of that philosophic and virtuous life ; the ὅσιον is defined as μέρος δικαίου τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν. We may say, then, that the Good is a power that operates to its own realization in the social world through the insight-

guided efforts of mankind. That it is a true man's function to bear his part in this self-realization of the Good is, in a word, the ethical import of the *Republic*. The *Euthyphro* adds the conscious reference to Deity, the thought that this philosophic life is a service in a personal relation as a willed coöperation. Taking due account of the formal peculiarities of the Greek terminology, the definition thus reached may be paraphrased somewhat as follows, "Religion is the intelligent and conscientious endeavor of man to further the Good in human society, as under God." The Good and God are not here expressly identified; but the line of distinction between these two conceptions was in Plato's thought almost if not quite effaced. If we take account of this circumstance and make explicit the implication of the argument, we may say that religion is the devoted service of the Ideal, consciously conceived as God. We thus attain to a thought which, while undeniably lying in the direct path of Platonic philosophizing, has not been superseded by any pronouncement of modern philosophers of religion.

The result thus stated is in substantial accord with the definition of piety extracted from Plato by Bonitz, *Platonische Studien*, p. 234, "If we thus supplement with Platonic thoughts our dialogue at the point where it is characteristically interrupted, we reach the definition that piety is nothing but perfect morality, only in such sort that man is conscious of being therein the ministering instrument of the divine activity." Not quite so satisfactory is the statement of Schanz. *Einleitung*, p. 13, "He is pious, who accommodates his will to the divine will, who becomes an instrument of the divine will." Here there is a *possible* difference between the Good and the divine will, whereas Socrates emphasizes the thought that piety is not dependent for its essential nature on the pleasure or the will of Deity.

Although most of the above suggestions of doctrine were derived from other works of Plato, they are not only consistent with, but even called forth by, hints contained in the *Euthyphro*. In the first place, Socrates declines to credit unworthy tales of the gods (6 A, 6 D). Again, he implies that we must conceive of them as being virtually agreed on moral questions, and suggests that man cannot do aught to make them better. Finally, he asserts that all good and perfect gifts

come from them (15 A). All of which hints unmistakably at the Platonic doctrine that God is good (*Rep.* 379 B ff.) and that, because he is good, he does only that which is good (*Tim.* 29 E).

We thus perceive that there are made in the *Euthyphro* certain positive suggestions of great significance for the theory of religion. But there are other thoughts, positive as well as negative, scattered throughout the dialogue, which are deserving of consideration. Attention has been already directed to the first attempt at a definition of piety, as that which Euthyphro is doing. Whatever may be our view of the evolution of religion, so much at least is plain: the commands of religion come originally as specific injunctions, "thou shalt," or "thou shalt not." Broad principles of action, such as Jesus' commandment to love God and one's neighbor, invariably come late. Hence the religious conscience is clear on details, but suffers considerable latitude in their formulation. The case of Euthyphro is typical for all time. Moreover, in this particular case, he illustrates a danger to which all scripture (if we may so call the Greek mythology) is exposed. The text to which he appeals in support of his treatment of his father was not designed to serve such a purpose. Man, in an unreflecting state, expresses his own moral standards in the tales he tells. If he conceives a new truth he invents a new tale. Only when he becomes reflective does he criticise the old one. At any time the public conscience is likely to be too laxly disciplined to respond unitedly to a new appeal; hence in all ages the conflict of ideals and the variety of applications of religious sanctions must be marked.

The disagreement between Euthyphro and his kindred on the one hand and Socrates on the other, as to his treatment of his father, is a case in point. His belief in the dissensions among the gods, on which he bases his action, is another. Euthyphro is simply the unreflecting religionist, who is unaffectedly orthodox. His only pride is in his superior knowledge. But Socrates, who conceives of the gods first of all as good, cannot help applying to them his ideal of goodness, and by reflection comes to disbelieve the common creed in the interest of the divine nature. He shows that the dissidence in ethical judgments, so characteristic of polytheism, must give place to unanimity, at least if we are to have a rational view of piety. This is only one illustration

of the thousand ways in which the growth of the ethical ideal and the moralization of religion, which was in progress in the days of Socrates and Plato, prepared the way for a purer monotheism.

Euthyphro's second definition also deserves attention. It pronounces that pious which is agreeable to the gods. There can be no doubt that the Greeks, almost to a man, would have adopted this view. It is the characteristic expression of any revealed religion. That virtue is conformity to the will of God, — varied in phrase, but identical in intention, — all systems of Christian ethics declare. And there can be no serious objection to the statement if two points are duly guarded: first, God must be conceived to be essentially rational and free of caprice, and, secondly, there must not be left any possibility of a divergence between the rational Good and the will of God. These conceptions were not current in Plato's time; hence, he could not accept the definition.

His higher view, moreover, was not to be attained simply by clarifying the notions already entertained by the people. Had this been possible, Plato's contribution to the history of religious thought would not have been so original, although its value to his people would perhaps have been enhanced. When Socrates assumes the conduct of the discourse (11 E), he is made to direct it to a consideration of the relation between the concepts ὅσιον and δίκαιον, in which Euthyphro concedes that the former is subordinate (as species to genus) to the latter. There can hardly be a serious doubt that to the popular view these concepts were entirely coördinate; and, indeed, Plato himself, in the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias*, when speaking in the popular language, so regarded them. This fact, however, only serves to show more clearly the originality of Plato's thought; for the conception is thus set into relation with the fourfold virtue comprehended under δικαιοσύνη, according to the scheme of the *Republic*. This omission of ὁσιότης from the list, as an independent and coördinate virtue, does not, however, betoken a diminution of interest in religion; it rather marks the elevation of all man's conduct to a higher plane, on which all duty is seen in the light of a service of God.

The service of the gods, which constitutes the essence of virtue in general and of piety in particular, is not however a service of ca-

pricious masters, as we have already seen, since their wills are supposed to be at one. But Plato goes still farther. In a discussion of some subtlety (9 E ff.), Socrates leads up to the thought that the pious is pious not because it is agreeable to the gods, — though he does not question that it is agreeable to them, — but, contrariwise, is agreeable to the gods because it is pious. Whatever may be our judgment upon the argument that conducts us to this conclusion, there can be no doubt as to the significance of the conclusion itself. It plainly asserts the autonomy of the human spirit even in matters of religion. In other words, it means that the content of our moral creed, — the determination of what is or is not duty, — does not depend upon the will or the pleasure of God. Duty is constituted duty by the spirit — human or divine — that apprehends it as that which is ultimately and absolutely Good. The human spirit is made to evolve its own moral ideal, which is *ipso facto* supposed to appeal to an approving Deity. The coincidence of man's ideal with the will of God thereby becomes the ultimate postulate of the moral life.

Apart from these important contributions to religious thought, the *Euthyphro* possesses also a certain logical interest. From all of Plato's works it becomes clearly apparent that there was in his day not even a beginning of technical logic except as he himself laid the foundations. Hence his dialogues contain much that to us seems extremely elementary. In the *Euthyphro*, the following suggestions toward a logical theory are offered: 1. Socrates shows that an example is not a definition (6 D). 2. In two instances (8 A f. and 13 A f.) he teaches Euthyphro that ambiguities of expression are to be excluded from the definition. 3. The categories of *antecedent* and *consequent*, *cause* and *effect*, are noted and employed (10 A ff.). 4. In the same connection the categories of the *active* and the *passive* are indicated, and the difference between predication that is merely temporary and predication that is permanent is brought out, pointing the distinction between *accident* and *essence*. 5. Socrates illustrates the method of defining terms *per genus et differentiam*.

After completing this survey of the *Euthyphro*, we may safely say in conclusion that none of the briefer Platonic dialogues can be compared with it for the value of its suggestions toward philosophical theory.

ABBREVIATIONS

B. = Babbitt's *Grammar of Attic and Ionic Greek*, 1901.
G. = Goodwin's *Greek Grammar* (revised edition), 1893.
GL. = Gildersleeve's *Latin Grammar* (third edition, revised and enlarged), 1894.
GMT. = Goodwin's *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (enlarged edition), 1890.
GS. = Gildersleeve's *Syntax of Classical Greek*, 1901.
HA. = Hadley's *Greek Grammar* (revised by Allen), 1884.
RD. = Riddell's *Digest of Platonic Idioms*, in the Appendix to his edition of Plato's *Apology*, 1877.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ

[ἢ περὶ ὁσίου, πειραστικός]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

St. I
p. 2

I. ΕΥΘ. Τί νεώτερον, ὦ Σώκρατες, γέγονεν, ὅτι A
σὺ τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε νῦν

I. 1. **ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ** [**ἢ περὶ ὁσίου, πειραστικός**]: the dialogues of Plato, with few exceptions, derive their titles from the names of the chief interlocutors, apart from Socrates, *e.g.* Euthyphro in our dialogue. The sub-title, **ἢ περὶ ὁσίου**, was probably added by the scholars of Alexandria, although Thrasyllus, who lived at Rome in the time of Augustus and Tiberius, and arranged the works of Plato in tetralogies, seems to have thought that they originated with Plato. **2. πειραστικός** = *tentative* assigns the dialogue its place in a scheme, according to which the dialogues of investigation (*ζητητικοί*) are either obstetric (*μαιευτικοί*), tentative (*πειραστικοί*), probative (*ἐνδεικτικοί*), or refutative (*ἀνατρεπτικοί*). The 'tentative' dialogues were valued for their capacity to rid the mind of false notions by disproof and purification (cp. *τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον καθαρτικόν*, Albinus, *Eisagoge*, p. 150, in Hermann's *Plato*, Vol. VI.). The other 'tentative' dialogues are the *Charmides*, *Meno*, and *Ion*. See Grote's *Plato*, I., pp. 158–161.

The scene of the dialogue is in. or before, the porch of the King Archon.

5. τί νεώτερον: HA. 649. 2 \
Up to his seventieth year Socrates had not been a party to a lawsuit (*Apol.* 17 D); hence Euthyphro's surprise at finding him here. **6. τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ . . . διατριβάς**: ἐν Λυκ. attrib., cp. HA. 666 a; G. 952, 1; B. 451, 1. The **Λύκειον** was a famous gymnasium situated on the right bank of the Ilisus in the precincts of Ἀπόλλων Λύκειος, which lay just outside and east of Athens. Here Socrates loved to resort, and here Aristotle subsequently founded his school. The scene of the *Lysis* and of the *Euthyd.* is laid here, and hither Socrates

διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν ; οὐ γάρ που καὶ σοί γε δίκη τις οὖσα τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὥσπερ ἐμοί.

ΣΩ. Οὗτοι δὴ Ἀθηναῖοί γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, δίκην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφήν.

ΕΥΘ. Τί φῄς ; γραφὴν σέ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, | γέγραπται· B
οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἕτεροι.

2 A betakes himself from the feast of Agathon, *Symp.* 223 D. **διατριβαί** here means only his *haunts*; cp., too, **διατρίβεις** in l. 7. It is not said that Socrates is engaging here in philosophical disputations, which is freq. the sense of these terms; for the dialogue gives no hint of other auditors of the discourse, and Euthyphro would have no occasion for surprise if Socrates had changed only the scene of his pursuits. Socrates is evidently bent on business. On the **διατριβή** as a literary form, see Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, I., p. 369 ff.

7. **τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν**: the **ἄρχων βασιλεύς** was the second of the nine Athenian Archons. He had charge of state matters involving religion, such as the mysteries, the **Λήναια**, and all gymnastic contests. He had jurisdiction in all cases concerned with impiety and blood-guiltiness. His porch, or court, was at the west end of the **ἀγορά**, — the first on the right on entering the market-place from the Ceramicus. A **στοά** was properly a colonnade; the **στοὰ βασίλειος** appears to have had three rows of columns, and is 2 A supposed to have exerted a strong influence on the architecture of the Roman and Christian basilica. — **οὐ γάρ που κτλ.**: 'you also, I dare say (**που**), do not have,' etc. For **οὐ γάρ που . . . γε**, cp. 4 B, 13 A, 14 E, and **οὐ γάρ που**, 7 E. On **οὖσα**, see HA. 984; G. 1586; B. 660, N. 8. **πρός**: *apud*. 9. **ὥσπερ ἐμοί**: the case of Euthyphro was a **δίκη φόνου**, and as such came under the jurisdiction of the **βασιλεύς**. Note his eagerness to tell about his own case. Cp. 3 E. 10. **οὗτοι δὴ . . . γε . . . γραφήν**: **γε** strengthens the neg., not **Ἀθηναῖοι**. Athenian jurisprudence recognized two distinct classes of actions at law: (1) **ἀγὼν ἴδιος, δίκη ἰδία**, or simply **δίκη**, *a private action*; (2) **ἀγὼν δημόσιος, δίκη δημοσία**, or **γραφή**, *a public prosecution*. The action laid against Socrates was of the latter sort. Roughly, the two classes correspond to civil and criminal trials in our own courts. 12. **γραφὴν . . . γέγραπται**: for **γραφήν**, HA. 715; G. 1051 (cp. 1125); B. 331; for **σέ**, HA. 725; G. 1076; B. 340; the pron. is emphatic. 13. **οὐ γὰρ** B

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΥΘ. Τίς οὗτος;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὸν ἄνδρα· νέος γάρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώς· ὀνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, Μέλητον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δήμων Πιτθεύς, εἴ τινα νῷ ἔχεις Πιτθέα

2 B . . . ἕτερον: 'for I shall not think so ill of you as to suppose that you have indicted another.' We should have expected σοῦ with καταγνώσομαι, as in *Men.* 76 C, but the clause ὡς σὺ ἕτερον renders it unnecessary. For the regular constr., cp. Ar. *Eq.* 46; Lys. 4. 14; for the rarer second gen., Lys. 13. 65; cp. Thuc. 3. 16. Here ἕτερον = ἄλλον (cp. ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος, in l. 15), see RD. § 45; B. 492. With ἕτερον supply γραφὴν γέγραψαι.

14. οὐ γὰρ οὖν: 'why, no, — certainly not.' 15. ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος: *sc.* γραφὴν γέγραπται. The question, being quite unnecessary, marks Euthyphro's surprise. Above we had ὡς σὺ ἕτερον. 16. πάνυ γε: expresses entire assent; in like manner, καὶ πάνυ γε and πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 18. οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω: *I myself am not very well acquainted with the man.* — οὐ πάνυ τι = *not quite*; HA. 702 b; G. 1016; RD. § 139. The indef. pron. τις, when joined with adjs., indef. numerals, and advs., serves to make distinct the idea conveyed by these words, rendering them now more, now less, emphatic, acc. to the sense or the connection. 19. ἀγνώς: pass. In this expression, as well as in the foregoing νέος τις and the following ὡς ἐγῷμαι, Socrates shows his contemptuous indifference to his chief accuser, Meletus, who was supported by Anytus and Lyco (his συνήγοροι). See *Apol.* 23 E. Of Meletus little is known but what we learn from the *Euth.* and the *Apol.*, it being difficult or impossible to identify him with any one of the men of the same name known through other sources. Some have thought him either the poet Meletus (Ar. *Ran.* 1302, cp. *Apol.* 23 E) or that poet's son. Anytus, however, was one of the most influential men in the restored Democracy, being a colleague of Thrasybulus (Isocr. 18. 23). In his hostility to the Sophists he wrongfully included Socrates, and probably did much toward his condemnation. According to *Apol.* 23 E, Lyco was an orator, and as such he doubtless contributed his professional services to the prosecution. 21. τῶν 2 B

Μέλητον οἷον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπον δέ.

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα γραφήν σε | γέγραπται; C

ΣΩ. Ἥντινα; οὐκ ἀγεννῆ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· τὸ γὰρ νέον ὄντα τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ φαῦλόν ἐστιν· ἐκεῖνος γάρ, ὥς φησιν, οἶδε τίνα τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες αὐτούς. καὶ κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι· καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατιδὼν ὡς διαφθείροντος τοὺς ἡλι-

2 B **δήμων**: partitive gen., closely akin to the chorographic. Schanz makes δῆμος = δημότης. The deme Πίτθος belonged to the tribe Κεκροπίς, and (acc. to Bursian, *Geogr. von Griech.*, I. 345) probably lay a little northeast of Athens, between Pallene and Gargettus. **21. νῷ ἔχεις**: *remember*; but ἐν νῷ ἔχειν c. inf. = *purpose*. **22. οἷον**: by attraction (HA. 997, 1002; G. 1036) for τοιοῦτον, οἷος τετανόθριξ ἐστί, κτλ. — **τετανότριχα**: 'with long, straight hair.' — **οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον**: 'with none too good a beard.' **23. ἐπίγρυπον**: *i.e.* Roman-nosed. The prep. ἐπι- seems to mean 'slightly.' Cp. ἐπίσιμος, ἐπίχαρις, etc. **24. ἐννοῶ** = νῷ ἔχω. — **ἀλλὰ δή**: C 'but, then.' **26. ἥντινα**: acc., instead of nom., retaining the case-form of the question; cp. *Gorg.* 449 E: περὶ λόγους . . . ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; When a question is repeated by the one to whom it was addressed, it is regularly put into the indir. form; hence ἥντινα, not τίνα. **26. οὐκ ἀγεννῆ**: 'one that speaks well for his character and nurture,' ironical, as is all the praise of Meletus. — **τὸ γὰρ . . . ἐγνωκέναι**: 'for the fact that, young as he is, he has apprehended a matter of such magnitude.' HA. 958 f.; G. 1541 ff.; B. 637. **27. οὐ φαῦλον**: 'no small thing.' Cp. *Crat.* 390 D; in *Symp.* 213 C οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα. See Frohberger on Lys. 10. 2 (App.). **28. τίνα τρόπον**: HA. 719 a; G. 1060; B. 336. **29. οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται**: see *Apol.* 24 B: Σωκράτη φησὶν (*sc.* ὁ Μέλητος) ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. It is thus seen that Socrates is here glancing at the phraseology of the formal accusation lodged against him. — **οἱ διαφθείροντες**: HA. 966; G. 1560; B. 650, 1. **30. κινδυνεύει**: here = δοκεῖ, as freq. in Plato; cp. 8 A, 11 A, D. The original sense has faded, and the verb makes a polite assertion. **31. διαφθείροντος**: agrees with ἐμοῦ, implicit in ἐμήν, HA. 691; G. 1001; B. 477, N. 2 C

κιώτας αὐτοῦ, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μου ὡς πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ φαίνεταί μοι τῶν πολιτικῶν μόνος ἄρχεσθαι ὀρθῶς· ὀρθῶς γάρ | ἐστι D
35 τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται ὅτι ἄριστοι, ὥσπερ γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἴσως πρῶτον μὲν | ἡμᾶς 3
ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας,

2 C 32. **αὐτοῦ**: for position, see HA. 673 b. — **ὡς πρὸς . . . πόλιν**: usually, in Plato, when two objects are compared, in prepositional phrases the second prep. is omitted, if the comparison precedes the thing compared [cp. HA. 1007; G. 1025]. Schanz cites *Prot.* 337 E, *Theaet.* 170 A, *Rep.* 414 E, 520 E, 545 E, *Tim.* 27 B, 81 B, 91 D, *Legg.* 905 B. But the prep. is repeated, as here, *Rep.* 440 D, 553 B, 573 E, *Phaedo* 82 E, 115 B, *Phaedr.* 255 D, *Tim.* 73 D, 86 A, *Theaet.* 206 D. In *Phaedo* 67 D, and *Tim.* 79 A, the Ms. reading is in doubt. For the use of **πρός**, cp. below, 3 B, and *Apol.* 18 B: *ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς*. The comparison of the state to a mother is common; see *Crito*, *passim*, *Rep.* 414 E, 575 D, Aesch. *Septem*, 16 ff. 33. **τῶν πολιτικῶν**: neut. How intensely ironical this passage is, may be seen by comparison with *Gorg.* 521 D, where Plato, in similar terms, describes Socrates as the only true statesman. 34. **ὀρθῶς γάρ ἐστιν**: 'this *properly* means first caring for the young.' **ὀρθῶς** is repeated 2 C with emphasis in order to define it. 35. **τῶν νεῶν . . . ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως**: HA. 742, 885; G. 1102, 1372; B. 356, 593. In the repetition of *ἐπιμεληθῆναι* just before *Μέλητος*, there is clearly an intentional play on words, found also *Apol.* 25 C, 26 B. Schanz (*Einleit.*, p. 11) calls attention to the following expressions, which serve to characterize Euthyphro as an etymologist: the distinction of *δίκη* and *γραφή*, 2 A; *ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι*, 3 A; the puns on *διώκω*, 3 E, and *ἔπομαι*, 12 A; the point on *ὁρᾶν* and *καθορᾶν*, 5 C; the paronomasia *Δαιδάλου . . . Ταντάλου*, 11 D. See RD. § 323. 37. **εἰκός**: regularly followed by aor. inf. 38. **καὶ δὴ καί**: HA. 1042 c; B. 441. N. 1. 39. **ἐκκαθαίρει**: *weeds out*, continuing the metaphor suggested in *ὥσπερ γεωργὸν ἀγαθόν* and *τὰς βλάστας*. — **τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας**: 'those tender shoots, the young.' If the text is sound, as it seems to be, *τῶν νέων* must be gen. of designation, HA. 729 g; G. 1086. The comparison and the thing compared are run to- 2 C D 3 A

40 ὥς φησιν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθεὶς πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος τῇ πόλει γενήσεται, ὥς γε τὸ εἰκὸς ξυμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένῳ.

II. ΕΥΘ. Βουλοίμην ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὀρρωδῶ, μὴ τοὐναντίον γένηται. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι κακουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σέ. καί μοι λέγε, τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ
5 φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους; |

3 A gether. As often in Plato, constr. and diction are poetic, prob. intended to remind us that Meletus was a poet. Cp. Eur. *Med.* 1098: *τέκνων . . . γλυκερὸν βλάστημ'*, Soph. *O.T.* 717.

40. **ὥς φησιν**: 'to quote his words,' cp. below, 3 B, l. 9. Not a real quotation, though it is intended to make it so appear; so also, l. 7, *φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν*. Cp. *ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος*, below, 8 D, 10 D. — **ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο**: *next thereafter*. Note the pleonasm. — **δῆλον ὅτι**: *clearly*, HA. 1049, 1 a. **42. ὥς γε . . . ἀρξαμένῳ**: 'if the natural result follows from such a beginning.' **τὸ εἰκός** is subj.; often the art. is omitted and **εἰκός** is pred.; cp. l. 37, 2 D. The difference of constr. matters little to the thought.

II. **2. ἀτεχνῶς**: 'actually.' The word is almost confined in use to Plato and comedy, serving to introduce proverbs, metaphors, hyperbolic phrases, — in short, any expression not quite inevitable. In effect, therefore, it often asks pardon for using a strong expression which may not be quite dignified, somewhat as Engl. '*as it were*.' This may readily be seen by comparing such a collocation as that, *e.g.*, in *Apol.* 30 E, **ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν**. Its sphere is colloquial. Here it introduces the proverb **ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι**, which suggests that Socrates was really the Holy of Holies in the Athenian state. In all sacrificial libations a beginning was made, in order to begin properly, with Hestia; for this goddess, as the deified hearth, represented the focal point of family and state. In Athens, as elsewhere, there was in the *πρυτανεῖον* a *κοινὴ ἑστία τῆς πόλεως*, the center of the city's religious life. On the proverb, see Roscher, *Ausführl. Lexicon der griech. und röm. Mythologie*, I. ii., pp. 2615 ff. **4. καί μοι λέγε**: *just tell me*. This use of *καί* with imv. is common. — **τί καὶ ποιοῦντα**: 'what in the world does he charge you with doing to corrupt the young?' Cp. *τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν*, below, 3 A

ΣΩ. Ἄτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὕτω γ' ἀκοῦσαι. B
φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καινοὺς ποιοῦντα θεούς, τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν.

3 A 6 B, and Xen. *Hell.* 3. 3. 11: *τέλος αὐτὸν ἤροντο τί καὶ βουλόμενος ταῦτα πράττοι*, 'for what conceivable purpose he did it.' Here *καί* emphasizes and intensifies the question. Cp. RD. § 132.

B **6. ὦ θαυμάσιε**: the Greek employs a great variety of forms of address, for many of which English equivalents are wanting. Perhaps the most common are *ὦ φίλε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὦ ἀγαθέ, ὦ ἄριστε, ὦ βέλτιστε*. Besides these, the *Euth.* shows *ὦ θαυμάσιε*, 5 A, 8 A, D, *ὦ γενναῖε Εὐθύφρον*, 7 D, *ὦ μακάριε*, 12 A. The adj. *θαυμάσιος* has lost much of its original meaning in Plato (cp. RD. § 314); but it suggests the verb *θαυμάζω* in its proper connection. *ὦ μακάριε*, in like manner, *e.g.* 12 A below, and *Gorg.* 469 C, 471 E, suggests *σὲ γὰρ μακαρίζω* (ironical), which compare with *εὐδαίμων εἶ*, *Rep.* 422 E, and *ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ*, *Gorg.* 491 E. See Campbell, *Theaetetus*, App. F. (very inadequate). — **ὡς οὕτω γ' ἀκοῦσαι**: 'at first hearing.' *ὡς* c. inf. is used to limit an assertion, being closely akin to the usage in elliptical phrases, as, *e.g.*, *ὡς ἀπ' ὀμμάτων*, Soph. *O.C.* 15. For the 'absolute' inf., which may stand without *ὡς*, see HA. 956; G. 1534; B. 642, 1; GMT. 776–8. 3 B Here *οὕτω* is used as in *οὕτω . . . ἀποδεχώμεθα*, 9 E, meaning 'simply,' and denoting more strongly than *ὡς* that there are mental reservations; and *γε* further strengthens *οὕτω*. It is possible, however, that *γε* really belongs to *ὡς*; cp. *Rep.* 432 B, *ὥς γε οὕτωσὶ δόξαι*, and many other passages. **7. φησὶ γάρ**: see Plato's version of the indictment quoted above on 2 E, Xen. *Mem.* 1. 1. 1: *ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρων· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.* Laert. Diog. 2. 5. 40. — **ποιητὴν . . . θεῶν**: Meletus was a poet, hence the phrase, used to caricature him. It heightens the effect of the absurdity (*ἄτοπα*) of the charge and makes it appear more spiteful. The wording of the charge in Xen. might refer with equal propriety to the grotesque insinuations in Ar. *Clouds*; but the term *δαιμόνια* suggests to Euthyphro the thought of Socrates' *δαιμόνιον*. **8. οὐ νομίζοντα**: *νομίζειν* denotes not only belief in the existence of the gods (*ἡγεῖσθαι*), but adds the idea of *νόμος*, — religious conformity, *recognizing*, *acknowledging*; it therefore expresses most fully the Greek con-

ΕΥΘ. Μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῂς σαυτῷ ἑκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστή-

3 B ception corresponding to our *having faith*. Cp. L. Schmidt, *Ethik der alt. Griechen*, II. 48. **9. ὥς φησιν**: returns to the *φησί* which opened the sentence, and adds a doubt as to the alleged motives of Meletus. Cp. the repetition of *φησί Prot.* 345 CD. From the language of this passage no conclusion can be drawn as to the importance attaching to the several counts of the indictment. Here the question merely is: How, on the view of Meletus, is Socrates corrupting the youth? The answer is, *By setting an example of irreligion*. (On the indictment, see the Introd. to Schanz's edition of the *Apol.*) An ulterior motive is indeed hinted at in ὥς *φησιν*, but whether it was the personal motive mentioned *Apol.* 23 E, cannot be determined.

10. μανθάνω . . . ὅτι δή: 'ah, I apprehend. It is, forsooth, because,' etc. ὅτι δή is to be referred to *φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν*. Cp. 9 B, below. — **τὸ δαιμόνιον**: Plato (*Apol.* 31 D) and Xenophon (*Mem.* I. 1. 2) take the same view of the case as Euthyphro. The psychological phenomenon is still unexplained. It was clearly, to Socrates, a private substitute for *μαντική* — an inspiration or illumination coming from the gods. It was an agency of the gods (*τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον*, *Apol.* 40 B), not itself a divinity. Acc. to Plato, it exercised only the power of veto; acc. to Xenophon, it even prompted to action, not only on the part of Socrates, but also of his friends. The difficulties in the way of a rational interpretation of the phenomenon are enhanced by the circumstance that Plato appears to employ it occasionally in a spirit of pleasantry to lend interest to the character of Socrates in the dramatic development of a dialogue; while Xenophon, for other reasons, is not an unimpeachable witness. For fuller discussion, see Riddell, *The Apology of Plato*, App. A; Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen*, II. i., 474–491; Gomperz, *Griech. Denker*, II. 70 ff. **11. γίγνεσθαι**: 'occurred.' Note that *γίγνεσθαι* is the standing expression for the occurrence of the *δαιμόνιον*. — **καινοτομοῦντος**: *cutting a new drift*, a mining term; others, with less reason, consider it as referring to new coinage. In Plato it is always used metaphorically, of revolutionary innovation. Cp. 5 A, 16 A. **13. ὡς διαβαλῶν**: HA. 969 c, 978; G. 1563, 4, 1574; B. 653, 5; 656, 3.

ριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς
15 πολλούς. καὶ ἐμοῦ γάρ τοι, ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ |
ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλ- C
λοντα, καταγελῶσιν ὡς μαινομένου. καίτοι οὐδὲν ὅτι
οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα ὧν προεῖπον, ἀλλ' ὅμως φθονοῦσιν
ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρὴ
20 φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ὁμόσε ἰέναι.

III. ΣΩ. Ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν κατα-
γελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα. Ἀθηναίοις γάρ

3 B **14. πρός**: see note on 2 C, l. 32. **15. ἐμοῦ καταγελῶσιν**: HA. 752; G. 1123; B. 370. Note Euthyphro's haste to tell his story.
C **16. τὰ μέλλοντα**: *sc.* ἔσεσθαι. **17. μαινομένου**: Euthyphro, as a *μάντις*, might be so called in view of his inspiration (*μανία*, cp. *Phaedr.* 244 BC); but the scoffers meant that he was *mad*. **17. καίτοι . . . ἀλλ' ὅμως**: an instance of the so-called palindromic constr. An apparent concession is made, then practically withdrawn. *καίτοι* refers to the preceding statement, but is correlative with the following *ἀλλ' ὅμως*. Cp. *Phaedo* 68 E (*bis*), *Symp.* 177 E; Ar. *Ran.* 43; *Charm.* 175 C; similarly *καίτοι . . . δέ*, *Apol.* 40 B, and *καίτοι . . . ἀλλά*, *Phaedo* 77 A. Cp. 12 C, 13 CD. — **οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ**: HA. 1003a; G. 1035; B. 485, N. 1. **18. φθονοῦσιν . . . τοῖς τοιούτοις**: for the *φθόνος*, cp. *Apol.* 28 A. With great condescension Euthyphro classes Socrates with himself as an adept in religious lore. **19. αὐτῶν . . . φροντίζειν**: HA. 742; G. ~~1002~~; B. 356. Cp. 4 D 3 C *οὐ δεῖν φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου*. **20. ὁμόσε ἰέναι**: Lat. *comminus ire*, *close with the enemy*; 'tackle,' as we may say familiarly; so *Euthyd.* 294 D *ὁμόσε ᾔτην τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν*, *they tackled the questions*. Plato seems always to be conscious that the phrase is Homeric (cp. N 337), and uses it metaphorically. See *Rep.* 610 C, and cp. *Phaedo* 95 B *Ὁμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες*.

III. **1. ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλά**: the postponement of the conj. occurs more freq. with *δέ*, esp. often in Plato and Pindar (Gildersleeve on *Ol.* 1. 36). Its effect is to give pause, and add emphasis to the adversative. — **τὸ μὲν κ.**: *μέν solitarium*, so-called, without answering *δέ*; common with *ἀλλά*, *at certe*, as here, or with other particles, as *μὲν οὖν*, *μὲν δή*, HA. 1037. 12; RD. § 242. **2. οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα**: 'a matter of no consequence'; cp. below, 3 E *οὐδὲν ἔσται πρᾶγμα*, 4 D *οὐδὲν ὂν πρᾶγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι*.

τοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιούτους, | θυμοῦνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε D δι' ἄλλο τι.

ΕΥΘ. Τούτου οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι.

3 C **4. μὴ μέντοι**: *μή* because of the implied cond. — **διδασκαλικὸν . . . σοφίας**: for gen. cp. HA. 754 b. Socrates says, *Apol.* 33 A, that he never was the teacher of any man (ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην); Plato here saves himself by saying οἴωνται. But nothing more is meant than having adherents, and this Socrates undoubtedly did. Critias and Charicles (Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2. 31) published an edict, directed primarily against Socrates, — λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν, *not to teach the art of argument*. Socrates disclaimed ability to teach, because he professed to know nothing capable of being taught, and because he believed that truth could be reached only through coöperation of minds — his so-called philosophical 'midwifery,' μαιευτική, which required dialogue (διαλέγεσθαι, from which διαλεκτική is derived). The notion, moreover, is here introduced by Plato, chiefly to prepare the way for the demand to be instructed by Euthyphro. **5. ὃν δ' ἂν . . .**: the clause is virtually in the dat. with θυμοῦνται, HA. 764. 2; G. 1160; B. 376. — 3 C τοιούτους, as often (cp. 4 C, 4 D, 6 B, etc.), refers vaguely to what precedes. **6. εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ . . .** D **εἴτε**: emphasis on first alternative, cp. RD. § 307. The formula εἴτε . . . εἴτε with οὖν occurs repeatedly, οὖν standing usually after the first εἴτε (as here and *Apol.* 27 C, *Prot.* 333 C), once after the second (Soph. *Phil.* 345), and *Apol.* 34 E after both, without material difference to the thought. Note the simple dat. φθόνῳ, followed by διά c. acc. **8. τούτου οὖν πέρι**: regarding his capacity as a teacher; for πέρι, cp. HA. 109 a; G. 116, 1; B. 68. — **ὅπως ποτέ**: *just how*. This use of the indef. ποτε should be noted; it is esp. common in Plato with forms of τίς, *when a definition is required*, as *e.g.*, in 11 A below, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν. Cp. esp. *Meno* 72 B ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας, ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν. Other words are similarly used, as *e.g.*, τίς δή 13 D, τί δήποτ' 15 A. As ποτέ is here reënforced by δή, it is often associated with καί; cp. *Gorg.* 455 A φέρε δή, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν [see Frohberger

ΣΩ. Ἴσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν· ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὅτιπερ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως, εἴ τίς μου ἐθέλοι ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιέν μου καταγελᾶν, ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη ἀηδὲς | παίζοντας καὶ E
γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ διαγαγεῖν, εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτ' ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν.

3 D on Lys. 12. 29 (App.)]. Again, καί alone may take its place: cp. *Gorg.* 474 C καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ' ἐρεῖς with *Gorg.* 467 C ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι λέγεις.

10. σὺ μὲν . . . ἐγὼ δέ: the pronouns give only so much emphasis as is necessary for the contrast. 12. φιλανθρωπίας: see the paper by Higginson, *Proceed. Amer. Phil. Ass'n.* V. 20 ff. 13. ἐκκεχυμένως: G. 366. 14. ἄνευ μισθοῦ: *Apol.* 23 C Socrates says he is in extremest poverty (ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμί); but he regards it as dishonorable to require pay for his counsels and instruction, if so it may be called (*Gorg.* 520 E), and converses freely (ἐκκεχυμένως) with all who may desire (*Apol.* 33 A). He repeatedly emphasizes his own refusal of pay in contrast with the conduct of the Sophists, whom he loves to ridicule (*Apol.* 19 D, 31 B, *Rep.* 337 D, 344 E). — προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως: equiv. to προστιθείην ἂν ἡδέως, the part. 3 D being preferred because more nearly parallel to ἄνευ μισθοῦ; the verb is used abs., hence no need of supplying μισθόν. 16. μέλλοιεν . . . σπουδάσονται: note the mixed cond. The change from the ideal opt. to the indic. marks the latter alternative as the more likely to take place. Cp. 9 C. Att. prose regularly makes the fut. of σπουδάζω in the mid. Cp. B. 507. On the use of the mid., see Rutherford, *The New Phrynichus*, p. 138 and pp. 376 ff. He says, p. 138: "All verbs expressing the exercise of the senses, or denoting any functional state or process, have the inflections of the mid. voice either throughout or in the fut. tense." σπουδάζω does not strictly fall into this classification, but may be regarded as somewhat analogous. There are, however, many semi-deponents of which Rutherford takes no account. 19. τοῦτ' E
ἤδη: 'here we come to a matter

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμήν.

IV. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ δή σοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τίς ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις;

ΕΥΘ. Διώκω.

ΣΩ. Τίνα;

ΕΥΘ. Ὃν διώκων αὖ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι. 4

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις;

3 E which,' etc. Cp. *Rep.* 436 A τόδε δὲ ἤδη χαλεπόν. Here ἤδη, as οὔπω (*Rep.* 353 C, 370 D) and οὐκέτι (*e.g. Rep.* 430 D, 468 B, *Legg.* 792 C), applies to an ideal limit, not to objective time; the reference is to a stage of the argument not yet reached (οὔπω), or reached (ἤδη, sometimes, in neg. clauses, οὐκέτι; cp. οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, *Gorg.* 503 A), or already past (οὐκέτι). *Rep.* 348 E (ἤδη and οὐκέτι) and *Gorg.* 486 E, 487 E, are good examples to study. Note the emphasis on τοῦτο. — **ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται . . . τοῖς μάντεσιν**: cp. Xen. *Mem.* 1. 1. 6 περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο μαντευσομένους ἔπεμπεν (*sc.* ὁ Σωκράτης) εἰ ποιητέα. Socrates facetiously adopts the phraseology of the soothsayers. By saying ὑμῖν, he declines to be classed with Euthyphro; contrast ἡμῖν πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις, 3 C.

22. σύ τε . . . οἶμαι δέ: a slight anacoluthon (on which see Frohberger on Lys. 25. 34 App.), not infrequent when the second member is to be emphasized; here it marks Euthyphro's eagerness to direct attention to his own case. Cp. note on ὥσπερ ἐμοί, 2 A. — **κατὰ νοῦν**: *to your mind.* This sample of Euthyphro's prophetic powers is not calculated to win respect; but the kindly wish is father to the thought. — **δίκην**: Euthyphro again employs the generic term, for the more specific, γραφήν; see note on 2 A. — **καὶ ἐμέ**: HA. 940 b; B. 630, N. The idiomatic phrase οἶμαι δὲ καί is frequent in Plato, taking sometimes the acc. and sometimes (as οἶμαι may be parenthetic) the nom. Cp. *Lach.* 180 A οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λάχητα τόνδε and *Rep.* 608 D οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σύ.

IV. **1. ἔστιν δὲ δή**: note that δὲ δή, as usual, marks the transition to a new subject. Say, 'well, then, but what of your trial?' For δὲ δή, see 4 B. 4 E, 7 C, 13 B. **2. φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις**: tech. terms in law, HA. 820; G. 1241; B. 513; for αὐτήν, see HA. 715 b; G. 1051; B. 333. **5. αὖ**: *again;* see 3 C. **6. τί δέ**: merely announces a question.

ΕΥΘ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὅς γε τυγχάνει ὢν εὖ μάλα πρεσβύτης.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὗτος;

ΕΥΘ. Ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ.

ΣΩ. Ὁ σός, ὦ βέλτιστε;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ τί τὸ ἔγκλημα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ΕΥΘ. Φόνου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἡράκλεις! ἦ που, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀγνοεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει . . . οὐ γὰρ οἶμαί γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ | πόρρω B
που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

4 A Cp. 7 D. — **πετόμενόν τινα διώκεις**: a pun, *διώκω* standing in both the legal and the literal sense; in the latter the phrase is proverbial, as we speak of 'a wild-goose chase.' Cp. *Euthyd.* 291 B.

7. ὅς γε: causal, *qui quidem*. Cp. 6 B *οἵ γε αὐτοί*, κτλ. **8. εὖ μάλα**: εὖ intensive; cp. *Charm.* 154 B *εὖ μάλα . . . μειράκιον*, Xen. *Cyrop.* 8. 7. 1 *μάλα δὴ πρεσβύτης ὤν*, *Phaedo* 92 D *εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι*. Sometimes, however, *μάλα* reënforces *εὖ*. Cp. Epic *εὖ πάντες* and *μάλα πάντες*, *quite all*. **11. ὁ σός**: the repetition, in the form of a question, marks surprise. Cp. *Rep.* 328 A. **12. πάνυ μὲν οὖν**: see note on *πάνυ γε*, 2 B. **13. τίνος ἡ δίκη**: almost = *τίς ἡ δίκη*, 3 E. The gen. denotes that *for which* an action is laid, as *δίκη κακηγορίας*, *an action for libel*. So *φόνου* in l. 14.

15. Ἡράκλεις! expressing (with or without *ὦ*) great astonishment, GS. 24. Cp. Tac. *Ann.* 4. 28. 1 miserarum ac saevitiae exemplum atrox, reus pater, accusator filius. Plato, *Lys.* 208 E Ἡράκλεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μῶν μή τι ἠδίκηκας τὸν πατέρα ἢ τὴν μητέρα; — **ἦ που**: *surely*, *indeed*, ironical. **16. ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει**: evidently there is here a lacuna. We may supply from 9 A *τὸ ἐπεξιέναι φόνου τὸν υἱὸν πατρί* (with Schanz) or from the immediate context *τὸ τῷ πατρὶ φόνον ἐγκαλεῖν* (with Wohlrab). See App. **17. τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος**: 'the part of anybody taken at random.' HA. 732 c; G. 1094. 1. Cp. *παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ*, *Crito* 47 B. The aor. part. *ὁ ἐπιτυχών* is regularly used in this sense. So, too, *ὁ τυχών* and *ὁ προστυχών*. **18. σοφίας**: HA. 757; G. 1092; B. 360. Cp. *Crat.* 410 E *πόρρω ἤδη, οἶμαι, φαίνομαι*

ΕΥΘ. Πόρρω μέντοι νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεὼς ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός; ἢ δῆλα δή; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ὑπέρ γε ἀλλοτρίου ἐπεξῄεισθα φόνου αὐτῷ.

ΕΥΘ. Γελοῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οἴει τι διαφέρειν, εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκεῖος ὁ τεθνεώς. ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο μόνον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκῃ ἔκτεινεν ὁ κτείνας εἴτε μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκῃ, ἐᾶν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάνπερ ὁ κτείνας συνέστιός σοι καὶ ὁμοτράπεζος ᾖ. |

4 B **σοφίας ἐλαύνειν.** The metaphor in **ἐλαύνοντος** is derived from the race-course.

19. μέντοι: attached closely to **νὴ Δία**. Cp. *Apol.* 35 D **ἄλλως τε μέντοι νὴ Δία πάντως**, where **μέντοι νὴ Δία** divides **ἄλλως τε πάντως**. **20. τῶν οἰκείων τις**: acc. to Greek law, all **δίκαι φονικαί**, *i.e.* prosecutions for manslaughter, etc., had to be brought either by the person assailed or by his kindred. The case of Euthyphro is therefore quite exceptional, as will appear in the sequel. It has been conjectured that the workman (**πελάτης**, see 4 C) stood to Euthyphro in the relation of an hereditary dependent, so that the latter could legally represent him as if he were his slave. See Meier u. Schoemann, *Att. Process*, I. 199, N. 10. **21. ἢ δῆλα δή**: cp. *Prot.* 309 A, *Rep.* 452 A; **ἢ δῆλον δή**, *Soph.* 267 D. HA. 635 a; RD. §§ 17, 42. Cp. **οὐδέτερα**, 9 D. **22. φόνου**: HA. 745 a; G. 1121; B. 367. **23. διαφέρειν**: *i.e.* to him as a moral agent; in point of law, there was a great difference. **25. φυλάττειν**: 'regard, consider'; by a natural catachresis, almost = **σκοπεῖν**. Cp. *Apol.* 28 B **ἀλλ' οὐκ ⟨οἴει δεῖν⟩ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερα, κτλ.** **26. εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκῃ**: there were certain circumstances that constituted a **φόνος δίκαιος**, or justifiable homicide, *e.g.* killing one unintentionally, or in self-defense; killing an adulterer; and possibly tyrannicide. Cp. Dem. 23. 51 ff. **27. ἐάνπερ ὁ κτείνας**: Euthyphro considers the desire to avoid contact with bloodguiltiness a sufficient motive for violating tradition and the formal requirements of the law relative to bringing forward an accusation. He alleges none of the altruistic motives for punishment mentioned *Gorg.* 480 D. For the **μίασμα** resulting from fellowship with the murderer and the criminal generally, see Antipho, *Tetral.* 1. 1. 10; *Or.* 5. 10; Horace, *C.* 3. 2. 26 ff. **κτείνας**, for the regular Att. **ἀποκτείνας**, is a bit of legal archaism, as may be seen in Demosthenes, *passim*.

ἴσον γὰρ τὸ μίασμα γίγνεται, ἐὰν ξυνῇς τῷ τοιούτῳ C
ξυνειδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀφοσιοῖς σεαυτόν τε καὶ ἐκεῖνον τῇ
δίκῃ ἐπεξιών. ἐπεὶ ὅ γε ἀποθανὼν πελάτης τις ἦν
ἐμός, καὶ ὡς ἐγεωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ, ἐθήτευεν ἐκεῖ

4 C **29. τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξιών**: the dat. may be instrum., but is more prob. merely a variant of δίκην ἐπεξιών, to be constr. acc. to HA. 772; G. 1177; B. 392. Cp. *Clitopho* 408 D ἐπεξελθεῖν . . . τῷ πράγματι, *to follow the matter up*; *Lys.* 215 D ἐπεξῄει τῷ λόγῳ; *Gorg.* 492 D οὐκ ἀγεννῶς . . . ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ; *Rep.* 349 A, 361 D; *Rep.* 366 E οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὔτ' ἐν ἰδίοις λόγοις ἐπεξῆλθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς κτλ. See note on ὁμόσε ἰέναι, 3 C, and cp. *Gorg.* 495 C ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ. Cp. also ἐπεξιέναι τινί (*alicui*), l. 22. **30. ἐπεὶ . . . γε**: concessive, as below, 8 D, 9 B, 11 D; so also *Crat.* 410 A; *Theaet.* 142 C; *Symp.* 187 A; *Gorg.* 471 E. This use of ἐπεί is very like Lat. *cum* concessive and adversative. The conj. merely indicates the existence of a relation; when the cause is not sufficient, we call it concessive or adversative. Cp. GL. §§ 586 f. — **πελάτης**: here = θής (15 D, cp. θητεύω in l. 31, and 9 A), *a free day-laborer*. As the victim was a freeman, the legal right of Euthyphro to represent him in court may well be doubted. But, doubtful as it is, it is not impossible. Cp. Dem. 47. 68–70. The suggestion that the πελάτης was legally a client seems to rest upon an anachronism; for that use of the term does not occur before the Roman conquest of Greece. But the paid laborer was at Athens little better than a slave (Lys. 12. 98), and, in the days of Augustus, Dionys. Hal. (*Antiq.* 2. 9) says that the Athenians treated the πελάται as purchased slaves. **31. ἐγεωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ**: Naxus, the largest of the Cyclades, became subject to Athens about 473 B.C., whereupon κληροῦχοι were established there. (Cp. Boeckh, *Staatshaush. der Athener*, I.[2] 540 a.) It is prob., but not certain, that Euthyphro's father was one of them; and since the power of Athens over the island ceased after Aegospotami (September, 405), his holdings as κληροῦχος also would have been lost. There remain to be accounted for, on that supposition, about five years before 399, when Socrates was tried. Whether statutes of limitation would here apply to vitiate the suit brought by Euthyphro, is one of the moot-points of Attic law. Possibly Euthyphro's case had no standing in court; or, again, Plato may here be guilty of one of the anachronisms which he admits for dramatic effect. 4 C

παρ᾽ ἡμῖν. παροινήσας οὖν καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν οἰκε-
τῶν τινι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτόν· ὁ οὖν
πατὴρ συνδήσας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ,
35 καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει δεῦρο ἄνδρα πευ-
σόμενον τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ, ὅτι χρείη ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ
τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ | δεδεμένου ὠλιγώρει τε καὶ ἠμέλει ὡς D
ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὂν πρᾶγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι·
ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν· ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ῥίγους καὶ
40 τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνῄσκει πρὶν τὸν ἄγγελον παρὰ τοῦ
ἐξηγητοῦ ἀφικέσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὅ

4 C **32. οἰκετῶν τινι**: note the hyperbaton of *τινι* to improve the rhythm; similarly, *Apol.* 33 D. Cp. *Gorg.* 451 AB. **33. ἀποσφάττει**: *ἀπο-* suggests a cruel and brutal deed. **36. τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ**: see below, 9 A; for the gen., see HA. 750; G. 1103; B. 365. The *ἐξηγηταί* ⟨*τῶν ὁσίων*⟩ were three in number, and were charged, among other offices, with the duty of directing complainants how to proceed in the difficult cases having to do with bloodguiltiness. It seems prob. that the members of this college were chosen by the Delphic oracle from a list of nine placed in nomination by the state. Here only one, their president, is mentioned. See Schöll, *Hermes* 6, pp. 36 ff. **37. τοῦ δεδεμένου**: HA. 742;
D G. 1102; B. 356. — **ὡς ἀνδροφόνου**: *sc.* *ὄντος*, in the pred. This is not a gen. abs., as some have thought. **38. οὐδὲν ὂν πρᾶγμα**: acc. abs., HA. 973; G. 1569; B. 658. The acc. abs. is here subjoined to a dependent part.; sometimes, as 4 D
Rep. 604 B, Xen. *Mem.* 2. 2. 13, Thuc. 7. 25. 7, acc. abs. and gen. abs. are combined, often for special reasons. Cp. l. 44 f. — **εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνοι**: *even if he* should *die*. The opt. marks the event as, from his point of view, unlikely; *καί* denotes death as the worst that could befall him. **39. οὖν**: the event is a natural consequence. Similar phrases are freq., as *Charm.* 155 B ὃ *οὖν καὶ ἐγίνετο* (cp. *Euthyd.* 283 A, *Rep.* 564 C) marking transition. — **ὑπὸ . . . ἀποθνῄσκει**: note pass. force, HA. 820; B. 513; GS. 171; *ὑπό* personifies, GS. 166. Cp. 12 A. **40. πρὶν . . . ἀφικέσθαι**: HA. 955; G. 1470 f.; GMT. 621, 622, 626. **41. ταῦτα**: HA. 719 c; G. 1060. The common constr. is *ἀγανακτεῖν τινι*, or *ἐπί τινι*. — **καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ**: *καί* denotes Euthyphro's wonderment at their displeasure; he thinks it quite unreasonable. Note *ἀγανακτεῖ . . . ὅτι*; elsewhere in Plato (*Apol.* 34 C, *Gorg.* 482 D, 518 C,

τε πατὴρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου τῷ πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι, οὔτε ἀποκτείναντι, ὥς φασιν ἐκεῖνοι, οὔτ' εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀνδροφόνου γε ὄντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, οὐ δεῖν φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου· ἀνόσιον γὰρ | εἶναι τὸ υἱὸν E πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξιέναι· κακῶς εἰδότες, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὁσίου τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, οὕτωσὶ ἀκριβῶς οἴει ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅπῃ ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὥστε τούτων οὕτω πραχθέντων, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ δικαζόμενος

4 D *Lach.* 194 A, *Legg.* 903 D) εἰ is used. Cp. HA. 926; G. 1423 f.; B. 598. 1; GMT. 494–496. *Gorg.* 519 B, ὡς. A similar showing is discovered by referring to Ast's *Lex. Plat.* for other similar expressions, such as ἀγαπῶ (no case of ὅτι?), χαλεπαίνω (*Rep.* 480, εἰ; *Menex.* 236 C, ἄν; *Euth.* 6 A, ὅτι), θαυμάζω (εἰ or ἐάν sixteen times, ὅτι four times), δεινόν ἐστι (εἰ six times, ὅτι twice). But Ast's enumeration is incomplete.

44. οὔτ' εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν: 'nor, were it never so true that he had killed him.' Here ὅτι μάλιστα does not really intensify the verb, but merely emphasizes the condition as a whole; similarly, below, 9 C, *Meno* 80 D, *Crat.* 435 A, *Charm.* 160 C, *Alc. I.* 106 A, 113 D. See note on 15 B. Compare μάλιστα and σφόδρα γε in answers. **45. οὐ δεῖν**: here δεῖν is Att. for δέον, acc. abs. Note the pleonasm of οὐ after οὔτε, and see RD. § 263: "The object of 4 D the pleonasm is, after premising the neg. as an announcement of the general form of the sent., to place it also in close contact with the word which it immediately concerns." — **φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου**: cp. 3 C οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν. **46. ἀνόσιον**: E *unholy.* The dialogue deals with Holiness, and this is the first real mention of the theme, although Euthyphro has before (4 C) used the word ἀφοσιοῖς. Socrates is not slow to catch the word and avail himself of it to lead up to the discussion of the principle at stake. **48. τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔχει**: 'what the divine law is in regard to': a case of prolepsis, HA. 878; so also περὶ τῶν θείων, ὅπῃ ἔχει, l. 50. The phrase is forced. **51. ὁσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων**: τε καί regularly connect opposites as well as similars. The καί before ὁσίων is explicative, not connective.

τῷ πατρί, ὅπως μὴ αὖ σὺ ἀνόσιον πρᾶγμα τυγχάνῃς πράττων;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέ τῳ ἂν διαφέροι | Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην.

V. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν μοι, ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρον, κράτιστόν ἐστι μαθητῇ σῷ γενέσθαι καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν λέγοντα, ὅτι ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδή με ἐκεῖνος αὐτοσχεδιάζοντά φησι καὶ καινοτομοῦντα

4 E 53. **ὅπως μὴ αὖ σύ**: for *ὅπως μή* after verbs of fearing, see HA. 887 a; G. 1379; B. 594, N.; GMT. 279. Schanz, *ad loc.*, cites as further examples, *Phaedo* 77 B, 84 B, *Symp.* 193 A, *Alc. II.* 150 B. But *Symp.* 193 A edd. read διασχισθησόμεθα. 55. **οὐδὲν . . . εἴη**: 'I should be of no use'; lit., *there would be no use of me.* Cp. *Apol.* 28 B, *Crito* 46 A. 56. **τῳ ἂν διαφέροι**: HA. 781 a; G. 1184; B. 388. Note that *τῳ* is 5 A *not* the art. — **Εὐθύφρων**: in thus speaking of himself in the third person, Euthyphro displays his self-complacency. Cp. *Phaedo* 91 C, Homer A 240, Aesch. *Prom.* 306, Soph. *Ajax* 98, *O.C.* 3, Dem. 18. 79. Among poets it is often a rhetorical device, as *e.g.* in Horace; in Catullus it amounts to a mannerism. Note how Euthyphro passes from the third person to the first in **εἰδείην**. — **ἀνθρώπων**: HA. 748; G. 1117; B. 362. 1.

V. 1. **ἆρ' οὖν**: for the more common **ἆρ' οὖν οὐ** or **οὐκοῦν**, anticipating an affirmative answer; so also *Gorg.* 477 A, *Phaedo* 65 E, *Meno* 86 A, 89 B, *Crat.* 388 B. Cp. **ἆρα**, 6 A, for **ἆρ' οὐ**. 2. **μαθητῇ . . . λέγοντα**: HA. 941; G. 928. 1; B. 631. 1; RD. § 184 f. 3. **αὐτὰ ταῦτα**: HA. 716 b; G. 1054; B. 334. Cp. **ἃ προυκαλούμην αὐτόν**, l. 16. — **προκαλεῖσθαι**: for the procedure in court, see Gow, *A Companion to School Classics*, § 76. Before the trial (*πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς*) either party to the suit might offer the other a challenge (*πρόκλησις*) to take any steps with a view to a settlement, which, if declined, would possibly establish a presumption in favor of the challenger. In this case, the refusal would tend to impugn Meletus's alleged motives of public interest and make him appear to be acting from personal animosity. 4. **ὅτι**: G. 1477. — **ἔμπροσθεν**: HA. 666 a; G. 952. 1. 5. **περὶ πολλοῦ**: HA. 803. 1 b; B. 412. 1 B. 5 A

περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητὴς δὴ γέγονα σός — καὶ εἰ μέν, ὦ Μέλητε, φαίην ἄν, Εὐθύφρονα ὁμολογεῖς | σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὀρθῶς νομίζειν B
ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζου· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἐκεῖνον δὲ νουθετοῦντί τε καὶ κολάζοντι — καὶ ἂν μή μοι πείθηται μηδὲ ἀφίῃ τῆς δίκης ἢ ἀντ' ἐμοῦ γράφηται σέ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ἃ προυκαλούμην αὐτόν;

ΕΥΘ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄρα με ἐπιχειρήσειε γράφεσθαι, εὕροιμ' ἄν, ὡς | οἶμαι, ὅπῃ σαθρός C
ἐστιν, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγώ τοι, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ταῦτα γιγνώσκων μαθητὴς ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σός, εἰδώς, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος πού τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν,

5 B 9. **τὰ τοιαῦτα**: HA. 718; G. 1058; B. 330. 10. **εἰ δὲ μή**: 'otherwise.' — **τῷ διδασκάλῳ**: virtually in appos. with *ἐκείνῳ*. Cp. the common constr. of *ἄλλος*. 11. **λάχε δίκην**: see Gow, *op. cit.*, p. 132, n. 2: "It would seem that plaintiffs balloted for the order in which their cases should be taken; hence *δίκην λαχεῖν* was practically to lodge a claim at law." 12. **διαφθείροντι**: note the double meaning, explained by *διδάσκοντι* and *κολάζοντι*. 14. **ἀφίῃ τῆς δίκης**: cp. *τούτου ἀφίημί σε*, 9 C. 15. **λέγειν**: depends on *κράτιστον*, 5 A, l. 1. 17. **εἰ ἄρα**: HA. 1048. 1. *ἄρα* emphasizes
C the cond. 18. **ὅπῃ σαθρός ἐστιν**: 'his weak spot'; cp. Dem. 4. 44 *εὑρήσει τὰ σαθρὰ . . . τῶν* 5 C *ἐκείνου* ⟨*sc.* Φιλίππου⟩ *πραγμάτων αὐτὸς ὁ πόλεμος*. 19. **πολὺ ἂν πρότερον κτλ.**: 'it would sooner be a question of him than of me.' On the hyperbaton of *πολύ*, which limits *πρότερον*, see HA. 1062. Note the sudden change from the ideal (*εἰ . . . ἐπιχειρήσειε . . . εὕροιμ' ἄν*) to the contrary-to-fact condition (*ἂν . . . ἐγένετο*), vividly declaring the confidence of Euthyphro that the case will not arise. The opposite change takes place, *e.g.* 7 D, *Meno* 89 B, Xen. *Cyneg.* 12. 22. See below on 9 C. 23. **ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος**: the tone is contemptuous. *οὗτος* marks him, with all his previously men-

ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὀξέως καὶ ῥᾳδίως κατεῖδεν, ὥστε ἀσε-
βείας ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι, ὃ νῦν
δὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι διισχυρίζου· ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς
φῂς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν
ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ | ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον D
αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τοῦ μὲν ὁσίου πᾶν
τοὐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτῷ ὅμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ

5 C tioned qualities, as present to the minds of the interlocutors, though not there *in persona*. Cp. τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας, *Crito* 45 A, likewise scornful. — **οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν . . . κατεῖδεν**: οὐδέ goes with ὁρᾶν. There is here a play on words, ὁρᾶν = 'espy,' καθορᾶν = 'see through.' Cp. *Gorg.* 479 B, 524 E, 525 A. κατα- has here the same force ('throughout,' 'through and through,' 'from head to foot'), as in καταπεποίκιλται, 6 C. There may be a further point in the hint at ἐπιμελεῖσθαι contained in Μέλητος (Μέλητος ἀμελής); see above on 2 D. **24. ὥστε**: HA. 927; G. 1450; B. 595. **25. νῦν δή**: *just now*. **26. ποῖόν τι**: *of what nature?* But ποῖος alone often expresses a sense of 'contrast between the suggestion and the fact,' sometimes humorous, sometimes ironical or indignant. — **τὸ εὐσεβές** = τὸ ὅσιον in
D the *Euth.* **28. ταὐτόν ἐστιν κτλ.**: on ταὐτόν and ὅμοιον, see HA. 773 and a; G. 1175; B. 392. 2. on αὐτό, see HA. 688; G. 997. **29. τοῦ μὲν ὁσίου πᾶν τοὐναντίον**: *quite the opposite of the holy*. In Plato ὁ ἐναντίος, when applied to qualities, usu- 5 D
ally is constr. with the gen. **30. ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν κτλ.**: 'possessing as a whole some one characteristic aspect in reference to its being unholiness.' This is untechnical language. Cp. *Meno* 72 C οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἔν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσι, δι' ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, *Just so also in respect of the virtues: even though they be numerous and manifold, they yet possess one and all some one identical aspect in view of which they are virtues*. There is here no reference to hypostatized *Ideas*; only the definitional essence is required, in the common Socratic manner. No inference as to the date of the dialogue can be drawn from this usage, as it may occur in any work, even side by side with the more technical sense; cp. *Rep.* 435 B καὶ δίκαιος ἄρα ἀνὴρ δικαίας πόλεως κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶδος οὐδὲν διοίσει, ἀλλ' ὅμοιος ἔσται. The efforts to detect a significant difference between εἶδος and ἰδέα have failed. Cp. ἰδέα, εἶδος, and μορφή, *Rep.* 380 D. See App.

ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πᾶν, ὅτιπερ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;

ΕΥΘ. Πάντως δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

VI. ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί φῂς εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ΕΥΘ. Λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅσιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ
5 ἱερῶν κλοπὰς ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι

5 D 31. ὅτιπερ κτλ.: 'whatever is to be, is to pass for, unholy'; for μέλλῃ, see HA. 846; G. 1254; B. 533. 33. πάντως δήπου: a formula, expressing strong affirmation, freq. in answers.

VI. 1. λέγε δή: note δή (*then*) with the imv., as freq. Cp. 7 A, 10 A, 12 D (*bis*), 13 E.

First Definition of Holiness: '**Holiness is doing as I am now doing.**' Socrates has endeavored to prepare the way for a definition of holiness by winning assent to the statement that there is in all cases of holiness a constant characteristic which is of the essence of holiness. His next step is to seek to arrive at that constant and essential notion. Euthyphro does not see the significance of the principle he has admitted, and hence adduces what could at best be only a particular exemplification of holiness instead of disclosing the essence of holiness, as requested. His failure is not, however, without value. Had he better apprehended the procedure of definition, he could not have expressed so naïvely the popular notions which he entertained, and which are held by the unthinking even in our day. Before addressing himself to the proposed definition, Socrates expresses his disbelief of the legends which impute unworthy actions to the gods, and suggests that this may be the reason of his being brought to trial for impiety. Moreover, it is no uncommon thing to have the respondent offer particular instances in lieu of the required general definition. Fritzsche (*Proleg. ad Menon.*, p. 21, n. 6) cites as examples *Meno* 71 E, *Theaet.* 146 C, *Lach.* 190 E, *Hipp. Ma.* 287 E. Note that τοίνυν introduces a definition, as in 6 E, 12 E. 5 D

4. τῷ ἀδικοῦντι . . . ἐξαμαρτάνοντι: the second part., with the dependent phrases ἢ περὶ φόνους . . . τοιούτων, explains ἀδικοῦντι; ἀδικεῖν merely implies that the defendant committed the deed, whereas ἐξαμαρτάνειν adds the notion of culpability. The language is rather formal. 5. ἤ τι ἄλλο: depends on περί, as does κλοπάς.

ἐπεξιέναι, ἐάντε πατὴρ ὢν τυγχάνῃ ἐάντε μήτηρ ἐάντε
ἄλλος | ὁστισοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι ἀνόσιον· ἐπεί, E
ὦ Σώκρατες, θέασαι, ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ τεκμήριον τοῦ
νομίμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἤδη εἶπον, ὅτι
10 ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη οὕτω γιγνόμενα, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν
τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδ' ἂν ὁστισοῦν τυγχάνῃ ὤν· αὐτοὶ
γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν
θεῶν ἄριστον καὶ δικαιότατον, καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι
τὸν | αὑτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι, ὅτι τοὺς υἱεῖς κατέπινεν οὐκ 6
15 ἐν δίκῃ, κἀκεῖνόν γε αὖ τὸν αὑτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι'
ἕτερα τοιαῦτα· ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ

5 D **6. ἐπεξιέναι**: epexegetic inf., here, as usual, without the art. Cp. 11 A φιλεῖσθαι. *Meno* 80 A ναρκᾶν, *Phaedo* 61 A ποιεῖν; but *Phaedo* 92 A τὸ . . . εἶναι.

E **7. ἀνόσιον**: in the pred., while τὸ ὅσιον, above, is subj. — **ἐπεί**: causal, GMT. 718. Cp. *Gorg.* 473 E οὐκ οἴει ἐξελεγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς, ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί. *Don't you think you have been refuted, Socrates, when you are driven to say things that no living man would say? For — why, ask any one of those here present!* **8. τοῦ νομίμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει**: prolepsis, HA. 878. τὸ νόμιμον is almost identical with τὸ ὅσιον, as the verb νομίζειν expresses the attitude of the orthodox believer (see note on 3 B, above). Cp. *Phaedo* 108 A ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω; *Legg.* 861 D οὐ γὰρ ἂν νόμιμον οὐδ' ὅσιον ἂν εἴη. Euthyphro reverts to 5 E
νομίμου in νομίζοντες, l. 12. **9. ὅτι ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴη**: depends on εἶπον, 'I told others too ere now that this would be right if done in this manner' (οὕτω γιγνόμενα, cond., GMT. 472, 841). **10. μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν**: *sc.* ἀσεβεῖν, explains οὕτως ἔχει. **14. κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ**: 6 A
'gulped down, and unjustly, too,' imperf. of repeated action. οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ is an emphatic ἀδίκως, receiving further stress from its position. The drastic κατέπινεν is a quot. from Hes. *Theog.* 459 καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατέπινε μέγας Κρόνος. Cronus swallowed his children, because he knew that his son was destined to be the ruler of heaven and earth. **15. κἀκεῖνόν γε αὖ**: αὖ, *in turn*. The story is told by Hes. *Theog.* 154 ff. Uranus feared his sons, the Titans, and thrust them into Tartarus. Cronus lay in wait for him, and mutilated him with a sickle.

ἐπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περί τε τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩ. Ἆρά γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτ' ἔστιν, οὕνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι; διὸ δή, ὡς ἔοικε, φήσει τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν. νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ σοὶ

6 A 17. **αὐτοὶ . . . περὶ ἐμοῦ**: 'they express opinions inconsistent with each other in approving the actions of the gods and condemning mine.' The fifth century B.C. was a period of transition. The foundations of the old faith were crumbling, and a moralized creed was supplanting it. Xenophanes and Pindar had been aware of the unworthy character of the gods, as portrayed in the mythology, and had protested against the myths. Aeschylus set himself to reinterpret them in a sense conformable to his higher moral ideal. Sophocles remained neutral, and Euripides seems to have favored now the old, now the newer creed. Aristophanes carped at the new, without supporting the old. Among the men of greatest enlightenment, Socrates and Plato mark the virtual overthrow of the old polytheism. The multitude, however, seem to have been but lightly touched by the reformation. Euthyphro, as a man of the people, does not question the traditional faith. See Gomperz, *Griech. Denker*, II. 1 ff. Cp. the interesting discussion in Auct. *ad Herenn.* 2. 25. 39. 20. **ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα**: note the hyperbaton, HA. 1062. 6 A 21. **δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι**: *I scruple to accept*; for this sense of δυσχερῶς, see *Polit.* 294 A ἔμελλον γάρ σε διερωτήσειν ταῦτα πότερον ἀποδέχῃ πάντα, ἤ τι καὶ δυσχεραίνεις τῶν λεχθέντων and Eur. *Med.* 733 μῶν οὐ πέποιθας; ἦ τί σοι τὸ δυσχερές; In such connections πως, as the adv. to the indef. pron. τις, limits its adv., and here renders it more emphatic; see note on οὐ πάνυ τι, 2 B. The early Christian Fathers inveighed passionately against the immoralities imputed in Greek mythology to the supreme gods; but they added nothing to the protests of the ancient Greeks themselves (cp. Plat. *Rep.* 377 E ff., 408 C; Isocr. 11. 38 and Eur. *passim*). Eur. (*fr.* 294. 7) made bold to say εἰ θεοί τι δρῶσιν αἰσχρόν, οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοί, *If gods do aught that's base, no gods are they*. Cp. *Rep.* 408 C ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα οὐ πειθόμεθα αὐτοῖς ἀμφότερα, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θεοῦ ⟨*sc.* υἱὸς⟩ ἦν, οὐκ ἦν, φήσομεν, αἰσχροκερδής, εἰ δ' αἰσχροκερδής, οὐκ ἦν θεοῦ. 22. **εἰ καὶ σοί κτλ.**: note the redundancy of expression. Where two persons are juxtaposed, καί is often placed with

ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ τῷ εὖ | εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀνάγ- B
κη δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυγχωρεῖν. τί γὰρ καὶ
φήσομεν, οἵ γε αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν
εἰδέναι; ἀλλά μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίου, σὺ ὡς ἀληθῶς
ἡγεῖ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι;

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πόλεμον ἄρα ἡγεῖ σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ

6 A each, as in rel. clauses with ὅσπερ and ὥσπερ. Here the ξυν- in ξυνδοκεῖ further reënforces καί . . . καί. Cp. *Polit.* 277 A δεῖ δὲ μὴ σοὶ μόνῳ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κἀμοὶ μετὰ σοῦ κοινῇ συνδοκεῖν. Note reduplication of the neg., 4 D above, of γε, 13 E, and of αὖ, 14 E. See Frohberger, Lys. 14. 24 (App.); 19. 4 (App.). On ἡμῖν = ἐμοί, see GS. 54.

B **24. τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν**: *indeed, what* am *I to say?* See note on 3 A, l. 4. **25. αὐτοί**: prob. goes with εἰδέναι, though it may belong to ὁμολογοῦμεν. — **μηδὲν εἰδέναι**: we might have expected οὐδέν acc. to HA. 1024, G. 1611; but see GMT. 685. Cp. 12 B αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδέν. **26. ἀλλά**: 'nay,' freq. with imv. Cp. 14 D. — **πρὸς Φιλίου**: *sc.* Διός, 'by Zeus, patron god of friendship.' As here, *Gorg.* 500 B, 519 E. Cp. *Phaedr.* 234 E πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου. — **ὡς ἀληθῶς**: ὡς in this connection seems to be the abl. of the art., and ὡς ἀληθῶς almost = τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. But see Krüger, *Gr. Sprachl.* 69. 63. 8. Schanz gives the formula ἀληθῶς : ὡς 6 B ἀληθῶς :: ἀληθείᾳ : τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. He also notes that Plato, who affected the phrase, ceased to employ it in his latest works (*Phil.*, *Pol.*, *Tim.*, *Legg.*), but used ἀληθῶς with ἀληθείᾳ and τῇ ἀληθείᾳ instead. **29. ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν**: as μάντις, Euthyphro lays claim to recondite knowledge of things divine not shared by the *profanum vulgus*. His source of information was doubtless the Orphic writings (see Isocr. 11. 38 f., Lobeck, *Aglaophamus* 1. 602). **30. καὶ . . . καὶ . . . τε . . . καί**: the καί before πόλεμον is continuative; τε after λέγεται is correlative with the next καί; and τε in τά τε ἄλλα is correlative with καὶ δὴ καί. — **ἄρα**: for postponement of ἄρα, cp. *Gorg.* 472 D, 476 A (*bis*). — **τῷ ὄντι**: *in reality*. HA. 779 b. This formula alone, as Schanz has shown, occurs in Plato's earliest works, and in the latest works gives place to ὄντως, with which it alternates in the intermediate group of dialogues.

μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, οἷα λέγεταί τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε | ἄλλα C
ἱερὰ ἡμῖν καταπεποίκιλται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις
Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα ἀληθῆ φῶμεν εἶναι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον;

6 B **33. καὶ . . . καταπεποίκιλται**: we might have expected *οἵοις* after *καί* to conform to *οἷα* above; but Plato begins here to break with his first constr., which he wholly abandons at *καὶ δὴ καί*. Cp. *Rep.* 378 C *πολλοῦ δεῖ γιγαντομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον αὐτοῖς καὶ ποικιλτέον, καὶ ἄλλας ἔχθρας πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αὐτῶν.* *κατα-* suggests that the ornamentation is extensive and thoroughly done. — **ἀγαθῶν**: slightly ironical.

C **34. ἱερά**: means 'sacred objects' in general, not temples, as some have understood it. This is shown by the collocation *τά τε ἄλλα ἱερὰ . . . καὶ δὴ καὶ . . . ὁ πέπλος*. — **καὶ δὴ καί**: see note on 2 D. — **τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις**: for the dat., see HA. 782; G. 1192; B. 385. The festival of the Panathenaea was the most ancient and most important held at Athens. It was celebrated yearly, but from the time of Pisistratus the Great Panathenaea were held in the third year of every Olympiad, in the month of Hecatombaeon (July-August). The occasion commemorated the union of Attica under Theseus, and was sacred to Athene, the 6 C
patron deity of Athens, on whose traditional birthday, the 28th of the month, the festivities culminated in a grand procession to the Acropolis. The representation of this procession on the frieze of the Parthenon is justly celebrated. All the free inhabitants of the city participated in it, and escorted to the temple of the goddess on the Acropolis the splendid saffron-colored robe, the *peplus*. This garment had been begun nine months before by four virgins (*ἀρρηφόροι*), and was richly embroidered by skillful maidens and matrons (*ἐργαστῖναι*) with representations of the battle of the Giants and other scenes in which the goddess figured prominently. The *peplus* was carried at the head of the procession, spread on yards as a sail for a ship, which was moved on wheels, and was then draped about the statue of Athene Polias in the Erechtheum. See Frazer's *Pausanias* 2. 574. **36. ἀνάγεται**: *ἀνα-* because the Acropolis, as its name implies, is high ground; *ἄγεται* because of the procession accompanying the peplus. Cp. also *Rep.* 327 A.

ΕΥΘ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἄρτι εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἐάνπερ βούλῃ, περὶ τῶν θείων διηγήσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν μοι εἰς αὖθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσει· νυνὶ δέ, ὅπερ ἄρτι σε ἠρόμην, πειρῶ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν. οὐ γάρ με, | ὦ ἑταῖρε, τὸ πρότερον ἱκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἐρωτή- D
σαντα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι ποτ' εἴη. ἀλλά μοι εἶπες, ὅτι τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὅσιον ὄν, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνου ἐπεξιὼν τῷ πατρί.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ φῂς εἶναι ὅσια.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὅτι οὐ τοῦτό σοι διεκελευόμην, ἕν τι ἢ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅτιά ἐστιν· ἔφησθα

6 C 38. **μὴ μόνον** ⟨*sc.* ταῦτά⟩ **γε** ⟨*sc.* **φαθί**⟩: *μή* is deprecatory, RD. § 130; for *μὴ μόνον γε . . . ἀλλά*, see RD. § 157. — **ἄρτι**: refers to 6 B. 39. **περὶ τῶν θείων**: here almost *περὶ τῶν θεῶν*, which text is implied in the Armenian Version. 40. **εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι**: *certainly*, HA. 1049. 1 a. Here *εὖ οἶδα* is parenthetical, and *ὅτι* is superfluous. Cp. *Apol.* 37 B *ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων* and Dem. 9. 1 *πάντων οἷδ' ὅτι φησάντων γ' ἄν*, and see Frohberger on Lys. 13. 9 (App.).

VII. 1. **οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι**: *I should not be surprised*. Note that Socrates does *not* deny *ἐκπλαγήσει*. 2. **διηγήσει**: jussive fut., HA. 844; G. 1265; B. 583, N. 1; GMT. 66. 5. **ὅτι ποτ' εἴη**: see note on 3 D. 8. **ἔλεγον**: GMT. 57. 9. **ἀλλὰ γάρ**: introduces an objection; *γάρ* is not *γε*, HA. 1050. 4 d; B. 441, N. 2; RD. § 147. The collocation is common. Cp. 9 C, 14 B. 14. **εἶδος . . . ἰδέᾳ**: see note on 5 D. Here the terms are evidently identical in meaning. It is the notion that is desired, — the conception, or the essential characteristic in virtue of which things are, and are called, what they are. Here **ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος** and *ταύτην . . . αὐτὴν . . . τὴν ἰδέαν*, below, l. 18, have no

γάρ που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ | ὅσια ὅσια· ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις; E

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν, τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾖ, ὧν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτω βούλει, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕτω σοι φράσω.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν βούλομαί γε.

6 D reference to hypostatized Ideas (see note on 5 D), but **αὐτός** marks the notion as at once *essential* and by itself, that is, *distinguished from all else*.

E 19. **εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων κτλ.**: *looking to it and employing it as a model*. **ἀποβλέπω** in untechnical language means 'to have regard to,' 'to glance at'; cp. *Phaedo* 115 C, *Symp.* 220 E. Here the notion is only a norm serviceable as a test to insure correct thinking. Cp. *Gorg.* 474 D **τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα . . . εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάστοτε καλά**; 'But, sir, — all objects of beauty, do you not look to some model and so pronounce them beautiful on each occasion?' See also *Gorg.* 503 D, *Meno* 72 C. But the figure of the **παράδειγμα** played a large part in Plato's thought. For him the object of thought and 'being' or 'reality' are of necessity identical; hence, by a natural inference, the norm of true thinking becomes the absolutely real. 6 E This is the foundation for the traditional *Theory of Ideas*. Good instances of the technical use of **παράδειγμα** are *Parm.* 132 D, *Rep.* 472 C, and *Tim.* 28 A; but the untechnical meaning may be found in any dialogue, as *e.g. Legg.* 630 C. Note that **ἐκείνην** and **αὐτῇ** refer to the same object, RD. § 49. Usually **ἐκεῖνος** is employed for second mention, as in 14 D, but instances of the reverse order are not infrequent. Cp. Frohberger on Lys. 14. 28 (App.). For constr. of **παραδείγματι**, see HA. 777 a. 20. **ὧν**: for **τούτων ἅ**, HA. 996; G. 1032. 24. **φράσω**: 'will declare, make clear.' Cp. 10 A **ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι** and 6 C **πειρῶ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν**. 25. **ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε**: 'but, indeed, I *do* wish.'

SECOND DEFINITION: **'What is agreeable to the gods is holy; what is not, is unholy.'**

ΕΥΘ. Ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλὲς ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ | προσφιλὲς ἀνόσιον. 7

ΣΩ. Παγκάλως, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐζήτουν ἀποκρίνασθαί σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπεκρίνω. εἰ μέντοι ἀληθές, τοῦτο οὔπω οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δῆλον ὅτι ἐπεκδιδάξεις, ὡς ἔστιν ἀληθῆ ἃ λέγεις.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψώμεθα, τί λέγομεν. τὸ μὲν θεοφιλές τε καὶ ὁ θεοφιλὴς ἄνθρωπος ὅσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομισὲς καὶ ὁ θεομισὴς ἀνόσιος· οὐ ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ· οὐχ οὕτως ⟨εἴρηται⟩;

ΕΥΘ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρῆσθαι; |

6 E 27. μή: HA. 1026; G. 1613; B. 431. 1. 28. παγκάλως: καλῶς and similar words are oftenest used to express approval of the substance of a statement, as 9 E, 12 E, and 15 C, below, *Prot.* 352 D, *Phaedo* 79 D, and *Gorg.* 454 D, where καλῶς = ὀρθῶς or ἀληθῶς. Here, however, it is intended merely to commend the form of the definition, though it later proves untenable (cp. εἰ μέντοι ἀληθές). Euthyphro avoids his previous error of defining an universal by a particular; but, as we shall presently see, he is now guilty of what logicians call the erroneous conversion of an universal proposition. 30. ἐπεκδιδάξεις: 'you will follow up and complete your evidence that what you say is true.' Contrast δίδαξον, l. 18. Cp. *Prot.* 328 E.

7 A VIII. 1. τί λέγομεν: cp. τί λέγει, 9 E. The question asked is *whether what is said be true or false*; cp. the phrases, τὰ λέγειν 'to speak truth,' οὐδὲν λέγειν, 'to say what is not true,' and *Hipp. Ma.* 296 A ὡς φοβοῦμαι, τί ποτ' αὖ λέγομεν, 'I am greatly concerned whether what we now say be true or false.' Probably τί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου, 10 C, is to be understood in the same sense. 3. ταὐτόν . . . τὸ ἐναντιώτατον: both words in pred., but the former regularly has the art., the latter often, esp. when, as here, it = *the diametrical opposite*; cp. πᾶν τοὐναντίον, 5 D. Note the postponement of δέ to third place, possibly to avoid οὐ δέ, as Schanz suggests, though the combination does occur, as *e.g. Rep.* 328 C. 5. οὐχ οὕτως ⟨εἴρηται⟩; cp. 5 D.

ΕΥΘ. Δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. [εἴρηται γάρ.] B

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύ-
φρον, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἔχθρα ἐστὶν ἐν
αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ τοῦτο εἴρηται;

ΕΥΘ. Εἴρηται γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἔχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς, ὦ ἄριστε, ἡ περὶ τίνων
διαφορὰ ποιεῖ; ὧδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἆρ' ἂν εἰ διαφε-
ροίμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ, ὁπότερα πλείω,
ἡ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροὺς ἂν ἡμᾶς ποιοῖ καὶ
ὀργίζεσθαι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἐπὶ λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περί
γε τῶν τοιούτων ταχὺ ἂν | ἀπαλλαγείμεν; C

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος
εἰ διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μετρεῖν ἐλθόντες ταχὺ παυ-
σαίμεθ' ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς;

7 B **8. δοκῶ**: here = *δοκεῖ μοι, it seems so to me*. There are numerous examples; as, *e.g.*, *Rep.* 473 D, 554 B. The Greek tended strongly to use pers. expressions for impers. See note on 14 B. **10. ἀλλήλοις**: HA. 772; G. 1175; B. 392. Contrast HA. 748; G. 1117; B. 362. 1. **12. εἴρηται γάρ**: in 6 A ff. *γάρ* is often thus used in brief answers. Cp. *καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν* 6 D. **13. ἔχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργάς**: noteworthy, because such expressions are usually assimilated to the same number; here *ὀργαί* are probably conceived as particular outbursts of passion resulting from the disposition, *ἔχθρα*. Cp. Eur. *Med.* 1150 *ὀργὰς ἀφῄρει καὶ χόλον νεάνιδος*. **14. ἆρ' ἂν . . . ἄν**: for repetition of *ἄν*, see HA. 864; G. 1312; B. 439, N. 2; GS. 467. **15. ὁπότερα πλείω**: plur., because several aggregates are compared, and the decision is reached by reducing them to number. **17. ἤ**: does not here introduce the second part of a double question proper. We should say, 'should we not *rather*,' etc. The second clause excludes the first. — **περί γε**: for position of *γε*, see HA. 1037. 1 a. **20. περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος**: the terms are correlates and together make out the single notion, *size*; hence the art. is not repeated. So in l. 25, *περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου, i.e. weight*, 8 D *περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων*. When the art. is repeated the substantives are viewed as independent of each other, or they may be contrasted. 7 B C

ΕΥΘ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπί γε τὸ ἱστάναι ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου διακριθεῖμεν ἄν;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροί γε ἂν ἀλλήλοις εἶμεν καὶ ὀργιζοίμεθα; ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρόν σοί ἐστιν. ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος | σκόπει, εἰ τάδε ἐστὶ τό τε δίκαιον D καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. ἆρα οὐ ταῦτά ἐστιν, περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἱκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνώμεθα. καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ διαφορά, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρον: οὐκ εἴπερ τι διαφέρονται, διὰ ταῦτα διαφέροιντ' ἄν;

7 C See Krüger, 58. 2. 1: RD. § 237. Note 9 C **τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μή**, 15 E **τά τε ὅσια καὶ μή**, 12 E **τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή**. **22. τῆς διαφορᾶς**: HA. 748; G. 1117; B. 362. 1.

24. τὸ ἱστάναι: *weighing*. Usually the verb has some addition, such as ζυγῷ, ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ, ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ, or σταθμῷ. As here, Ar. *Pax*, 1249. **28. περὶ τίνος δὲ . . . καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν**: HA. 1012; G. 1601. The phrase ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν = ἐπὶ τίνος κρίσιν by a transference quite common in Lat.; cp. *ob eam iram*, Livy 21. 52, and similar examples. **31. ἐμοῦ λέγοντος**: for the gen. abs., see τόδε δέ σον ἐνενόησα ἅμα λέγοντος, 9 C. — **τό τε δίκαιον . . . καὶ κακόν**: in appos. with τάδε. For the omission of the art., see note above on l. 20. Cp. *Gorg.* 450 D οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττευτική γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι. For the thought, cp. *Alc. I.* 111 E ff. **35. ὅταν γιγνώμεθα**: not quite, but almost = ἑκάστοτε. The limitation is important, since it is quite possible to differ without hatred. **37. αὕτη**: in the pred. and = τοιαύτη. **39. τί δὲ οἱ θεοί**: 'but what of the gods?' Cp. τί δὲ ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετική; 13 D, and *Apol.* 25 A

ΕΥΘ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε | Εὐθύφρον, E
ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ
καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά· οὐ γὰρ ἄν που
45 ἐστασίαζον ἀλλήλοις, εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων διεφέροντο·
ἦ γάρ;

ΕΥΘ. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἅπερ καλὰ ἡγοῦνται ἕκαστοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ
καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων
50 μισοῦσιν;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ταὐτὰ δέ γε, ὡς σὺ φῄς, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγοῦν-
ται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικα· περὶ ἃ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες | στα- 8
σιάζουσί τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις. ἆρα οὐχ οὕτω;

55 ΕΥΘ. Οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Ταὔτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, μισεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν
καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομισῆ τε καὶ θεοφιλῆ ταὔτ' ἂν εἴη.

7 D **τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; τί δέ** here is akin to the usage seen in 4 A and 8 B. Cp. also *τί δὲ δή*, 14 A. — **εἴπερ τι διαφέρονται**: note the restriction, which is regular with *εἴπερ*; it implies disbelief of the alleged dissensions among the gods. Cp. the clauses with *εἴπερ* in 8 DE. The clause states the general hypothesis, and *διαφέροιντ' ἄν* is the apod. of a particular ideal supposition, not expressed, which is based upon it. Cp. *Apol.* 29 D. See note on *ταὔτ' ἂν εἴη*, 8 A.

41. **πολλὴ ἀνάγκη**: Plato is fond of reënforcing *ἀνάγκη*, in the manner of colloquial speech, with such words as *ἅπασα* (*Rep.* 381 C), *πᾶσα* (*Phaedo* 67 A), and *μεγάλη* (*Rep.* 485 E), besides *πολλή*, which occurs most freq. 7 D

43. **ἄλλοι ἄλλα**: HA. 704 a. E

46. **ἦ γάρ;** 'is it not so?'

52. **ταὐτὰ δέ γε**: *γε* belongs to *ταὐτά*, yielding its normal position to *δέ*. Other instances of *δέ γε* are 10 E, 13 B, 14 A.

57. **ταὔτ' ἂν εἴη**: for accent of *ταὔτ'*, see HA. 107; G. 120. The opt. is potential; the deferential hesitation is assumed in the interest of urbanity, not to express a real doubt. Cp. 13 D *ὑπηρετική τις ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη θεοῖς*; 14 C *ἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς ὁσιότης ἂν εἴη*; 14 E *ἐμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἴη*. On this use of the potential opt., see GS. 434–436. The 8 A

ΕΥΘ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν εἴη, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΥΘ. Κινδυνεύει.

IX. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὃ ἠρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ θαυμάσιε. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτό γε ἠρώτων, ὃ τυγχάνει ταὐτὸν ὂν ὅσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον· ὃ δ' ἂν θεοφιλὲς ᾖ, καὶ θεομισές ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν. ὥστε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν | πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, B εἰ τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν Διὶ προσφιλὲς ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἐχθρόν, καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἡφαίστῳ φίλον, τῇ δὲ Ἥρᾳ ἐχθρόν· καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκείνοις κατὰ τὰ αὐτά.

8 A tone of diffident question or assertion is peculiarly appropriate to Socrates, since he professes to seek instruction from Euthyphro.

60. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ: 'on this view'; others understand, 'acc. to your definition.' λόγος clearly = 'definition' in 9 D. The opinion is not adopted by Socrates, and contradicts 7 A. **61. κινδυνεύει**: see note on 2 C.

IX. **2. ὃ τυγχάνει κτλ.**: 'that which, while self-identical, is holy as well as unholy'; cp. 5 D, 7 A. Here *ταὐτὸν ὄν* go together, and the *ὄν* usual with *τυγχάνει* is omitted, on which see HA. 984 a; GMT. 902. **3. ὃ δ' ἂν θεοφιλὲς ᾖ**: HA. 914 B; G. 1431; GMT. 532. **4. ὥστε**: *consequently*; cp. 9 C. **6. τοῦτο δρῶν**: just as οὗτος (cp. 7 B *καὶ τοῦτο εἴρηται*) and οὕτω (cp. 9 D *εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὕτω . . . διδάξεις*) are used in referring to that which has just been described, so too δρᾶν resumes the verb, as we use 'do'; τοῦτο (or αὐτὸ) δρᾶν is the standing phrase for 'to do so.' See Morris on Thucyd. 5. 2. Note *ποιεῖν* in *ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων*, l. 5, and δρᾶν in *τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν*, 8 D. **8. τῇ δὲ Ἥρᾳ ἐχθρόν**: Hera cast her son Hephaestus from Olympus into Oceanus because he was born lame; he, in revenge, sent her a golden throne with secret chains with which she was bound when she sat upon it. See Hom. Σ 394–405, Pausan. 1. 20. 2. Allusion is made to the legend also in *Rep.* 378 D. **9. καὶ ἐκείνοις**: *sc.* τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν φίλον *ποιεῖς τῷ δὲ ἐχθρόν*. Here εἴ τις ἄλλος implies a plurality of gods; hence the plural. 8 B

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε τούτου τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι ἐκεῖνον, ὃς ἂν ἀδίκως τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἤδη τινὸς
15 ἤκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς τὸν ἀδίκως | ἀποκτεί- C
νοντα ἢ ἄλλο ἀδίκως ποιοῦντα ὁτιοῦν οὐ δεῖ δίκην διδόναι;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύονται ταῦτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ἀδι-
20 κοῦντες γὰρ πάμπολλα, πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀδικεῖν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὅμως οὐ δεῖν φασὶ σφᾶς διδόναι δίκην;

8 B **12. ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ κτλ.**: 'maintain, in opposition one to another, that he ought not.' For the dat., see HA. 772; G. 1175; B. 392. 2. Cp. ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς . . . οὐ δεῖ, l. 15, and l. 26 λέγειν οὐδ᾽ ἀμφισβητεῖν, ὡς οὐχί. The phrases are treated like ordinary verbs of denying (HA. 1029 a) and approximate, as the last-quoted passage shows, to simple indir. disc. **13. ἐκεῖνον, ὃς ἄν**: see note on ὃ δ᾽ ἂν θεοφιλὲς ᾖ 8 A. Cp. also 9 AD. — **ἀδίκως**: Euthyphro is begging the ques-
C tion. **18. οὐδέν**: a strengthened οὔ, HA. 719 b; G. 1060; RD. § 6. — **μὲν οὖν**: *immo vero*, corrective. — **ἀμφισβητοῦντες**: HA. 981; G. 1580; B. 660. **20. πάντα ποιοῦσι**: like πᾶν ποιεῖν, freq. implies unscrupulousness; cp. πανοῦργος, πανουργεῖν. **21. φεύγοντες**: conative, HA. 825; G. 1255; B. 523. Cp. *Apol.* 38 D. The verb has not its technical 8 C
meaning of 'being a defendant.' See *Gorg.* 479 B. **22. ὁμολογοῦσιν . . . ἀδικεῖν**: usually ἀδικοῦντες; the inf. here probably because of the following part., HA. 981; G. 1581; B. 660. 1 N. Cp. Arist. *Rhet.* 1358^{b} 30 ff. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἂν ἀμφισβητήσαιεν, οἷον ὁ δικαζόμενος ὡς οὐ γέγονεν ἢ οὐκ ἔβλαψεν· ὅτι δ᾽ ἀδικεῖ, οὐδέποτ᾽ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔδει δίκης. *About the rest sometimes they would not enter denial, e.g., the defendant would not deny that the thing had occurred, or that he had dealt the blow; but he would never admit that he was in the wrong.* See, however, Auct. *ad Herenn.* 2. 16. 24. **23. οὐ δεῖν φασί**: accent and position mark φασί for emphasis; the normal order occurs, l. 28, ου φασιν ἀδικεῖν.

ΕΥΘ. Οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι. τοῦτο γάρ, οἶμαι, οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδ' ἀμφισβητεῖν, ὡς οὐχί, εἴπερ ἀδικοῦσί γε, | δοτέον δίκην· ἀλλ', οἶμαι, D οὔ φασιν ἀδικεῖν. ἦ γάρ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἀμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ τίς ἐστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν. εἴπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μέν φασιν ἄλλους ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ

8 C **25. οὐκ ἄρα πᾶν κτλ.**: 'there is, then, one thing at least they dare not say.' There is here a play on the literal and derivative senses of *πᾶν ποιεῖν*, the more evident because *ποιοῦσι* is not really needed, since all hinges on *λέγουσι*. **26. οὐ τολμῶσι . . . ὡς οὐχί**: see note on l. 12.

D **28. οὔ φασιν**: HA. 1028; G. 1383. 2; B. 431. 3. *οὔ φασιν ἀδικεῖν*: *they plead not guilty*. On the face of it, this plea might be subject to a double construction: first, it might mean that they have not committed the act alleged; again, it might mean that, though they have done the deed, their action does not constitute a violation of the law (cp. *φόνος δίκαιος* and see note on 4 B). Here the latter is clearly intended. In what follows, if the text is sound (see App.), the plea is somewhat extended, so as to embrace the 8 D questions by whom, how, and when a violation of law was committed, if indeed there was a violation. In the case, *e.g.*, of justifiable homicide in self-defense, such a plea would not be at all inconsistent with one of 'not guilty,' to a charge of murder. **29. ἀληθῆ λέγεις**: frequent in answers, see l. 34, and 10 E, 14 E. **32. τὸ τίς ἐστιν**: for the art., see G. 955. 2. **35. καὶ οἱ θεοί**: *the gods likewise*. Socrates, as usual, is arguing from analogy. It is, in fact, the analogy between the conduct of gods and of men that underlies his whole argument. **37. οἱ μέν φασιν κτλ.**: 'and one set of gods declares that they (viz. certain other beings, *ἄλλους*) are in the wrong, whereas the other set says that they are not.' See App.

οὔ φασιν; ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε δήπου, ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὐδεὶς οὔτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων | τολμᾷ λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ E
40 γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην.

ΕΥΘ. Ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ κεφάλαιον.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἔκαστόν γε, οἶμαι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τῶν πραχθέντων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ
45 ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοί, εἴπερ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν θεοί· πράξεώς τινος πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπρᾶχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως· ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτω;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

X. ΣΩ. Ἴθι νυν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, δίδαξον καὶ | ἐμέ, ἵνα σοφώτερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν, 9

8 D E

38. **δήπου**: *assuredly*, more confident than *που*. 39. **τολμᾷ λέγειν**: 'has the effrontery to say.' — **τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι**: HA. 991; G. 1597; B. 666. Here *γε* indicates that his guilt is admitted; for its position, see HA. 1037, 1 a. 40. **δίκην**: HA. 990; G. 1597; B. 666. 41. **τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις**: note *μέν solitarium*. With the form of the sent. cp. *Gorg.* 461 D *τί τοῦτο λέγεις = τί ἐστι τοῦτο ὃ λέγεις*, *Alc. I.* 109 B *δεινὸν τοῦτό γε ἐρωτᾷς*, and above 3 C *οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα*, HA. 618, and 1012 a. But *ἀληθὲς λέγεις* (like *ἀληθῆ λέγεις*) is practically = *ἀληθεύεις*; cp. *Meno* 98 B, *Lach.* 186 A, Dem. 7. 43. 42. **τὸ κεφάλαιον**: 'in the main,' HA. 626 b; B. 318. The reservation is due entirely to embarrassment, not to any exception that he intends to urge. 45. **πράξεώς τινος πέρι**: explanatory asyndeton. HA. 1039. The emphatic position of *πράξεως* denotes that the gods differ among themselves in their judgment of the *action*, not about administering or withholding punishment of admitted guilt. For **πέρι**, see HA. 109 a; G. 116. 1; B. 68. 8 E

X. 1. **ἴθι νυν**: 'come now.' *νυν* is illative, not temporal, B. 582, N. 2. **τί σοι τεκμήριόν ἐστιν**: Socrates here asks for a demonstrative proof that the gods one and all judge the conduct of Euthyphro's father to be wrong. Since the *τεκμήριον* is an infallible mark or criterion, the question is tantamount to a demand for a definition of the essential nature of the *ὅσιον*, as against the accidental mark of being agreeable to the gods (*θεοφιλές*). In stating the question, the repulsive details are purposely dwelt upon, to emphasize the need of a criterion. 9 A

ὡς πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ἐκεῖνον ἀδίκως τεθνάναι, ὃς ἂν θητεύων ἀνδροφόνος γενόμενος, ξυνδεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, φθάσῃ τελευτήσας διὰ τὰ δεσμά, πρὶν τὸν ξυνδήσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ πυθέσθαι, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου δὴ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐπεξιέναι καὶ ἐπισκήπτεσθαι φόνου τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί· ἴθι, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί μοι σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πάντες θεοὶ | ἡγοῦνται ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν· κἄν B μοι ἱκανῶς ἐνδείξῃ, ἐγκωμιάζων σε ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ οὐδέποτε παύσομαι.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἔχοιμι ἂν ἐπιδεῖξαί σοι.

9 A **3. πάντες θεοί**: in 9 E we read *πάντες οἱ θεοί*: the phrases are practically equivalent; for distinctions, see HA. 672. — **ἐκεῖνον . . . ὃς ἄν**: see note on 8 A. — **τεθνάναι**: pass., see HA. 820; B. 513. Note **ἀποθανόντος**, l. 5, and see HA. 530, 4 a. **5. φθάσῃ τελευτήσας**: HA. 984; G. 1586; B. 660, N. *φθάνειν* may be constr. c. inf. after *πρίν*, or after *πρότερον ἤ*, *πρὶν ἤ*, or *ἤ*. **6. τὰ δεσμά**: only here neut. in Plato; cp. δεσμούς *Rep.* 378 D. See Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, p. 353. — **τῶν ἐξηγητῶν**: see note on 4 C. Here the entire college is meant; before only its president was referred to. **8. δή**: note the tone of contempt. — **ἐπισκήπτεσθαι**: techn. term in Att. law for *denounce*. This verb, like *ἐπεξιέναι* and *ἐγκαλεῖν*, takes the dat. of the person and the gen. of the charge. **9. τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί**: note the forceful juxtaposition; cp. 4 E. — **ἴθι**: resumes 9 A *ἴθι νυν*, l. 1. **10. παντὸς μᾶλλον**: 'beyond a doubt'; originally, . 'more than anything.' **11. κἄν**: B *and if*. **12. ἐγκωμιάζων . . . παύσομαι**: HA. 981; G. 1580; B. 660. — **ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ**: cp. *Hipp. Ma.* 281 C, 291 A, *Symp.* 206 B, *Meno* 70 A. **14. οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον**: cp. *Rep.* 369 B, *Phaedr.* 272 B, *Soph.* 217 B. See 14 B *πλείονος ἔργου ἐστίν*. Euthyphro is trying to evade the difficulty. **15. ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε**: on *ἐπεὶ . . . γε*, here and in l. 17, see note on 4 C. — **ἐπιδεῖξαι**: Socrates has used *ἐνδείξασθαι* = *ἀποδείξασθαι*, *prove by argument*. It is tempting to consider this as a fine bit of characterization of Euthyphro, who desires, like the Sophists, to persuade Socrates in a set speech (*ἐπίδειξις*); but the inference is not necessary, as *ἐπιδείκνυμι* is used elsewhere just as *ἐνδείκνυμι*

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὅτι σοι δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἐκείνοις γε ἐνδείξει δῆλον ὅτι, ὡς ἄδικά τέ ἐστιν καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσιν.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάνπερ ἀκούωσί γέ μου λέγοντος.

XI. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἀκούσονται, ἐάνπερ εὖ δοκῇς | λέγειν. τόδε δέ σου ἐνενόησα ἅμα λέγοντος, καὶ C πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ· εἰ ὅτι μάλιστά με Εὐθύφρων διδάξειεν, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα παρ' Εὐθύφρονος, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ὅσιόν τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

9 B is here. Cp. *Euthyd.* 294 C *τεκμήριόν τί μοι τούτων ἐπιδείξατον τοιόνδε, ᾧ εἴσομαι, ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγετον.* Note *σαφές* l. 10, *σαφῶς* l. 15.

16. **μανθάνω· ὅτι**: see note on 3 B. 20. **ἐάνπερ ἀκούωσί γε**: a witty turn; for Euthyphro is used to being laughed out of the assembly; see 3 C.

XI. 1. **ἐάνπερ εὖ δοκῇς λέγειν**: 'if they think you a good speaker.' Note the hyperbaton of *εὖ* for emphasis. Of course, this is not the only sense of *εὖ λέγειν*.

C 2. **ἅμα λέγοντος**: gen. abs.; for *ἅμα*, see HA. 976; G. 1572; B. 655. Cp. *Rep.* 370 A, 383 A. 3. **πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ**: cp. *Apol.* 21 D *πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην.* Cp. also *Rep.* 370 A. Adam rightly regards this incident as typical, referring to *Symp.* 174 D, where Socrates pauses to reflect on his way to the feast, and to 220 C, where he is said to have stood deep in 9 C thought from one dawn to the next. The Sophists introduced an age of subjectivity in the sense of that which is not rational, and cannot be communicated (see Gorgias); Socrates represents the rational subjectivity which seeks in the mind the criteria, not only of knowledge, but of reality. And dialectic, the logical instrument for the attainment of truth, is, according to Plato, a dialogue of the soul with itself (*Theaet.* 189 E, *Soph.* 263 E). This is merely a theoretical statement of that which Socrates habitually practised. — **εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα**: see note on 4 D. — **Εὐθύφρων... παρ' Εὐθύφρονος**: familiar tone; repetition for emphasis. 4. **διδάξειεν . . . μεμάθηκα**: the perf. stands for a fut. pf., GS. 234. The change from the regular opt. is in the interest of vividness.

(θεομισὲς μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ἄν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τούτῳ ἐφάνη ἄρτι ὡρισμένα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μή· [τὸ γὰρ θεομισὲς ὂν καὶ θεοφιλὲς ἐφάνη·] ὥστε τούτου μὲν ἀφίημί σε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον·) εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ | ἡγείσθων θεοὶ ἄδικον καὶ πάντες μι- D σούντων. ἀλλ' ἆρα τοῦτο νῦν ἐπανορθώμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς ὃ μὲν ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιόν ἐστιν, ὃ δ' ἂν φιλῶσιν, ὅσιον· ὃ δ' ἂν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφότερα; ἆρ' οὕτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὡρίσθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου;

ΕΥΘ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ τὸ

9 C **7. θεομισὲς μὲν γάρ κτλ.**: parenthetical. Socrates has said that he has conceived the thought that even if all the gods regarded the deed in question as unjust, he would not have ascertained the nature of the holy and the unholy. That, he remarks parenthetically, would only prove that all the gods hated the deed, not (he implies) that the deed was unholy, because, owing to the confusion of *θεομισές* and *θεοφιλές*, reference to the love or hatred of the gods (*τούτῳ*) had failed to discriminate between the holy and the unholy. Hence he will rule out this count and not demand a defense of it (*ὥστε τούτου μὲν ἀφίημί σε*. Cp. *ἀφίη ⟨με⟩ δίκης* 9 B). He then resumes his new line of thought abruptly in *εἰ βούλει*. See App. **8. ἄρτι**: refers to the argument in 6 E ff. **10. εἰ βούλει**: explanatory asyndeton, HA. 1039. Cp. *Euthyd.* 285 B. **11. ἡγείσθων . . . μισούντων**: the imv. makes an assumption for the sake of argument. GMT. 254. **12. ἐπανορθώμεθα κτλ.**: 'amend our definition to the effect that.' **14. ὃ δ' ἂν οἱ μέν κτλ.**: the clause retains in full its original cond. force: if taken as a serious admission of the existence of such objects, it would set aside the definition it purports to explain. Even the condition is purely formal. **15. οὐδέτερα**: HA. 635 a; RD. §§ 17, 42. Cp. *ἢ δῆλα δή*, 4 B. **16. ἡμῖν**: HA. 769; G. 1186; B. 380. **17. τί γὰρ κωλύει**: note the nonchalant tone. Cp. *Charm.* 163 A *τί γὰρ κωλύει; ἔφη. Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.* **18. τὸ σὸν σκόπει, εἰ**: virtually = *σκόπει, εἰ σύ γε*, as Schanz says. With *τὸ σόν* one may supply *μέρος*, 'interest,' but the expression is phraseological. For *εἰ*, see HA. 1016; G. 1605; B. 578.

σὸν σκόπει, εἰ τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος οὕτω ῥᾷστά με
διδάξεις ἃ ὑπέσχου.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε φαίην ἂν τοῦτο εἶναι | τὸ ὅσιον, E
ὃ ἂν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὃ ἂν
πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὖ τοῦτο, ὦ Εὐθύφρον,
εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐῶμεν καὶ οὕτω ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν
ἀποδεχώμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐὰν μόνον φῇ τίς τι
ἔχειν οὕτω, ξυγχωροῦντες ἔχειν; ἢ σκεπτέον, τί λέγει
ὁ λέγων;

ΕΥΘ. Σκεπτέον· οἶμαι μέντοι ἔγωγε τοῦτο νυνὶ
καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

XII. ΣΩ. Τάχ', ὦ 'γαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα. ἐν-
νόησον γὰρ | τὸ τοιόνδε· ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι ὅσιόν 10

9 D 19. **τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος**: 'on that assumption'; *ὑπόθεσις* is an assumption made for purely dialectical purposes to be employed consistently until it may break down. With *οὕτω*, which resumes *τοῦτο ὑποθέμενος*, the consequence or result is emphasized by the verb. GMT. 857. Cp. *Phaedo* 67 DE, 115 A.

E SECOND DEFINITION AMENDED: **'Holiness is what all the gods love; unholiness, on the contrary, is what all the gods abhor.'** At this point one of the incidental gains of the dialogue is reached: it is virtually conceded that if the traditional religion is to be made available as a support to moral conduct, the caprice of the polytheistic deities must be eliminated by assuming that they are in agreement on all essentials. But this is practically monotheism. 9 E

25. **καλῶς λέγεται**: see note on *παγκάλως*, 7 A. — **οὕτω . . . ἀποδεχώμεθα**: *οὕτω* = *offhand*, orig. spoken with a wave of the hand. See on *ὡς οὕτω γ' ἀκοῦσαι*, 3 A. — **ἡμῶν . . . αὐτῶν**: HA. 742; G. 1103; B. 356. 26. **ἐὰν μόνον . . . ἔχειν οὕτω**: the clause is the obj. of *ἀποδεχώμεθα*; *ἔχειν οὕτω* and the following *ἔχειν* are phraseological = *to be so*. 27. **τί λέγει**: see note on *τί λέγομεν*, 7 A; but *λέγει* may merely = *mean*.

XII. 1. **τάχ' . . . εἰσόμεθα**: *τάχα* here = *soon*. Att. prose uses *τάχα* with the fut. only in this sense. Cp. *Gorg.* 450 C, *Phil.* 53 E, *Minos* 314 C, *Soph.* 247 D. 2. **ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον . . . ὅσιόν ἐστιν**: in the first case, *τὸ θεοφιλές* would be only an acci- 10 A

ἐστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται, ὅσιόν ἐστιν ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι. λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ

10 A dental quality of *τὸ ὅσιον;* in the second, it would constitute its essence. That is to say, if holiness were holiness because the gods loved it, then the fact of the gods' loving an act would be the first and essential point to determine in deciding whether the act was or was not holy; but if the gods loved holiness because it was holy, then its being holy would be a fact without the gods' loving it, and hence their loving it would not affect its nature. Of these alternatives, the first is established in the following argument; and hence it is proved that the second definition, even in its amended form, is inadequate. There is, however, a great gain achieved by the discussion at this point; for the argument virtually means that the essence of holiness is independent of the will of Deity, — that is to say, that the human spirit is as truly autonomous in the field of religion as in the field of philosophical truth generally, where it has always asserted its independence. Unfortunately the argument is not at first sight clear. Socrates sets up a series of distinctions, first between the active and the passive (10 A). This is done to prepare the way for the inquiry. 10 A The passive is singled out because it is necessary to the question, *ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται ὅσιόν ἐστιν;* Noting the correlation of active and passive further emphasizes the *verbal* nature of the passive, as stating an *act*. Then a distinction is made between the passive verb *φιλεῖται* and the pass. part. *φιλούμενον* when used periphrastically with the copula *ἐστί* (10 B ff.). The form *φιλεῖται* is used to denote the act, while the part. expresses the general character which is predicated in consequence of the (habitual) occurrence of the act. Then (10 D) *φιλούμενον* ⟨*ὑπὸ θεῶν*⟩ is identified with *θεοφιλές* and later (11 A) with *οἷον φιλεῖσθαι* ⟨*ὑπὸ θεῶν*⟩. Cp. GS. 191 and W. J. Alexander, *Participial Periphrases in Attic Prose*, A. J. P. 4. 291 ff.

7. **λέγομέν τι φερόμενον**: this form of question is common in Plato, when he desires to lay the basis for an argument. See, in the *Gorgias* alone, 454 C, 463 E, 494 B, 495 C. Cp. Fritzsche *ad Menon.* 75 D. It appears to have been borrowed from Socrates; see Xen. *Mem.* 2. 2. 1;

ἄγον καὶ ὁρώμενον καὶ ὁρῶν· καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνεις ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ καὶ ᾗ ἕτερα;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγέ μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενόν τί ἐστιν καὶ τούτου ἕτερον τὸ φιλοῦν;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι, πότερον τὸ | φερόμενον, διότι B
φέρεται, φερόμενόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι;

ΕΥΘ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δή, διότι ἄγεται, καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον, διότι ὁρᾶται;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὁρώμενόν γέ ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διότι ὁρᾶται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρώμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται, φερό-

10 A 4. 2. 22. As usual, the examples are chosen from the sphere of concrete fact, where the relations are easily grasped.

9. **ἕτερα ἀλλήλων**: HA. 753 g; G. 1140; B. 362, 2. Cp. *ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ διαφέρεσθαι*, 8 B. — **ᾗ**: *how, wherein*. 13. **πῶς γὰρ οὔ**: common answer in strong assent. Cp. 10 D and *πῶς δ' οὔ*; 14 A. *γάρ* is of course confirmatory. 14. **λέγε δή μοι**: the student may find the meaning somewhat simplified if he will resort to some such device as the following: translate *τὸ φερόμενον* with *what is carried*; *φέρεται*, by putting it actively, with *somebody carries it*; and *φερόμενόν ἐστιν* with *has the quality of being carried*. Say, 'Tell me whether what is carried has the quality of being carried because somebody carries it, or for some other reason?' Similarly in what follows. — **διότι**: chosen here and in the following passage, instead of *ὅτι*, in order to point the parallel with *δι' ἄλλο τι*. 16. **οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο**: cp. 10 D, 12 D. Note the chiastic order, RD. § 305. The first question is emphatically affirmed after denying the second. See Deuschle-Cron on *Gorg.* 453 D. 21. **τὸ ἐναντίον**: HA. 626 b; G. 915; B. 318; RD. § 18. 10 A B

μενον. ἆρα κατάδηλον, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν ; | βούλομαι δὲ τόδε, ὅτι, εἴ τι γίγνεται ἢ τι C πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενόν ἐστι, γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι γίγνεται, γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν· οὐδ' ὅτι πάσχον ἐστί, πάσχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάσχει, πάσχον ἐστίν· ἢ οὐ ξυγχωρεῖς οὕτω ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνόμενόν τί ἐστιν ἢ πάσχον τι ὑπό του ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ τὰ πρότερα· οὐχ ὅτι φιλούμενόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ ὧν φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅτι φιλεῖται, φιλούμενον ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου, | ὦ Εὐθύ- D φρον ; ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος ;

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἆρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Διότι ἄρα ὅσιόν ἐστιν, φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὅσιόν ἐστιν ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔοικεν.

10 C **27. πάσχει**: 'has something done to it': used to convey what we mean by putting a verb into the passive. Cp. *Theaet.* 157 A and *Gorg.* 476 B ἆρα εἴ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος: where the entire argument should be compared. Note that the subj. of πάσχει (*i.e.* τι) is omitted. Cp. ἢ πάσχον τι in l. 33 below. **32. γιγνόμενόν τι**: like πάσχον, 10 C in the pred. The variety of expressions is used because in some of the verbs the 'passive' idea is not prominent. **36. ὑπὸ ὧν**: for ὑπὸ τούτων (ὑπὸ) ὧν. For the prep., see HA. 1007; G. 1025, 1032; B. 487, N. **40. ἄλλο τι** D **φιλεῖται**: ἄλλο τι = ἄλλο τι ἤ, 15 C, *nonne?* Cp. HA. 1015 b; G. 1604; B. 573, N.; RD. § 22.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, φιλούμενόν ἐστι καὶ θεοφιλὲς ⟨τὸ θεοφιλές⟩.

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσιον θεοφιλές, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ἀλλ' ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτου.

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δή, ὦ | Σώκρατες; E

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὅσιον διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διότι φιλεῖται, ὅσιον εἶναι· ἦ γάρ;

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

XIII. ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι θεοφιλές, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν, ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, τὸ

10 D **48. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . γε**: a formula of transition, not of objection (so-called *ὑποφορά*) as in *Crito* 48 A. Cp. RD. § 160 d, § 295; Frohberger on Lys. 12. 35 (App.). **γε** after **διότι** draws attention to the causal relation, as the point of cardinal importance. Cp. **ἵνα γε** in 12 B and **εἴ γε** in 10 E. **51. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλές κτλ.**: one might have expected the art. in the pred., because logically it is not mere predication but identification that is desired: this becomes evident not only from the course of the argument, but also from **ἀλλ' ἕτερον τοῦτο τούτου**. For the grouping of these words, Fritzsche compares *Meno* 87 C **τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο**. **54. πῶς δή**: 'how so?'

XIII. **5. ἀλλ' εἴ γε κτλ.**: 10 E Socrates proceeds to put his argument into succinct form. Assuming the conclusions already reached as hypotheses from which the consequences are to be deduced, he reaches by wholly correct reasoning the conclusion that being loved by the gods is an accident, not the essence of holiness. Two propositions have been granted:

(A) The gods love *τὸ ὅσιον* because it is *ὅσιον*; but it is *not ὅσιον* because the gods love it [its being *ὅσιον* is the *cause* of the gods' loving it];

(B) *τὸ θεοφιλές* is *θεοφιλές* because the gods love

θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο τὸ ὅσιον, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς εἶναι | ἐφιλεῖτο 11
ἂν τὸ θεοφιλές, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ
θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἦν, καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖ-
10 σθαι ὅσιον ἦν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὅτι ἐναντίως ἔχετον, ὡς
παντάπασιν ἑτέρῳ ὄντε ἀλλήλων. τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι
φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δ' ὅτι ἐστὶν οἷον
φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ
Εὐθύφρον, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν. τὴν
15 μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος

10 E it [its being *θεοφιλές* is the *effect* of the gods' loving it].

Now, taking these propositions as the basis of our argument, let us assume the identity of *τὸ ὅσιον* and *τὸ θεοφιλές* (their identity being necessary to the truth of Euthyphro's contention), which will require that either term may at will be substituted for the other in any proposition. On this hypothesis, then,

If the gods' loving *τὸ ὅσιον* is the *effect* of its being *ὅσιον* (A), then

the gods' loving *τὸ θεοφιλές* would be the *effect* of its being *θεοφιλές*;

and

If *τὸ θεοφιλές*, being *θεοφιλές*, is the *effect* of the gods' loving it (B), then

τὸ ὅσιον, being *ὅσιον*, would be the *effect* of the gods' loving it.

But this is obviously not the case; for, acc. to our hypothesis,

(B) the one (*τὸ θεοφιλές*), being of a character to be loved by the gods (*θεοφιλές*), is the *effect* of the gods' loving it; whereas,

(A) the gods' loving the other (*τὸ ὅσιον*) is the *effect* of its being of a character to be loved by the gods. 10 E

10. ἐναντίως ἔχετον: 'they are the opposite one of the other.' The terms are not logical contradictories; but in the scheme here adopted one is the *cause*, the other is the *effect* of *φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν*. Aristotle employed the adv. as his tech. term for contradiction. — **ὡς ὄντε**: HA. 974; G. 1570; B. 658, N. 11 A

12. οἷον φιλεῖσθαι: HA. 1000; GMT. 759. See note on 10 A, l, 2.

14. τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν . . . πάθος δέ τι: the passage shows that these terms were not yet common currency (cp. *Phaedo* 65 D, 78 C, 92 D, *Meno* 72 B). The *οὐσία* of an object is the sum of those qualities which must be included

δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅτι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων | θεῶν· ὅτι δὲ ὄν, οὔπω εἶπες. B
εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, μή με ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε ὂν τὸ ὅσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν
20 εἴτε ὁτιδὴ πάσχει· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τούτου διοισόμεθα· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ προθύμως, τί ἐστιν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε, ὅπως σοι εἴπω ὃ νοῶ. περιέρχεται γάρ πως ἡμῖν ἀεὶ ὃ ἂν
25 προθώμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἂν ἱδρυσώμεθα αὐτό.

ΣΩ. Τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, ἔοικεν

11 A in its definition as being essential [*i.e.*, what a thing 'is' when one wishes to define it]; every other quality or possible predicate, as being non-essential or 'accidental,' is styled a *πάθος*. A similar mistake, in offering a *πάθος* for the *οὐσία*, is made by Polus in *Gorg.* 448 C (cp. 448 E).

16. **ὅτι πέπονθε**: added to explain the new term *πάθος*, whereas *φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν* serves to define *ὅτι*. See
B note on *πάσχει*, 10 C. 17. **ὅτι δὲ ὄν**: *sc.* *φιλεῖται*. Cp. *τί ποτε ὂν . . . φιλεῖται*, l. 19. The stress falls on *ὄν* as representing the unfamiliar term *οὐσία*. It seems difficult to reduce the use of the interr. and the indef. rel. in indir. questions to a rule. Often both are used side by side, as *Gorg.* 448 E *τίς καὶ ὅντινα* followed immediately (449 A) by *τίς . . . καὶ τίνα*. Morris on Thuc. 1. 136. 4 says, "The rule is to say *οἶδά σε ὃς εἶ*, 11 B and *οὐκ οἶδά σε ὅστις εἶ*. But *ὅστις* is not seldom found after an affirmative, and *ὅς* sometimes after a negative." In Plato the exceptions are very numerous. 18. **ἀποκρύψῃ**: HA. 724; G. 1069; B. 340. 20. **εἴτε ὁτιδὴ πάσχει**: 'has any *πάθος* whatsoever'; for *ὁτιδή*, see HA. 1002 a. 23. **ὅπως . . . εἴπω**: here *εἴπω* is the interr. subj. in indir. disc., GMT. 677. 24. **ὃ νοῶ**: cp. *Lach.* 194 AB. — **περιέρχεται**: 'walks about'; cp. 15 B, *βαδίζοντες*. 27. **τοῦ ἡμετέρου προγόνου . . . Δαιδάλου**: cp. *Meno* 97 DE. Anciently in Greece, though with far less regularity than in Egypt, the arts and trades passed from father to son; hence certain guilds called themselves by patronymics, as, *e.g.*, the Ὁμηρίδαι, or rhapsodes, who collectively called Homer their eponymous ancestor. See *Symp.* 186 E,

εἶναι Δαιδάλου τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ | λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν C
αὐτὰ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἴσως ἄν με ἐπέ-
σκωπτες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυγγέ-
νειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ οὐκ
ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπου ἄν τις αὐτὰ θῇ· νῦν δὲ σαὶ γὰρ
αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν. ἄλλου δή τινος δεῖ σκώμματος·
οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοὶ μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ.
ΕΥΘ. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδόν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ σκώμ-
ματος, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα· τὸ γὰρ
περιέναι τούτοις τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
οὐκ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἐντιθείς, | ἀλλὰ σύ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ D

11 B *Alc. I.* 121 A. Socrates here humorously refers to the fact that both his father Sophroniscus and he belonged to the guild of statuaries, who might properly call Daedalus their ancestor. Some improvements in the design of statues, by which they were represented with arms free from their sides and with legs separated, were ascribed to Daedalus. See Ernst Kuhnert, "Daidalos, Ein Beitrag zur griech. Künstlergesch.," *Jahrb. für Phil.*, N.F. 15, p. 185 ff. Similar stories abound in the legends of the saints originating in the Middle Ages; and even the myth of Pygmalion and Galatea, whatever its connection with the rites of Adonis, must have grown out of some such motif. See Overbeck, *Gesch. der Plastik*, 1. 36.

30. **ὡς ἄρα**: freq. introduces a statement ironically, disclaiming responsibility for it. — **κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου ξυγγένειαν**: 'on acc. of my relationship to him'; **ἐκείνου** is 11 C quite natural, as *συγγενής* also takes the gen., HA. 754 d; G. 1144. 31. **ἔργα**: 'works of art,' a common meaning. 32. **νῦν δὲ σαὶ γὰρ . . . εἰσίν**: 'but as it is, why, the postulates are your own.' On *γάρ*, see HA. 1050. 4 a. There is no ellipsis. Examples of *νῦν δὲ . . . γάρ* are numerous: *Apol.* 38 B, *Lach.* 184 D, 200 E, *Prot.* 347 A, *Charm.* 175 B, *Symp.* 180 C. See Frohberger on Lys. 13. 62 (App.); RD. § 149. With *νῦν δέ* cp. 11 A above. 34. **αὐτῷ σοι**: emphatic only, not reflexive, HA. 687. 36. **δεῖσθαι**: 'call for.' 37. **τούτοις τοῦτο**: *τούτοις* depends on *ἐντιθείς*, and *τοῦτο* goes with *τὸ περιέναι*, the hyperbaton being employed for the sake of the paronomasia, HA. 1062. 38. **δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος**: *sc.* *εἶναι*. D Cp. *οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ*, l. 51, *Theaet.* 176 C. Δαίδαλος has the art. because he has already been mentioned. See App.

Δαίδαλος· ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα ἔμενεν ἂν ταῦτα
40 οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην τοσούτῳ, ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν τὰ αὑτοῦ μόνα ἐποίει οὐ μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δῆτα τοῦτό
45 μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός. ἐβουλόμην γὰρ ἄν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως ἱδρῦσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ Δαιδάλου σοφίᾳ τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ | τούτων μὲν ἄδην· E
ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτός σοι ξυμπρο-

11 D **39. ἐμοῦ γε ἕνεκα**: 'if it depended on me'; cp. the colloq. phrase 'for all of me.' **42. τὴν τέχνην**: HA. 718; G. 1058; B. 337. — **τοσούτῳ, ὅσῳ**: ὅσῳ stands here by attraction to τοσούτῳ, acc. to the usual phrase, although we should rather have expected ὅτι, as in τούτῳ, ὅτι, *Apol.* 21 D, 29 B. The constr. really amounts to an anacoluthon; and it would be easy to recast the sentence. We may imitate the Greek by saying, 'I am so much more skillful, inasmuch as,' etc. Schanz compares Xen. *Cyr.* 6. 2. 19. **43. οὐ μένοντα**: HA. 726; G. 1081. **45. τῆς τέχνης**: depends on τοῦτο. Cp. Thuc. 2. 36. 4 ᾧπερ τῆς τέχνης ἐπίστευον. — **σοφός**: here = δεινός, above; so, too, in l. 47 **σοφίᾳ** = 'skill, art.' **47. τὰ Ταντάλου χρήματα**: the typical Dives appears in Plato under various names: Tantalus, Darius, Polycrates, Cinyras, and Midas. Here Ταντάλου is evidently chosen for the paronomasia with Δαιδάλου. **48. γενέσθαι**: 11 D
the μοί, in l. 46, continues here. — **τούτων μὲν ἄδην**: *enough of* E
that, like Lat. *sed haec hactenus*. **49. τρυφᾶν**: 'to be indolent,' originally as a result of high-living or self-indulgence. Contrast ξύντεινε σαυτόν, 12 A. Cp. 12 A τρυφᾷς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. — **ξυμπροθυμήσομαι, ὅπως**: 'I will aid you that you may,' etc. Thus far Euthyphro has attempted to define holiness, but now is reduced to a confession of his inability. Socrates, therefore, assumes a new rôle, and, whereas he has hitherto devoted himself chiefly to criticising Euthyphro's definitions, now leads up to one which is all but reached, only to be left unattained because Euthyphro cannot follow him. This fact is doubly significant: first, because it indicates that the contemplated answer to the question as to the nature of holiness is to be sought by following up this clew; and,

50 θυμήσομαι [δεῖξαι], ὅπως ἄν με διδάξῃς περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου. καὶ μὴ προαποκάμῃς· ἰδὲ γάρ, εἰ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πᾶν τὸ ὅσιον.

ΕΥΘ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον ὅσιον; ἢ τὸ μὲν

11 E secondly, because Plato, in his minor dialogues, does not allow Socrates to dogmatize, but leaves the final solution of the problem that has been started to the reflection of the reader.

50. ὅπως ἄν με διδάξῃς: HA. 885 b; G. 1376; GMT. 348. *Gorg.* 481 A affords an excellent example of constructions with verbs of effort. **51. εἰ οὐκ**: HA. 1022 a. Socrates confidently expects an affirm. answer. **54. ἆρ' οὖν**: in technical terms of logic, the question here relates to *the conversion of universal propositions*; πᾶν τὸ ὅσιον δίκαιον, 'all holy is right,' is a universal affirmative proposition, in which the subject, πᾶν τὸ ὅσιον, is 'distributed,' that is to say, embraces everything holy; whereas the predicate, δίκαιον, is 'not distributed,' that is to say, does not embrace all that is right. Since in universal affirmative propositions this is always the case, the two terms, subject and predicate, are not 'convertible,' that is to say, cannot be directly identified, nor the proposition simply 'converted.' In other words, the predicate represents the genus under which the subject — the species — is classed. In the present discussion, δίκαιον is the genus, to which the species τὸ ὅσιον is assumed to belong; but since this one species does not exhaust the genus, it requires to be further defined in order to distinguish it from other species of the same genus. The accompanying figure may serve to illustrate the thought: —



ABCD = τὸ ὅσιον : αἰδώς.
AEFG = δίκαιον : δέος.

In this discussion δίκαιον bears the wider sense of 'right,' and the question is: What is the precise relation of holiness (religion) to the wider sphere of ethical conduct or moral obligation? Owing to the circumstance that the question of piety and impiety was to be reviewed by the court, something of the legal sense of δίκαιον may here attach to the term. It will be instructive to compare the definitions of the righteous and the pious (holy) man attributed to Socrates. Xen. *Mem.* 4. 6. 4

55 ὅσιον πᾶν | δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ὅσιον, ἀλλὰ 12
τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὅσιον, τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὐχ ἕπομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῖς λεγομένοις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γέ μου εἶ οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἢ
ὅσῳ σοφώτερος· ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾷς ὑπὸ πλούτου
60 τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ξύντεινε σαυτόν· καὶ
γὰρ ο'δὲ χαλεπὸν κατανοῆσαι ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ
τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας —

11 E ὁ ἆρα τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς νόμιμα εἰδὼς ὀρθῶς ἂν ἡμῖν εὐσεβὴς ὡρισμένος εἴη; *Then we should be right in defining the pious man as the one who knows what is lawful in respect of the gods? Ibid.* 4. 6. 6 ὀρθῶς ἄν ποτε ἆρα ὁριζοίμεθα ὁριζόμενοι δικαίους εἶναι τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ περὶ ἀνθρώπους νόμιμα; *Then we should be right in defining the righteous* (*just*) *as those who know what is lawful in respect of men?* Note, first, that the two virtues are entirely coördinate, having mutually exclusive spheres. Note, also, that Socrates, as is his wont, reduces the virtues to a specific form of knowledge. In the *Euthyphro* the virtue of piety is a specific form of the general exercise of righteousness, and knowledge does not enter into the definition. But see the fourth definition, 14 C. *Gorg.* 507 A (καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαιʼ ἂν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια) is purely Socratic.

A 56. **τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ**: *sc.* τοῦ δικαίου, 'one part of the right.' — **τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄλλο**: τι modifies τό, to mark its indef. character, 12 A HA. 654 a; cp. *Hipparch.* 230 A τοῦ κέρδους τὸ μέν τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δέ τι κακόν. ἄλλο here is pred. (= 'is different') and καί is adv. 57. **οὐχ ἕπομαι**: metaphorical; in his rejoinder, Socrates takes it literally, in order to play on the words. Cp. *Apol.* 39 B. 58. **οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἤ**: here = τοσούτῳ. 59. **ὃ λέγω**: for the pres., see Krüger 53. 1. 2. The usage is common, esp. with ὅπερ, ὥσπερ, and ὡς. The reference is to 11 E. — **ὑπὸ πλούτου**: cp. 4 D. 60. **ὦ μακάριε**: see note on 3 B. — **ξύντεινε σαυτόν**: 'brace up.' Cp. our colloq. phrase, 'to pull oneself together.' 61. **λέγω γὰρ δή**: 'You see (γὰρ δή) I say the reverse,' etc. 62. **τὸ ἐναντίον ἤ**: HA. 1045, 1 b; RD. § 173. Cp. *Phaedo* 115 D, *Gorg.* 481 C, etc. — **ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας**: note the paronomasia. ὁ ποιητής usually means Homer; not so in this instance. ὁ ποιήσας probably reflects Plato's uncertainty as to the poet's name. The poem in question is the *Cypria* (so called because it originated on Cyprus?), one of the

Ζῆνα δὲ τόν θ' ἕρξαντα, καὶ ὃς τάδε πάντ' ἐφίτευσεν, |
οὐκ ἐθέλεις εἰπεῖν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς. B

ἐγὼ οὖν τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἶπω σοι ὅπῃ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἵνα δέος, ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς· πολλοὶ γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες δεδιέναι μέν, αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδὲν ταῦτα, ἃ δεδίασιν. οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ὅστις αἰδούμενός τι πρᾶγμα καὶ αἰσχυνόμενος οὐ πεφόβηταί τε καὶ | δέδοικεν ἅμα δόξαν πονηρίας; C

ΕΥΘ. Δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος. ἔνθα καὶ αἰδώς· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὲν αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος,

12 A 'epic cycle,' having for its subject the events which preceded the story told in the Iliad. Its authorship was in doubt even among the best-informed critics of antiquity.

63. **Ζῆνα δὲ τόν θ' ἕρξαντα**: *of Zeus, who hath created and begotten the world, thou wilt not speak; for where fear is, there also is reverence.* The poet seems only to have meant that fear and reverence forbid one to speak of Zeus; but Plato here, as elsewhere, does not scruple to do violence to the poet's thought if he may thereby point his own moral. Cp. *Lysis* 212 E, *Prot.* 339 B foll., *Lach.* 191 B. In the argument αἰδώς is a species of the genus δέος. 12 A

65. **τούτῳ . . . τῷ ποιητῇ**: the words go together; for the dat., see HA. 772; G. 1175; B. 392. B

68. **οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι**: εἶναι = 'to be true,' as Adam says; but he is prob. in error when he says that εἶναι has the same meaning in ἀλλ' ἵνα γε αἰδώς, ἔνθα καὶ δέος εἶναι, in l. 73.

70. **δεδιέναι**: HA. 849 b; G. 1263; B. 535; GS. 230. So **πεφόβηται**, l. 75. — **αἰδεῖσθαι δὲ μηδέν**: see notes on μηδὲν εἰδέναι, 6 A, and on οὐδέν, 8 C.

77. **οὐκ ἄρ' . . . ἀλλ' ἵνα . . . οὐ μέντοι**: note the palindromic turn. Cp. notes on 3 C above. καίτοι . . . ἀλλ' ὅμως, and 13 D, οὐχ ἡγούμενος. C

οὐ μέντοι ἵνα γε δέος, πανταχοῦ αἰδώς. ἐπὶ πλέον
γάρ, οἶμαι, δέος αἰδοῦς· μόριον γὰρ αἰδὼς δέους,
ὥσπερ ἀριθμοῦ περιττόν, ὥστε οὐχ ἵναπερ ἀριθμός,
ἔνθα καὶ περιττόν, ἵνα δὲ περιττόν, ἔνθα καὶ ἀριθμός.
ἔπει γάρ που νῦν γε ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τοίνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων ἠρώτων,
ἆρα ἵνα δίκαιον, ἔνθα καὶ ὅσιον, ἢ ἵνα μὲν ὅσιον,
ἔνθα καὶ | δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον, οὐ πανταχοῦ D
ὅσιον· μόριον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. οὕτω
φῶμεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι δοκεῖ ;

ΕΥΘ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω. φαίνει γάρ μοι ὀρθῶς
λέγειν.

XIV. ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος
τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐξευρεῖν
τὸ ποῖον μέρος ἂν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν
οὖν σύ με ἠρώτας τι τῶν νῦν δή, οἷον ποῖον μέρος
ἐστὶν ἀριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ὢν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ
ἀριθμός, εἶπον ἄν, ὅτι ὃς ἂν μὴ σκαληνὸς ᾖ, ἀλλ'
ἰσοσκελής· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ;

12 C 79. **ἵνα γε**: cp. l. 73, above. γε follows ἵνα in order to emphasize the precise relation, just as is done by ἵναπερ in l. 81. Cp. εἴ γε, 10 E, and διότι γε, 10 D. — **ἐπὶ πλέον κτλ.**: 'for fear has greater (logical) extension than reverence.' 81. **περιττόν**: περιττόν (= *odd*) and ἄρτιον (= *even*) were familiar to the Greeks as the constituent elements of number; cp. *Gorg.* 451 B. 85. **τὸ τοιοῦτον κτλ.**: 'it was something of that sort I meant when I asked.' He refers to 11 E foll.

XIV. 1. **τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο**: cp. 12 D *Meno* 87 C τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο. 3. **τὸ ποῖον μέρος**: the art. calls for *a strict definition*. Cp. *Gorg.* 463 C ὁποῖόν μόριον. 4. **οἷον**: 'as, for example.' 5. **οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός**: *sc.* ὁ ἄρτιος ἀριθμός. 6. **εἶπον ἄν**: for the aor., see HA. 895 b; B. 606; GMT. 414. — **σκαληνὸς . . . ἰσοσκελής**: note that arithmetical relations are represented by geometrical. This is not uncommon in Greek, and for obvious reasons: first, the Greeks were strong visualizers, and therefore developed geometry

ΕΥΘ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ | οὕτω διδάξαι, τὸ ποῖον E
μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέθ' ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή.

ΕΥΘ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν· τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

12 D before arithmetic; again, their methods of numerical notation were so inadequate and cumbrous (they only approached algebraic symbols quite late in their history), that all problems capable of a geometrical solution were treated preferably by that method. Note that, in the triangles, the base line is disregarded altogether. The principle of *διχοτομία* (equal division by two), which was represented by *πέρας*)(*ἄπειρον*, *περιττόν*)(*ἄρτιον*, *τετράγωνον*)(*ἑτερόμηκες*, *ἰσοσκελές*)(*σκαληνόν* [see Ritter-Preller 55], played an important part in the mathematical speculations of the Pythagoreans, in which Plato took a lively interest.

E 10. **λέγωμεν**: = *κελεύωμεν*. Note the constr. 12. **μεμαθηκότας**: cp. *Gorg.* 488 A *ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἑκὼν ἐξαμαρτάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθίᾳ τῇ ἐμῇ*, 'If I do aught amiss in the conduct of my life, rest assured that I do 12 E so not intentionally but through ignorance.' These words of Socrates formed Plato's ethical creed as well. To know, for them, was to do. (Cp. the note above on 11 E.) Hence if Meletus is convinced that Socrates is better instructed, he must trust him in future and not prosecute him for impiety. See Introd. § 2.

THIRD DEFINITION: **'Holiness is that form of right conduct which relates to the service of the gods.'** Euthyphro heartily adopts the suggestion of Socrates that *τὸ ὅσιον* is a species of the genus *δίκαιον* and proceeds to distinguish this species from other species by giving the specific differentia. As there is great ambiguity in the term *θεραπεία*, Socrates sets out to disclose and remove it. It is interesting to note that the Stoics who, like Euthyphro, laid great stress on divination and the formal aspects of religion, are quoted as saying (Laert. Diog. 7.

XV. ΣΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, φαίνει λέγειν· ἀλλὰ | σμικροῦ τινος ἔτι ἐνδεής εἰμι. τὴν 13
γὰρ θεραπείαν οὔπω ξυνίημι ἥντινα ὀνομάζεις. οὐ γάρ που λέγεις γε, οἵαπερ καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θερα-
πεῖαί εἰσιν, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεούς. λέγομεν γάρ που — οἷον φαμέν, ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπίσταται θερα-
πεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὁ ἱππικός· ἦ γάρ ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ γάρ που ἱππικὴ ἵππων θεραπεία.

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὁ κυνηγετικός.

ΕΥΘ. Οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Ἡ γάρ που κυνηγετικὴ κυνῶν θεραπεία. |

ΕΥΘ. Ναί. B

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δὲ δὴ ὁσιότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον ; οὕτω λέγεις ;

12 E 119) εἶναι τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας, which, as introducing ἐπιστήμη, is nearer the Socratic view. Cp. note on 11 E.

XV. 1. καλῶς: see note on 13 A 7 A. 2. σμικροῦ κτλ.: cp. *Protag.* 329 B σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεὴς εἶμι πάντ' ἔχειν. — τὴν γὰρ θεραπείαν κτλ.: a case of prolepsis. ἥντινα, for which we might have had τίνα (see note on 11 B), classifies; cf. GS. 130. So in Lat. *quis* is roughly used for *qualis*; cp. οἵαπερ, l. 4, and τοιαύτην, l. 5, τίνα and τοιαύτην, 13 D. 6. οἷον: cp. οἷον τοιόνδε, 13 B. RD. § 16. The constr. is changed to avoid a didactic statement: an illustration, in the true Socratic manner, has the preference, in order to lead up gradually to the inference. 9. ἱππική: *sc.* τέχνη; just so, too, κυνηγετική, βοηλατική, etc. — ἵππων θεραπεία: cp. *Alc. I.* 122 A, *Gorg.* 515 C ff., *Meno* 93 D. 16. ἡ δὲ βοηλατικὴ βοῶν: *sc.* θεραπεία; the same word is to be supplied with θεῶν, l. 18. Socrates loved to ring the changes on a few homely examples drawn from the life of herdsmen, cobblers, etc., and so became the butt of ridicule; see *Gorg.* 491 A, *Symp.* 221 E, Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2. 37. 13 A B

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταὐτὸν διαπράττεται; οἷον τοιόνδε· ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινί ἐστι καὶ ὠφελίᾳ τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς δή, ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τῆς ἱππικῆς θεραπευόμενοι ὠφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίους γίγνονται· ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ κύνες γέ που ὑπὸ τῆς κυνηγετικῆς, καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, | καὶ τἆλλα πάντα C ὡσαύτως· ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἴει τοῦ θεραπευομένου τὴν θεραπείαν εἶναι;

ΕΥΘ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης θεραπεία οὖσα θεῶν ὠφελία τέ ἐστι θεῶν καὶ βελτίους τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖ; καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ξυγχωρήσαις ἄν, ὡς ἐπειδάν τι ὅσιον ποιῇς, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζει;

ΕΥΘ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύφρον. οἶμαί σε τοῦτο λέγειν· πολλοῦ καὶ δέω· ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην, τίνα ποτὲ | λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, D οὐχ ἡγούμενός σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.

13 B **22. οἷον τοιόνδε**: HA. 626 b; G. 915; B. 318. So also *Gorg.* 464 A, *Rep.* 331 C. More commonly **τὸ τοιόνδε**. **23. ὥσπερ ὁρᾷς δή**: cp. *Rep.* 421 A. C **31. μὰ Δί'**: HA. 723; G. 1066; B. 344. **36. ξυγχωρήσαις ἄν**: potential opt., HA. 872; G. 1327; B. 563; GS. 438. The old-fashioned ending **-αις** is common in Plato; cp. *Symp.* 202 C, 13 C *Phaedr.* 241 D, 275 D, etc. **40. πολλοῦ καὶ δέω**: pers. for the more common impers. constr., HA. 743 b; G. 1116; RD. § 259. **42. οὐχ ἡγούμενος**: a palindromic D turn, repeating *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ . . . οἶμαι*. Such returns are frequent in Plato. Cp. notes on 3 C and 12 B.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην λέγω.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἴη ἂν ἡ ὁσιότης;

ΕΥΘ. Ἥπερ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δοῦλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ὑπηρετική τις ἄν, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη θεοῖς.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

XVI. ΣΩ. Ἔχοις ἂν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἡ ἰατροῖς ὑπηρε-

13 D 47. **ἥπερ**: cp. Xen. *Hell.* 2. 3. 14 *ἐθεράπευον πάσῃ θεραπείᾳ*. 49. **μανθάνω**: see note on 3 B. — **ὑπηρετική τις . . . θεοῖς**: *ὑπηρετική* is subst. GS. 33; for the dat., see HA. 765 a; G. 1174; B. 393. So, too, *δόσεως θεοῖς* 14 C, *ὑπηρεσία τοῖς θεοῖς* 14 D, *δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς* 15 A. Holiness is here called a *ministration to Deity* rather than a *service* or *tendance* (*θεραπεία*) ostensibly to obviate misapprehension; but in reality, I think, to point the connection of the argument at this stage with the plea of the *Apology*. There Socrates put forth every effort to show that he bore a commission from God to lead his special form of the philosophic (or religious) life, which to him constituted the very essence of piety. The plea culminates in 30 A, where he declares, "This will I do to whomsoever I may meet, be he young or old, stranger or fellow-townsman, and to you, my fellow-citizens, by as much more as ye are nearer of 13 D kin to me. For such, I assure you, is the command of God, and I am persuaded that never has there befallen you in our city a greater blessing than this my ministration to the God (*τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν*, cp. *Euth.* 14 D *αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία . . . τοῖς θεοῖς*)." By interpreting our passage in the light of the foregoing, we obtain an insight into the meaning of both. Socrates' life is the type of the holy life; and when Socrates asks for the *end* to be realized by man's ministration to Deity, the answer is suggested by the *end* which he sought to attain. For in *Apol.* 30 A (continuing where we just left off) he said, 'For I go about with no other business but this, to plead with you, young and old, not to have more regard for your bodies nor for wealth than for the soul, that it may be as good as possible." See the Introd. §§ 5 and 6.

τικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν τυγχάνει οὖσα ὑπηρετική; οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας οἴει;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος | ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετική ἐστιν; E

ΕΥΘ. Δῆλον ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοίου.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ που εἰς οἰκίας;

ΕΥΘ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δή, ὦ ἄριστε· ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ οἶσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τά γε θεῖα κάλλιστά γε φῂς εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἰπὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἡμῖν ὑπηρέταις χρώμενοι;

13 D XVI. **2. εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν**: cp. *ἡ περὶ τίνων διαφορά*, 7 B. Here is broached the matter of the *ἔργον*, which has great significance to Plato's thought. It is that which is effected by an action, and, indeed, that which, as an end, determines the means to its accomplishment. Originating in art, the term acquired a large use in ethics, and, with Plato and Aristotle, always looks to the *Good* as the supreme end of rational and moral endeavor. Cp. *Rep.* 352 E–353 B, *Gorg.* 468 B, 499 E for its connection with *τὸ ἀγαθόν* and *ἀρετή*. Cp. also *Gorg.* 503 E, *Crat.* 389, and Xen. *Oecon.* 1. 2. In the note on p. 83 attention was called to Socrates' cure of souls, which he regarded as the object of 13 D greatest moment (cp. *Gorg.* 477 B foll.); with the reference to the *ἔργον*, the final goal of holiness is raised a step higher, and the realization of *the Supreme Good* in human society is suggested as its object. That, however, is the assimilation of the individual soul to God (*Theaet.* 176 AB) and, for society, the ultimate approximation to the ideal of righteousness sketched in the *Republic*. Euthyphro does not catch the hint. **3. εἰς ὑγιείας**: *sc.* *ἀπεργασίαν*; so, too, with *εἰς πλοίου* and *εἰς οἰκίας*, 13 E. **8. ἡ οἰκοδόμοις**: *sc.* *ὑπηρετική*. E **12. τά γε θεῖα κάλλιστά γε**: note the repetition of *γε*. Ast's *Lex.* cites many examples.

ΕΥΘ. Πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ | οἱ στρατηγοί, ὦ φίλε· ἀλλ' ὅμως 14
τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥᾳδίως ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ
πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἢ οὔ;

ΕΥΘ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Πολλὰ δέ γ', οἶμαι, καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ γεωργοί·
ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν τῆς ἀπεργασίας
ἡ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφή.

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἃ οἱ θεοὶ
ἀπεργάζονται; τί τὸ κεφάλαιόν ἐστι τῆς ἐργασίας;

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ ὀλίγον σοι πρότερον εἶπον, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ὅτι πλείονος ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀκριβῶς | πάντα ταῦτα ὡς B
ἔχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἁπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν

13 E 18. **πολλὰ καὶ καλά**: Euthyphro, not knowing precisely what to say, takes refuge in generali-
14 A ties. 19. **οἱ στρατηγοί**: again one is forcibly reminded of Socrates' plea before the court; see *Apol.* 28 DE. 20. **τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν**: a case of brachylogy; cp. *τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστι τῆς ἀπεργασίας*, l. 24. It is possible, but not probable, that **κεφάλαιον** (*sc.* **ἔργον**) is an adj. Schanz supplies *τῆς ἀπεργασίας*; without the addition, *αὐτῶν* is to be constr. like *τῆς τέχνης*, 11 D. See App. 23. **οἱ γεωργοί**: cp. *Rep.* 333 A. 24. **αὐτῶν**: hyperbaton. 27. **τί δὲ δή**: see note on 7 D. — **τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν**: cp. *Gorg.* 509 D *τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν*; this is a free use of the gen., to premise mention of a thing, RD. § 27. For other examples, see *Rep.* 459 B, 470 A, 515 B, *Phaedo* 78 D, etc. There is no ellipsis 14 A
of *περί*, as some have thought. 28. **τῆς ἐργασίας**: cp. *ἀπεργασίας*, above, l. 24. It is common thus to employ the simple for the compound verb or noun when it has just been used. For examples in Plato, see *Crito* 44 D, *Phaedo* 104 D, *Theaet.* 178 A, *Soph.* 267 A f., etc. In Euripides, *Med.* 1252 *κατίδετ' ἴδετε*, *Alc.* 400 *ὑπάκουσον ἄκουσον*, *Bacch.* 1065 *κατῆγεν ἦγεν ἦγεν εἰς μέλαν πέδον*. 29. **ὀλίγον . . . πρότερον**: in 9 B; for *ὀλίγον*, see HA. 781 a. 30. **πλείονος ἔργου**: cp. 9 B *ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον ἐστίν*, where see note. — **πάντα ταῦτα κτλ.**: B
'to learn how all these matters stand.' 31. **ἁπλῶς**: 'simply,' 'without qualification.' — **ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα**: not a new definition, but a rhetorical restatement of that offered in 12 E.

μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίσταται τοῖς θεοῖς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ ὅσια, καὶ σῴζει τὰ τοιαῦτα τούς τε ἰδίους οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων· τὰ δ' ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἀσεβῆ, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἅπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.

XVII. ΣΩ. Ἡ πολύ μοι διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἶπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ἠρώτων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμός με εἶ διδάξαι· δῆλος εἶ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν | ἐπειδὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἦσθα, ἀπετράπου· ὃ εἰ C ἀπεκρίνω, ἱκανῶς ἂν ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὁσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη. νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωτωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ὑπάγῃ· τί

14 B **32. λέγειν κτλ.**: **εὐχόμενος** takes up **λέγειν**, as **θύων** takes up **πράττειν**. **34. σῴζει τὰ τοιαῦτα**: this remark is aside from the subject, and is not regarded by Socrates. It is a favorite commonplace with the moralists; cp. *Minos* 314 D, Arist. *Rhet.* 1360ᵃ 19, *Polit.* 1286ᵃ 7 ff., 1287ᵃ 18, Heraclitus apud Laert. Diog. 9. 2. As the Greek state was founded on religion, its salvation was believed to depend on the piety of the citizens. Cp. the noble ode of Horace, *C.* III. 6. Strangely enough, some critics have regarded this trite saying as the key to the definition of holiness. **36. ἀνατρέπει**: cp. *Crito* 50 B.

XVII. **1. πολύ**: belongs to **βραχυτέρων**. **3. ἀλλὰ γάρ**: HA. 1050. 4 d; RD. §§ 147, 149. — **δῆλος εἶ**: asyndetically added, as *Prot.* 339 E **δίκαιος εἶ**. Cp. HA. 1039; RD. § 207. Note the pers. for impers. constr., HA. 944 a. Cp. *Gorg.* 474 C **ὡς ἔοικας**, *Crito* 44 D, 46 D; and see 14 B note on 7 B. **4. ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἦσθα**: C 'you were hard by it'; 'you were hot,' the children say. Socrates exhausts his vocabulary in trying to convince Euthyphro that the true definition of holiness is to be found by following the clew just obtained, rather than by grasping at a new one. See the notes on 13 D. **6. ἐμεμαθήκη**: for the tense, see HA. 895; G. 1397; B. 606; cp. *Apol.* 36 C. — **νῦν δὲ . . . γάρ**: see note on 11 C. — **τὸν ἐρωτῶντα κτλ.**: following the lead of the argument is a commonplace in Plato (*Rep.* 365 D, 394 D, 410 B, 415 D, *Phaedo* 82 D, 115 B, *Gorg.* 527 E, etc.). See App. **7. ἐκεῖνος**: refers to **τῷ ἐρωτωμένῳ**. — **ὑπάγῃ**: **ὑπο-** suggests that one is following a path whose end is not in sight. The suggestion is in harmony with the thought of following the argument. Cp. *Phaedo* 82 D.

δὴ αὖ λέγεις τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα ; οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαί ἐστι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὸ δ' εὔχεσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς ;

ΕΥΘ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς | ὁσιότης ἂν εἴη ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου. D

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ξυνῆκας ὃ εἶπον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιθυμητὴς γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ, ὥστε οὐ χαμαὶ πεσεῖται ὅτι ἂν εἴπῃς. ἀλλά μοι λέξον, τίς αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ; αἰτεῖν τε φῂς αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκείνοις ;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.

14 C FOURTH DEFINITION: 'Holiness is the art or the science of sacrifice and prayer.' This definition is closely akin to that attributed to Socrates by Xen. *Mem.* 4. 6. 4 (see note on 11 E) and it is probable that it fairly represents the common unphilosophical views of the Greeks. Socrates extracts it from the last proposition of Euthyphro, omitting the notion κεχαρισμένα, only to show that it is inherent in the general view, in 15 B. Compare 14 B ἐπίστηται . . . εὐχόμενός τε καὶ θύων with our definition, ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι. The term ἐπιστήμη adds nothing new; for ὁσιότης has already been regarded as τέχνη = ἐπιστήμη; cp. τεχνικόν, 14 E. **14. αἰτήσεως**: *sc.* παρὰ θεῶν. **15. ὁσιότης**: without the art., 14 D HA. 660; G. 944. Cp. τὴν ὁσιότητα, l. 5, and ἡ ὁσιότης, 14 E, l. 10. **17. ἐπιθυμητὴς . . . τῆς σῆς σοφίας**: contrast with this colorless phrase the vivid expression in *Meno* 70 B ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. Cp. *Rep.* 600 D. See App. **18. ὥστε . . . πεσεῖται**: the metaphor is derived from arrows that miss the mark and fall in vain to the ground; cp. Pind. *Ol.* 9. 13 and schol. **19. ὑπηρεσία**: Socrates is glancing at 13 D, and thereby clearly shows that he does not regard Euthyphro's latest attempt as a definition of holiness proper, but only as a special description of man's ministrations to Deity. **20. αὐτοὺς . . . ἐκείνοις**: see note on 6 E.

XVIII. ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἂν εἴη, ὧν δεόμεθα παρ' ἐκείνων, ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλὰ τί;

ΣΩ. Καὶ αὖ τὸ διδόναι ὀρθῶς, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι | τυγχά- E
νουσιν δεόμενοι παρ' ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἐκείνοις αὖ ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι; οὐ γάρ που τεχνικόν γ' ἂν εἴη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῷ ταῦτα ὧν οὐδὲν δεῖται.

ΕΥΘ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἴη. ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τέχνη ἡ ὁσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ' ἀλλήλων.

ΕΥΘ. Ἐμπορική, εἰ οὕτως ἥδιόν σοι ὀνομάζειν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἥδιον ἔμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνει ἀληθὲς ὄν. φράσον δέ μοι, τίς ἡ ὠφελία τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὖσα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων ὧν παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν; ἃ μὲν γὰρ διδόασι, παντὶ δῆλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ

14 D XVIII. **2. ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν**: HA. 724; G. 1069; B. 340. **3. ἀλλὰ τί**: 'what else?' Ritter (*Untersuchungen über Plato*, p. 57) says that in his later works Plato uses *τί μήν;* instead of this phrase. **4. αὖ . . . αὖ**: note the repetition. See note on E 6 A. **6. τεχνικόν**: 'in accordance with *ἐπιστήμη* (= *τέχνη*).' **11. ἐμπορική**: *τις* somewhat softens the repulsive expression, but there is in the term a certain protest against popular notions. Cp. *Symp.* 188 B *ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ θυσίαι πᾶσαι καὶ οἷς μαντικὴ ἐπιστατεῖ — ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία*; *Symp.* 202 E, *Rep.* 365 E, *Polit.* 290 CD, Aes. *Choeph.* 255 ff. This conception of religion, however repugnant to enlightened minds, was com- 14 E
mon among primitive peoples and still serves to explain certain ceremonies. See Deussen, *Allgemeine Gesch. der Philosophie*, 1. 1. 91 ff. **12. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἥδιον κτλ.**: Socrates resents concessions made to his pleasure rather than to the truth; for truth is not a respecter of persons. Cp. *Rep.* 595 C, *Phaedo* 91 A, C, Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1. 4. 1096ª 16. **15. οὐδὲν γὰρ . . . ἐκεῖνοι δῶσιν**: the views of Socrates on Providence are given by Xen. *Mem.* 1. 4 and 4. 3. A Christian scholiast refers to James 1. 17, "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights." Cp. the utterance of Democritus, *fr.* 13 (Mullach).

ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν, | ὅτι ἂν μὴ ἐκεῖνοι δῶσιν· ἃ δὲ 15
παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, τί ὠφελοῦνται; ἢ τοσοῦτον
αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὥστε πάντα
τὰ ἀγαθὰ παρ' αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ παρ'
20 ἡμῶν οὐδέν;

ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλ' οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς θεοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων, ἃ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί δήποτ' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς;

25 ΕΥΘ. Τί δ' οἴει ἄλλο ἢ τιμή τε καὶ γέρα καί, ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;

ΣΩ. Κεχαρισμένον ἄρα | ἐστίν, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τὸ Β
ὅσιον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ὠφέλιμον οὐδὲ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς;

ΕΥΘ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον.

15 A **16. ἃ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν κτλ.**: the unexpressed antecedent of ἅ is a free acc. (or nom.? cp. *Phil.* 27 E), cp. *Phaedo* 65 D *τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε*. Note the fuller form in l. 21 *ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων ἃ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν*. For *τί*, see HA. 716 b; G. 1054. **21. ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων**: 'they derive benefit from.' *ὠφελεῖσθαι* c. *ἐκ* and *ἀπό* with reference to things, c. *ὑπό* and *παρά* (rare) with reference to persons. Cp. *ἀπό* with *λαμβάνω* (*Apol.* 25 E), *ἀπολαύω* (*Apol.* 31 B), *πάσχω* (*Phaedo* 83 B). **23. τί δήποτ'**: the *δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς* are regarded as constituting essentially a unit, hence *τί* rather than *τίνα*; cp. GS. 132. Socrates requires not an enumeration but a statement of the character of our gifts to the gods. **25. τιμή τε καὶ γέρα**: note the free nom. in enumeration, GS. 8. Or possibly 15 A
οἴει may be parenthetical. Sacrifices were actually called *τιμαί* (cp. Lat. *honores*), *γέρα*, and *χάριτες*. **26. ἄρτι**: *i.e.* in 14 B. **27. κεχαρισμένον . . . φίλον**: Euthyphro's use of *κεχαρισμένα*, 14 B, and *χάρις*, 15 A, has occupied Socrates' thought all the while, though he has temporarily disregarded the point. Now by an adroit turn he makes Euthyphro identify these terms with *φίλον* and so shows him that the argument has traveled round in a circle to the point of departure, in 6 E. **29. πάντων γε μάλιστα** B
φίλον: this may be merely a strengthened superlative, 'nothing quite so dear,' as in *Charm.* 158 E; but it seems better to take it as an emphatic assertion that it is *φίλον* at all events, whether it be *ὠφέλιμον* or not. Cp. *Gorg.*

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο ἄρ' ἐστὶν αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ὅσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.

ΕΥΘ. Μάλιστά γε.

XIX. ΣΩ. Θαυμάσει οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, ἐάν σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνωνται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες, καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὢν πολύ γε τεχνικώτερος τοῦ Δαιδάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνει, ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταὐτὸν | ἥκει; μέμνησαι C γάρ που, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἀλλήλων· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;

ΕΥΘ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον φῂς ὅσιον εἶναι; τοῦτο δ' ἄλλο τι ἢ θεοφιλὲς γίγνεται; ἢ οὔ;

ΕΥΘ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν, ἢ εἰ τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα.

ΕΥΘ. Ἔοικεν.

15 B 453 D οὐ δῆτα, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει, 'persuade, you ask? Why yes, — of *all* things!' See note on εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα, 4 D.

30. αὖ: refers back to 6 E. — τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον: explanatory of τοῦτο, the pred. of τὸ ὅσιον. 32. μάλιστα γε: 'most certainly,' frequent in answers.

XIX. 3. τὸν Δαίδαλον: cp. 11 C; for the art., see H.A. 663. This is, of course, in app. with ἐμέ. 4. καὶ κύκλῳ . . . ποιῶν: καί emphasizes κύκλῳ, and ποιῶν assigns the ground for the previous statement. 5. ὁ λόγος κτλ.: for the thought, see *Theaet.* 200 C, *Hipparch.* 231 C, *Clitopho* 410 A. 7. ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν: 10 DE. C 12. ἄλλο τι ἢ: HA. 1015 b; G. 1604; B. 573, N. — γίγνεται: 'turns out to be.' 15. ἄρτι: in 10 E. — καλῶς . . . ὀρθῶς: see note on 7 A.

CLOSE OF THE DIALOGUE: 'Our quest has been futile; let us begin anew.' 'Excuse me; I have a pressing engagement. Some other day.'

XX. ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἡμῖν πάλιν σκεπτέον, τί ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον· ὡς ἐγώ, πρὶν ἂν μάθω, ἑκὼν εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. | ἀλλὰ μή με ἀτιμάσῃς, ἀλλὰ D παντὶ τρόπῳ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν ὅτι μάλιστα νῦν εἰπὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἶσθα γάρ, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἶ, ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν ἂν εἴπῃς. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἤδησθα σαφῶς τό τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἄν ποτε ἐπεχείρησας ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκάθειν φόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ᾐσχύνθης. νῦν δὲ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι

15 C XX. 2. **ὡς**: HA. 925; G. 1505; B. 598. — **πρὶν ἂν μάθω**: HA. 921, (924 a); G. 1471. 2; B. 627. — **ἑκὼν εἶναι**: HA. 956 a; G. 1535; B. 642. 1; GMT. 780. Cp. B. L. Gildersleeve in A. J. P., 1889, 381 f. "It may well be contended that in all these passages *εἶναι* serves the purposes of a larger γε — which particle, by the way, is absent from nearly all the passages in which the re- D strictive *εἶναι* occurs." 4. **παντὶ τρόπῳ . . . ὅτι μάλιστα**: double intensive, because Euthyphro is remiss (*τρυφᾷ*). Cp. *Gorg.* 496 C *καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.* 5. **εἴπερ τις ἄλλος**: HA. 905; B. 615. 6. **ὥσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς**: cp. Hom. δ 384 ff.; *Euthyd.* 288 B, *Ion* 541 E. All sea-divinities possessed two characteristics which render the comparison of Euthyphro with them especially fitting: they had the gift of prophecy, and they had the power to change at will from 15 D one form to another. Cp. the representations on figured vases of Peleus' wooing of Thetis. For Thetis, see *Apol.* 28 C, Hom. Σ 70 ff. 8. **οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως**: 'it is impossible that,' phraseological; virtually an adv. = *nullo modo.* 9. **ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην**: HA. 625 a. Note the emphatic juxtaposition. — **πατέρα**: 'and that your father.' Note the emphatic order. 10. **διωκάθειν**: HA. 494; G. 779. — **τοὺς θεούς**: obj. of **ἂν ἔδεισας**, and *παρακινδυνεύειν* is an epexegetic inf. likewise depending on it. 11. **μὴ οὐκ . . . ποιήσοις**: one of the very rare cases of the fut. opt. after verbs of fearing, GMT. 131. 12. **ᾐσχύνθης**: supply *ἄν* from the foregoing verbs. The omission is more common with the opt., GS. 450. Cp. *Phaedo* 87 E, *Anterast.* 135 C, 136 C.

σαφῶς | οἴει εἰδέναι τό τε ὅσιον καὶ μή· εἰπὲ οὖν, ὦ E
βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρον, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ὅτι αὐτὸ ἡγεῖ.
ΕΥΘ. Εἰς αὖθις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες· νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω
ποι, καί μοι ὥρα ἀπιέναι.
ΣΩ. Οἷα ποιεῖς, ὦ ἑταῖρε! ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με καταβαλὼν
μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ἣν εἶχον, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ μαθὼν τά τε
ὅσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλά-
ξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος ἐκείνῳ ὅτι σοφὸς ἤδη παρ' |
Εὐθύφρονος τὰ θεῖα γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὑπ' ἀγνοίας 16
αὐτοσχεδιάζω οὐδὲ καινοτομῶ περὶ αὐτά, καὶ δὴ καὶ
τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὅτι ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην.

15 D 13. **σαφῶς οἴει εἰδέναι**: cp. *ἀκριβῶς οἴει ἐπίστασθαι*. *σαφῶς* limits *εἰδέναι*, and *οἴει* is used to suggest that it is a *mere* (unfounded) opinion. Cp. *Apol.* E 29 A. 15. **εἰς αὖθις**: 'some other day.' Cp. 6 C *ταῦτα μέν μοι εἰς αὖθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσει*. 16. **ὥρα ἀπιέναι**: HA. 952; G. 1521; B. 641; for the omission of the copula, see HA. 611 a; GS. 83 ff. Laert. Diog. 2. 29 says that Socrates induced a certain Euthyphro to desist from prosecuting his father. Though there is a mistake in the nature of the charge, acc. to his account, there can be no doubt that our Euthyphro is meant. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, 1. p. 196, n. 1, suggests that the variant *ξενίας* in Laert. Diog. 2. 29 for (*ξενοκτονίας* or) *φόνου*, acc. to *Euth.* 4 A, was due to some other Socratic dialogue, rather than to a comedy, as Bergk supposed, *De Reliquiis Comoediae Atticae Antiquae*, p. 357 ff. 17. **οἷα ποιεῖς**: H.A. 1001 a. The words express 15 E disappointment. Cp. *Charm.* 166 C, *Alc. I.* 113 E, *Phaedo* 117 D. — **ἀπ' ἐλπίδος κτλ.**: cp. *Phaedo* 98 B. Socrates has based two hopes on the expectation of being duly instructed by Euthyphro: first, the hope of exemption from trial (*ὡς . . . ἀπαλλάξομαι*, GMT. 136; cp. Eur. *El.* 919); again, the hope of leading a better life with truer insight (*ὅτι ἄμεινον βιωσοίμην*, GMT. 128; cp. Thuc. 6. 30). Socrates, no doubt, was genuinely disappointed; but it is customary, in Plato's minor dialogues, to leave the main question unanswered. 19. **καὶ . . . καὶ δὴ καί**: 'both . . . and especially.'— **ἀπαλλάξομαι . . . βιωσοίμην**: note the change from dir. to indir. disc. For the constr., see note on *ἀπ' ἐλπίδος*, l. 17. The doubling of conjunctions is not unexampled; cp. Xen. *Cyr.* 5. 3. 30; *Anab.* 5. 6. 19; 7. 4. 5. Inversely, *ὅτι . . . ὡς*, *Hipp. Ma.* 281 C. 16 A

APPENDIX

§ 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY

a. *General Works on Plato Dealing with the* Euthyphro

SCHLEIERMACHER, F.: *Platons Werke*, Berlin, 1804. 1. 2. pp. 37–39.

AST, F.: *Platons Leben und Schriften*, Leipzig, 1816. pp. 469–474.

SOCHER, J.: *Ueber Platons Schriften*, München, 1820. pp. 60–64.

ARNOLD, A.: *Platons Werke, einzeln erklärt und in ihrem Zusammenhange dargestellt*, Berlin, 1835. 1 Heft, pp. 45–67.

HERMANN, K. F.: *Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie*, Heidelberg, 1839. pp. 480 f., 640 f.

STEINHART, K. und H. MÜLLER: *Platons sämtliche Werke*, Leipzig, 1851. 1. pp. 187–200.

SUSEMIHL, F.: *Die genetische Entwickelung der Platonischen Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1855. 1. pp. 114–127.

MUNK, E.: *Die natürliche Ordnung der Platonischen Schriften*, Berlin, 1857. pp. 441–457.

UEBERWEG, F.: *Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften*, Wien, 1861. pp. 250 ff.

GROTE, G.: *Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates*, London, 1865. 1. pp. 310–330.

SCHAARSCHMIDT, C.: *Die Sammlung der Platonischen Schriften*, Bonn, 1866. pp. 390–396.

BONITZ, H.: *Platonische Studien*, Dritte Aufl., Berlin, 1886. pp. 227–242.

TIEDEMANN, D.: *Dialogorum Platonis Argumenta Exposita et Illustrata*, Biponti, 1786. pp. 13–15.

VAN PRINSTERER, W. G.: *Platonica Prosopographia*, Lugdun. Batav., 1823. pp. 170 ff.

HUNZIKER, J.: *Argumenta Dialogorum* (in *Platonis Opera*, ed. Didot) Parisiis, 1873. 3. pp. 20–22.

LUTOSLAWSKI, W.: *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, New York, 1897.

b. *General Editions of Plato's Works*

Editio Princeps, apud Aldum, Venice, 1513.

STEPHANUS, H.: Paris, 1578. All recent Plato texts are printed with page

and letter (A, B, C, D, E) of this edition added in the margin, and all citations are made in accordance with them.

Ast, F.: *Platonis quae Extant Opera*, Lipsiae, 1819–1832.

Stallbaum, G.: *Platonis Opera Omnia*, Lipsiae, 1821–1825.

Bekker, I.: *Platonis Scripta Graece Omnia*, Londini, 1826.

Hermann, C. F.: *Platonis Dialogi secundum Thrasylli Tetralogias Dispositi*, Lipsiae, 1851–1853.

Hirschig, R. B.: *Platonis Opera, Graece et Latine* (Didot), Parisiis, 1846–1856.

Schanz, M.: *Platonis Opera quae Feruntur Omnia*, Lipsiae, 1875 ff. (Critical edition, not yet completed.)

Hermann-Wohlrab: *Platonis Opera post C. F. Hermannum Recognovit M. Wohlrab*, Lipsiae, 1881 ff.

Burnet, J.: *Platonis Opera*, Oxonii, 1900. (Not yet completed.)

c. *Special Editions containing the* Euthyphro

Fischer, I. F.: *Platonis Euthyphro Apologia Socratis Crito Phaedo*, Ed. III., Lipsiae, 1783.

Wolf, F. A.: *Platonis Dialogorum Delectus. Pars I. Euthyphro Apologia Socratis Crito*, Berolini, 1812.

Engelhardt, F. G.: *Platonis Dialogi Quattuor Laches Euthyphro Apologia Socratis Menexenus*, Berolini, 1825.

Wohlrab, M.: *Platons Euthyphro für den Schulgebrauch erklärt*, Leipzig, 1872. Dritte, verbesserte Auflage, 1887.

Wells, G. H.: *The Euthyphro of Plato. With an Introduction and Notes*, London, 1880.

Schmelzer, C.: *Platos ausgewählte Dialoge. Menon. Euthyphron.* Berlin, 1883.

Graves, C. E.: *The Euthyphro and the Menexenus of Plato. Edited for the Use of Schools*, London, 1883.

Fritzsche, A. R.: *Platonis Meno et Euthyphro. Incerti Scriptoris Theages Erastae Hipparchus*, Lipsiae, 1885.

Schanz, M.: *Platonis Euthyphro. In scholarum usum denuo edidit M.S.*, Lipsiae, 1887.

Schanz, M.: *Sammlung ausgewählter Dialoge Platos mit deutschem Kommentar. Erstes Bändchen. Euthyphro*, Leipzig, 1887.

Christ, A. Th.: *Platons Euthyphron. Für den Schulgebrauch herausgegeben*, Wien und Prag, 1890.

Adam, J.: *Platonis Euthyphro. With Introduction and Notes*, Cambridge, 1890.

d. *Special Works dealing with the* Euthyphro

NÜRNBERGER, I. C. B.: *De Consilio Platonis in Scribendo Euthyphrone*, Erlangen, 1787.
SCHIERENBERG, H.A.: *Ueber die Zeit der Abfassung des Platonischen Dialogs Euthyphron*, Lemgo, 1842.
YXEM, E. F.: *Ueber Platons Euthyphro*, Berlin, 1842.
GRASER, F. W.: *Ueber Platons Euthyphro*, in Zeitschrift für Altertumswissenschaft, 1842, pp. 563–572.
STRUVE, E. A.: *Quid Socrati Pium Videatur in Platonis Euthyphrone*, Görlitz, 1855.
MARESCH, A.: *Einleitung zu Platons Euthyphron*, Pressburg, 1859.
MUNSCHER, F. W.: *Inhalt und Erläuterung des Platonischen Dialogs Euthyphron*, Hersfeld, 1859.
HERMANN, E.: *Einleitung, Gedankengang und Gliederung des Platonischen Dialogs Euthyphron*, Toppau, 1861.
WALSER, J.: *Platons Euthyphron oder die Erörterung über die Frömmigkeit*, Hammerstadt, 1866.
COLLMANN, E.: *Ueber den Platonischen Dialog Euthyphron*, Marburg, 1870.
SCHULTZE, R.: *Ueber Platons Euthyphron*, Wittstock, 1870.
MICHAEL, A.: *De Pietatis Notione, quam Plato in Euthyphrone Tractat*, Zittau, 1871.
WECLEWSKI, S.: *De Platonis Euthyphrone*, Conitz, 1875.
LECHTHALER, J.: *Die ὁσιότης (Frömmigkeit) bei Platon, mit Rücksicht auf Schaarschmidts Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron*, Meran, 1879.
RIESER, O.: *De Platonis Euthyphrone*, Frauenfeld, 1880.
WAGNER, J.: *Zur Athetese des Dialogs Euthyphron*, Brünn, 1883.
WAGNER, J.: *Präparationen zu Platons Euthyphron*, Brünn, 1888.
SUMAN, J.: *Beitrag zur Erklärung des Platonischen Dialogs Euthyphron*, in Zeitschrift für die oesterreich. Gymnasien, 1894, pp. 687 ff.
HEIDEL, W. A.: *On Plato's Euthyphro*, in Transactions of the American Philological Association, xxxi, 1900, pp. 163–181.

§ 2. CRITICAL NOTES ON THE TEXT

A detailed report of the readings of the Mss. has been given with great precision by Schanz and Fritzsche, to whose *adnotatio* the scholar is referred. A careful study of the text of Burnet (Oxford, 1900) and of Schanz's smaller critical edition (Leipzig, 1887) as compared with the large edition (Leipzig, 1875), shows how unwilling critics now are to follow slavishly any one class of Mss.

It is well known that the works of Plato were divided for convenience into two volumes, the first of which contained the first seven tetralogies, the second containing the remainder. The best Ms. for the first volume, as is universally acknowledged, is the *Clarkianus* of the Bodleian Library, Oxford. For the second volume, the *Parisinus* is admittedly the best. Burnet suggests the possibility that the *Marcianus* (T) — which shares, though not quite equally, with the *Clarkianus* (B) the distinction of affording the critical basis for the first volume — is really the lost first part of the *Parisinus*. It may therefore be in order to give a brief account of these two Mss.

The *Clarkianus*[1] or *Bodleianus* (B), a parchment written in the year 895 (so Burnet; Schanz says 896), contains the first six tetralogies of Thrasyllus. It is admitted by all to be the best representative of the first class of Mss., to which Schanz in his large critical edition deferred in all cases of doubt. The Ms. suffers chiefly from two classes of errors: first, from mistakes of the copyist, which, not being masked by false learning, are readily detected and corrected; second, from omissions, which may be recovered by reference to T. In matters of detail, B is fairly accurate, but requires to be corrected here and there, when the right reading appears only in inferior Mss.

The *Marcianus*[2] (T), the leader of the second class of Mss., is a parchment, written in the twelfth century or earlier, discovered and collated by Schanz, who at once perceived its great worth. The scribe who wrote it was more than ordinarily intelligent, and made few mistakes of an egregious sort. There occur, however, numerous transpositions, which are easily corrected by reference to B. In the vast majority of points the text of the *Euthyphro* is now fully made out, and the disagreements between B and T have been finally weighed; but there still remain a number of passages in which the indications are by no means clear. In such cases the editor follows B or T according to his best judgment of the requirements of the context.

In offering the following critical notes, the object has been twofold. In the first place, it appeared desirable to single out the principal points at which the text may still be fairly said to be in doubt, and to exhibit the readings of B and T. But, again, it was only natural that account should be taken of the text presented in the best recent editions. In so doing, it became necessary to take sides, and sometimes to take issue with scholars whose critical judgment is deservedly held in high esteem. The text here presented exhibits only one novelty, viz. the reading ἄλλους ἀδικεῖν for ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν in 8 D, and this was suggested as a possibility, though not adopted, by Adam. Where no note is given, the text of Wohlrab's recen-

[1] See Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, Wirceburgi, 1871, pp. 105–118.

[2] See Schanz, *Ueber den Platocodex der Markusbibliothek in Venedig, Append. Class. 4, Nr. 1.* Leipzig, 1877.

sion of Hermann's Teubner edition (Leipzig, 1881) is followed. The following abbreviations, not previously explained, have been employed.[1]

S. = Schanz's larger critical edition, of 1875.
S^2. = Schanz's smaller critical edition, of 1887.
Fr. = Fritzsche.
Wb. = Hermann-Wohlrab.
A. = Adam.
Bur. = Burnet.

2 A. **ὦ Εὐθύφρον** : B and T always show **ὦ Εὐθύφρων** ; Edd., excepting Bur., read **ὦ Εὐθύφρον** with the vulgate. B and T frequently err in such matters. Fritzsche *ad loc.* cites numerous instances of similar character from the Mss.

γραφὴν σέ τις Fr., A., Bur. ; **γραφήν σέ τις** Wb., S. *σέ* is clearly emphatic.

2 B. **γέγραπται·** A., Bur., rightly ; **γέγραπται** ; Wb., S., F.

ὡς σὺ ἕτερον B ; **ὡς σύ γε ἕτερον** T, wrongly ; for *σύ* receives all the necessary stress from its juxtaposition with *ἕτερον*.

πρὸς τὴν πόλιν· Cobet, following Schaefer ad Dion. Hal. *De Comp. Verb.*, p. 328, omits *πρός*, since he deletes the prepos. wherever the comparison precedes the thing compared. See *Var. Lect.*, p. 165.

3 A. **τῶν νέων** : S^2., following Gomperz, brackets the words unnecessarily, as I think. See the Notes.

3 B. **με ποιητὴν εἶναι** B ; **ποιητὴν εἶναί με** T.

διαβαλῶν E, Edd. ; **διαβαλών** BT.

3 D. **ἐθέλοι** B ; Bur. without good reason reads **ἐθέλει** with T. *ἐθέλοι* is the normal protasis to *προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως* ; for Socrates exaggerates in order to point the contrast between himself and Euthyphro.

νῦν δὴ Wb., Fr., S., A. ; **νυνδὴ** S^2., Bur., following Cobet, throughout.

3 E. **σπουδάσονται** T ; **σπουδάζοντας** B, by a false assimilation to *παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας*.

4 A. **ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει** Mss. Madvig, *Adversaria Crit.*, I., p. 366, indicates a lacuna after these words, suggesting that an infinitive (*εὐσεβεῖν?*) has been lost and *ὀρθῶς* has crept into its place. Schanz looks to 9 A or 15 D for the necessary supplement. See Notes. Wb. is content to say that the subj. of *ὀρθῶς ἔχει* (such as *τὸ τῷ πατρὶ φόνον ἐγκαλεῖν*) is only vaguely in Socrates' thought ; and hence he marks no definite lacuna. Similarly Fr. The former view is, on the whole, the more probable. A. brackets *ὀρθῶς*, and reads *ἔχεις*, gaining a thought hardly in keeping with the context. A. T. Christ inserts *ταῦτα πρᾶξαι* after *ἔχει*, and deletes *αὐτὸ πρᾶξαι* in the next clause. Bur. brackets *ὀρθῶς* before *αὐτὸ*, and follows the Mss. for the rest.

4 B. **ἢ δῆλα δή** ; S^2., A., Bur., rightly ; **ἢ δῆλα δή·** Wb., S., Fr.

[1] For full titles, see the Bibliography, App. § 1. c.

που ὑπέρ γε ἀλλοτρίου T, followed by S^2., A., Bur., rightly, I think, because the γε naturally places the stress on *ἀλλοτρίου* (W. has *ἀλλοτρίου γε*); **πού γε ὑπὲρ ἀ.** B, followed by Wb., S., Fr.

ὁ κτείνας Mss.; **χὠ κτείνας** S^2., without good reasons.

4 C. **χρείη** B (first hand), rightly, restored by S., followed by Edd.; **χρὴ** T.

4 E. **μου** Heusde, followed by Edd.: **μοι** BT. The former reading only is allowable.

5 B. **καὶ ὀρθῶς νομίζειν ἐμὲ** B, followed by S., Fr., Wb.; **καὶ ὀρθῶς . . . καὶ ἐμὲ** T, followed by A. Bur. brackets the first *καί* and reads *καὶ ἐμὲ*.

διδάσκοντι . . . νουθετοῦντι . . . κολάζοντι restored by Madvig from interior Mss.; **διδάσκοντα . . . νουθετοῦντα . . . κολάζοντα** BT.

εἰ ἄρα με B, followed by S., Fr., Wb., A.: **ἐμὲ** T, followed by Bur. As the emphasis naturally falls on *εἰ*, *με* is to be preferred.

5 C. **ἐγένετο** B, followed by S., Fr., Wb., A., Bur.; **γένοιτο** T. See the Notes.

ὀξέως B; **ὀξέως ἀτεχνῶς** T. *ἀτεχνῶς* is evidently out of place, and is probably a marginal remark, calling attention to the somewhat forced point in *κατεῖδεν*, transferred erroneously into the text. So, too, S^2. Bur. conjectures *ἀτενῶς*, which does not give an acceptable sense.

5 D. **πᾶν τοὐναντίον** S^2.; **παντὸς ἐναντίον** Mss. As S. remarks, since *τὸ ὅσιον* precedes without a modifier, one should expect no modifier with *τοὐ ὁσίου* in view of the strong contrast; whereas a strengthening of *ἐναντίον* is quite in place. Cp. *Protag.* 332 A.

κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα T, followed by Wb., Fr., S^2.; **κατὰ τὴν ὁσιότητα** B, followed by A. S. follows B, but brackets the words. **κατὰ τὴν ⟨μὴ⟩ ὁσιότητα** Bur., following the Armenian Version. It seems to me that the lection of T is clearly correct. The only objection to it arises from the mistaken assumption that the words contain a reference to hypostatic Ideas, among which one of absolute negation would seem to be out of place. The assumption should not, however, be made since the matter was thoroughly discussed by Bonitz (*Platonische Studien*, 3te Aufl., pp. 240 ff.). The definitional notion only was referred to by Plato, and if it is possible to define *τὸ ἀνοσιον*, as Plato everywhere implies, one may certainly say *κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα*. It is evident that the doubts of modern critics, such as Schaarschmidt and Wagner, had occurred to the ancients. This appears from the variants of T and B, and, still more, of the Armenian Version. Most instructive of all is the forced interpretation of the scholiast: *κατὰ τὴν ὁσιότητα· ἀντὶ τοῦ ὁμοίως, παραπλησίως τῇ ὁσιότητι*. As all this confusion arose from the mistaken notion that Plato referred to hypostatic Ideas, Adam should not have adopted the reading and the interpretation of the scholiast.

5 E. **τοῦ νομίμου** Baumann, followed by S^2.; **τοῦ νόμου** Mss. *νόμος* cannot here mean the law of Athens, as Adam suggests. It must mean that which is universally accepted; but it is questionable whether the word will bear such an interpretation. Schanz conjectured *τοὐντρόμου*, and Hirschig *τοῦ*

ὁσίου. Baumann's τοῦ νομίμου gives the required sense, and seems to be the most likely reading.

ὅτι . . . οὕτω γιγνόμενα bracketed by S^2.

6 A. **οὕνεκα** S^2., followed by A.; **οὗ οὕνεκα** B T, followed by Bur., who brackets **οὗ**; **οὗ ἕνεκα** S., Wb., Fr.

διὸ δὴ T, followed by S^2., A., Bur.; **δι' ἃ δὴ** B, followed by S., Wb., Fr. Probably, as Schanz suggests, **δι' ἃ** arose from an erroneous assimilation to τὰ τοιαῦτα; whereas the reference is to the whole clause τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . ἀποδέχομαι.

6 C. **μὴ μόνον** B, followed by Edd.; **μὴ μόνα** T. The sing. evidently was questioned, and so gave rise to the plur.

6 D. **καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν** T, followed by S., Wb., Fr., Bur.; **καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ὅσια** B, followed by A. Since ὅσια is wanting in B after εἶναι in the previous line, it is probable that there is here, as Burnet suggests, a mere transposition.

7 A. **ἀληθές** inferior Mss., followed by Wb.; **ἀληθῶς** B, followed by S., Fr., A., Bur.; **ὡς ἀληθῶς** T. For a discussion, see Wohlrab's Crit. App. and Jordan in Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 1876, p. 781. Supposing the lection ἀληθές, which is clearly the most appropriate. ἀληθῶς may be accounted for in several ways. First, by simple assimilation to παγκάλως; then, if ὡς were written above -ές, ὡς ἀληθῶς (T) would naturally arise. Again, it is conceivable that ὡς ἀληθῶς was added in the margin to draw attention to the emphasis on ἀληθές. In that case, ὡς ἀληθῶς (T) may easily have supplanted ἀληθές, because it was supposed to be a var. lect., and. being incapable of interpretation, ἀληθῶς (B) would be the resultant reading.

ὁ θεοφιλὴς BT, followed by S., Fr., Wb., A.; **θεοφιλὴς** Bur., following W. **οὐχ οὕτως ⟨εἴρηται⟩**; Hermann, followed by A.; **οὐχ οὕτως** Mss.

οὕτω μὲν οὖν Mss.; **οὕτω μὲν οὖν. εἴρηται γάρ.** Anton Maresch, followed by Wb., Fr., transposing εἴρηται γάρ, which, in the Mss., stands after δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

7 B. **δοκῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.** [**εἴρηται γάρ.**] Naber introduced the brackets. The entire passage is desperate. See Fritzsche and Schanz (with the *Addenda*).

ὧδε Fr., S^2., A., B.; **ᾧδε** S., Wb.

7 C. **μετρεῖν** T, followed by Wb., Fr., S^2., A., Bur.; **μέτριον** B; **μέτρον** inferior Mss., followed by S.

ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν Edd., excepting S^2., who reads **ἐπί τινα κρίσιν.** The change is not necessary.

7 D. **τί δὲ οἱ θεοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρον**; so I punctuate with Bur.; others punctuate **τί δέ; οἱ θεοί, κτλ.** Cp. the passage, 14 A.

διὰ ταῦτα B, followed by S., S^2., Wb., Fr., A.; **δι' αὐτὰ ταῦτα** T, followed by Bur. The emphasis is not needed.

8 A. **ὃ τυγχάνει** B T, followed by Edd., except Schanz, who conjectures **ᾧ**. See the Notes.

8 C. **οὐ δεῖν φασὶ** S., A., Bur., rightly, as φασί is emphatic; **οὐ δεῖν φασι** Wb., Fr.

8 D. **οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε . . . Ἀληθῆ λέγεις** Schanz brackets these words, following the suggestion of Schenkl. in Zeitschr. für österreich. Gymn., XI., p. 178; but the passage cannot be spared for the thought.

ἄλλους ἀδικεῖν W. A. Heidel; **ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν** Mss.; **ἄλλ' ἄλλους** Adam. This is a difficult passage, of which no satisfactory explanation has been offered. Wohlrab interprets *καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀδικοῦντες οἱ μέν φασιν ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὔ φασιν*, which, I suppose, must mean, 'Though they wrong one another, some say that they (themselves) are in the wrong, others say that they (themselves) are innocent.' This is to me incredible. Fritzsche interprets *ἀδικοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, καὶ οἱ μέν φασιν (ἀδικεῖσθαι), οἱ δὲ οὔ φασιν (ἀδικεῖν)*. This is intelligible; but it is truly, as he says, '*mira brevitas!*' Besides, one is obliged to do violence to the text in order to reach this interpretation. Schanz merely says "*ἀλλήλους, hier die einen die andern.*" The sense would then be, 'Some accuse each other: others say that they (themselves) are innocent.' The disjunction is exceedingly lame, and cannot be accepted. Adam's *ἄλλ' ἄλλους* needlessly complicates the situation. The situation is simple: certain gods (not necessarily including *all* gods) differ in their judgments touching others (whether gods or men does not distinctly appear): one set of gods says, 'they (*ἄλλους*, a third party) are in the wrong'; the other set says, 'they are not.' The frequent confusion of *ἄλλων* etc. with *ἀλλήλων* etc. in Mss. is sufficiently known.

8 E. **τὸ κεφάλαιον** B: **τό γε κεφάλαιον** T. followed by Bur.

9 C. **τὸ γὰρ θεομισὲς ὂν καὶ θεοφιλὲς ἐφάνη** bracketed by Kleist, followed by Wb., S^2. Adam brackets all from *ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦτῳ* to *ἐφάνη*. The difficulty arises, I believe, from a misapprehension. The bracketed words are required, because without them the second definition, in its first and unamended form, is not disposed of. Socrates has had a sudden inspiration. He sees that they are wasting time over unprofitable talk, and he desires to introduce an objection to the real purport of the definition, to which he therefore suggests an amendment. He is unwilling, however, to part with the last theme without clinching, in a word, his objection to the self-contradictory definition. This he does in a parenthesis, extending from *θεομισὲς μὲν γάρ* to *ὦ Εὐθύφρον*, whereupon he resumes his first announcement of the new thought that has come to him in the emphatic and abrupt words, *εἰ βούλει κτλ.* See the Notes.

ὥστε τούτου μὲν T, followed by Wb., Bur., rightly, as I think, because Socrates wishes to suggest that he has a more fatal objection to urge; **ὥστε τούτου** B, followed by S., Fr., A.

εἰ βούλει B, followed by S., A., Bur.; **καὶ εἰ βούλει** T. followed by Wb., Fr.

9 D. **ἡγείσθων** B (second hand): otherwise the Mss. generally show **ἡγείσθωσαν**, which Fr. adopts. The imv. ending *-ωσαν* is not found on inscriptions before 300 B.C. See Meisterhans, *Grammatik der Att. Inschriften*^{3}, § 63 d.

νῦν ἐπανορθώμεθα inferior Mss.; **νῦν ἐπανορθούμεθα** T; **ὁ νῦν ἐπανορθούμεθα** B, followed by Bur. The reading of B, which makes the sentence anacoluthic, may very well be the original text.

10 C. **ἤ τι πάσχει** B, followed by Edd.; **ἢ εἴ τι πάσχει τι** T. Cp. *ἢ πάσχον τι* in l. 33, below.

ὑπὸ ὧν Mss. For the hiatus, see Cic. *Orat.* 44. 151 and Fritzsche *ad Menon.* 77 A.

10 D. ⟨**τὸ θεοφιλές**⟩ added by Bast, followed by Edd., excepting Wb. in the Teubner text. In his (third) annotated edition Wb. also accepts Bast's conjecture, pronouncing it indispensable.

10 E. **αὐτῷ τούτῳ** T; **αὐτῶν τούτῳ** B.

11 D. **σύ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος** Edd.; **σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ὁ Δαίδαλος** Adam, who thinks the omission of *εἶναι* in such a case unusual. But see *οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι* ⟨sc. *εἶναι*⟩ *δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι*, 11 E, and cp. *Gorg.* 505 E. Adam's punctuation yields an added point, but it is certainly more natural to supply *εἶναι* than *ἐντιθέναι*, as he proposes. But 15 B seems to favor Adam's view.

11 E. [**δεῖξαι**]: omitted by some Mss. and deleted by Hermann, who is followed by S., Wb., A., Bur.; Fr. adopts Bekker's conjecture *διδάξαις* and reads **δεῖξαι, ὅπως ἄν με διδάξαις.**

12 A. **ἐλάττονι** B, followed by S., Wb., Fr., A.; **ἔλαττον** T, followed by Bur. As *οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἢ* virtually = *τοσούτῳ*, it is to be preferred.

οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν Mss.; **οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν** Naber.

τόν θ' ἕρξαντα B (second hand), followed by S., Wb., Fr., A.; **τὸν θέρξαντα** B (first hand): **τὸν στέρξαντα** T. Adam suggests **θρέψαντα**, while Burnet reads **τὸν [θ'] ἕρξαντα.**

12 B. **ἐθέλεις εἰπεῖν** BT. followed by S., Wb., Fr., A.; **ἐθέλει νεικεῖν** Bur., deriving his suggestion from **νείκεσιν** (schol. T) and **ἐθέλειν εἴκειν** (schol. ap. Cram. *Anecd. Par.* I., p. 399).

12 C. **αἰδὼς δέους** B, rightly; **αἰδοῦς δέος** T.

12 E. **ἵνα καὶ Μελήτῳ . . . ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή** Mss. It appears to me that the words are uncalled for and really out of place here, although the sentiment is appropriate in 5 A f. and 15 E f. The use of the art. in *καὶ τὰ μή* may suggest a spurious addition, since we find simply *καὶ μή* in 9 C and 15 E (*bis*).

13 B. **ἡ δέ γε βοηλατικὴ** T, rightly followed by Bur.; **ἡ δὲ β.** B.

13 D. **ᾗπερ** B, followed by S., Fr., A.; **ἥνπερ** T, followed by Wb., S^2., Bur. The dative relieves the stiffness of the sentence.

13 E. **κάλλιστά γε** B, followed by S., Fr., Wb., A.; **κάλλιστα** T, followed by Bur.

14 A. **τὸ κέφαλαιον αὐτῶν** Mss.; **τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς ἀπεργασίας αὐτῶν** Schanz.

ἐργασίας B; **ἀπεργασίας** T. See the Notes.

14 C. **ἐρωτῶντα** T; **ἐρῶντα** B.

ἐρωτωμένῳ Arm. Vers. and inferior Mss.; **ἐρωμένῳ** B T.

The reading of T, *τὸν ἐρωτῶντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ*, shows how easily the text

could be corrupted, and how little weight can attach to the Mss. The confusion between the words is common, and it is as easy to obtain ἐρῶντα from ἐρωτῶντα by quasi-haplography as ἐρωτῶντα from ἐρῶντα by quasi-dittography. If there was an attempt to correct the text, it is altogether more likely that a scribe, knowing the reputed amativeness of Socrates, would make the change from ἐρωτῶντα to ἐρῶντα than the reverse. Indeed, the colorless phrase ἐπιθυμητὴς . . . τῆς σῆς σοφίας, in 14 D (contrast ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ *Meno* 70 B and *Rep.* 600 D), may well have prompted the change, though it cannot really support it. How colorless ἐπιθυμητής is, may be seen by referring to a few examples. In *Rep.* 475 B it denotes one who aspires to honor; in Xen. *Mem.* I. 2. 60 and Xen. *Apol.* 28 the word means an *adherent* of Socrates. *Legg.* 643 E παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον affords a striking illustration. Plato first uses the weak term ἐπιθυμητής, and then, with conscious exaggeration, adds ἐραστής. The presence of ὑπάγῃ (see the Notes) makes for ἐρωτωμένῳ rather than for ἐρωμένῳ. Hence I follow Schanz.

15 B. **πολύ γε** B; **πόλυ** T.

15 C. **οὐ μέμνησαι** B; **οὐδὲ μέμνησαι** T.

ὡμολογοῦμεν B (corrected); **ὁμολογοῦμεν** B (first hand), T.

τί ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον B; **τί ἐστιν ὅσιον** T.

15 D. **προσέχων** B, followed by Edd.; **προσχὼν** T; **προσσχὼν** Bur.

16 A. **ὅτι** Mss., bracketed by S., followed by Wb., Bur.; omitted by S^2.

GREEK INDEX

ἅ = ἀπὸ τούτων ἅ 15 A.
ἀγανακτῶ, ὅτι 4 D.
ἀγὼν δημόσιος 2 A n. / ἀγὼν ἴδιος 2 A n.
ἅδην (καὶ τούτων μέν) 11 E.
αἰδοῦμαι 12 B.
αἰδώς (example) 12 B ff.
αἰσχύνομαι 12 B, 15 D.
αἴτησις (*sc.* παρὰ θεῶν) 14 C.
αἰτῶ 14 C.
ἀκινήτως 11 D.
ἀκολουθῶ 14 C.
ἀκριβῶς μαθεῖν 14 A.
ἀκρόπολις 6 C.
ἄκων 11 D.
ἀληθῆ λέγεις (in answers) 8 D (*bis*), 10 E, 14 E. / καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγω 13 E.
ἄλλα (τά τε) . . . καὶ δὴ καί 6 C.
ἀλλά with imv. 6 B, 14 D. / ἀλλά postponed after voc. 3 C. / ἀλλὰ γάρ 6 D, 9 C, 14 B. / ἀλλὰ . . . γε 8 E, 12 B. / ἀλλὰ δή 2 B. / ἀλλ ἴσως . . . ἀλλά 3 E. / ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ . . . γε 10 D. / ἀλλὰ μὴ . . . ἀλλά 15 D. / ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε 6 E. / ἀλλὰ τί 14 D.
ἀλλήλους for ἄλλους in Mss. 8 D App.
ἄλλο τι = ἄλλο τι ἤ 10 D.
ἄλλο τι ἤ 15 C.
ἀλλότριος 11 D.
ἅμα with gen. abs. 9 C.
ἀμελῶ 4 D.
ἀμφισβητῶ, ὡς οὐ, 8 B, 8 C, 8 D. See διαφέρομαι, ὡς οὐ.
ἄν with part. 3 D. / ἄν repeated 7 B. / ἄν to be supplied from preceding clause 15 D.
ἀνάγκη 6 B. / ἀνάγκη (in answers) 10 C. / πολλὴ ἀνάγκη (in answers) 7 D.
ἀνάγω 6 C.
ἀνατρεπτικός 2 A n.
ἀνατρέπω 14 B.
ἀνδροφόνος 4 D (*bis*), 9 A.
ἄνευ μισθοῦ 3 D.
ἀνοσιότης (? ὁσιότης, μὴ ὁσιότης) 5 D App.
ἀντιδωροῦμαι 14 E.
ἀπαλλάττομαι 15 E.
ἀπεργάζομαι 13 E, 14 A.
ἀπεργασία 13 D, 13 E (*bis*). / ἀπεργασία to be supplied 13 D, 13 E (*bis*).
ἀπέρχομαι 15 E.
ἁπλῶς 14 B.
ἀπό (ὠφελεῖσθαι ἀπό) 15 A, (ὠφελία ἀπό) 14 E.
ἀποβλέπω εἰς 6 E.
ἀποδειλιάζω 15 C.
ἀποδέχομαι 6 A. / ἀποδέχομαι with gen. 9 E.
ἀποδιδράσκω 11 C.
ἀποκρύπτομαι 11 B, 15 E.
ἀποκτείνω 4 D (*bis*). See κτείνω.
Ἀπόλλων Λύκειος 2 A n.
ἀποσφάττω 4 C.
ἀποτρέπομαι 14 C.
ἆρα postponed 6 B. / ἆρά γε 6 A. / ἆρα ἵνα . . . ἢ ἵνα μὲν . . . ἵνα δέ

12 C. / ἆρ' οὖν 5 A, 11 E. / ἆρ' οὖν οὐ 14 D. / ἆρα οὐ 7 D. / ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτω 8 A, 8 E.
ἀριθμός (example) 12 C.
ἄρτι with imperf. 15 A, C. / ἄρτι with aor. 6 C (*bis*), 9 C.
ἄρτιος ⟨ἀριθμός⟩ 12 D. / τὸ ἄρτιον 12 D.
ἀρρηφόροι 6 C n.
ἀσέβεια 5 C, 12 E.
ἀτεχνῶς 3 A. / [ἀτεχνῶς] 5 C App.
αὖ *vicissim* 4 E, 5 D, 6 A.
αὐτός intensive with pers. pron. 11 C. / αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁ αὐτός 5 D. / αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅμοιος 5 D. / αὐτοῦ in pred. posit. 4 C. / ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένειν 11 C.
αὐτοσχεδιάζω 5 A, 16 A.
ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι (proverb) 3 A.
ἀφίημι with gen. 5 B, 9 C.
ἀφοσιῶ 4 C.

βαδίζω 15 B (*bis*).
βασιλεύς ⟨ὁ ἄρχων⟩ 2 A.
βλάστη 3 A.
βοηλατική, ἡ, (example) 13 B.
βοῦς (example) 13 B.

γάρ (in short answers) εἴρηται γάρ 7 B, καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν 6 D. / καὶ γάρ 6 D, 12 A, 13 E, 14 B. / γὰρ δή 12 A. / γάρ τοι 3 B, 3 C. / γάρ που 6 D, 13 A, 15 C. / οὐ γάρ που 7 E. / οὐ γὰρ . . . γε 2 B, 4 A. / γάρ που . . . γε 12 C. / οὐ γάρ που . . . γε 2 A, 4 B, 13 A, 14 E. / πῶς γὰρ οὔ; in answers 10 A, 10 D. See πῶς δ' οὔ; / οὐ γὰρ οὖν 2 B.
γε with gen. abs., marking cond. force, 4 D. / γε . . . γε 13 E. / γε with particles ἔτι γε 6 B, διότι γε 10 D, εἴ γε 10 E, ἵνα γε 12 B, 12 C. / καὶ . . . γε 6 B, 6 D, 7 A, 12 E, 13 D, 13 E. / καὶ . . . γέ που 13 B, 13 E.
γέρα, 'sacrifices,' 15 A.
γεωργός (example) 14 A.
γίγνομαι (of the occurrence of the δαιμόνιον) 3 B.
γραφή *vs.* δίκη 2 A n.

δαιμόνιον, τό, 3 B.
δέ following τε 3 E. / δέ γε 7 E, 10 E, 13 B. / δέ γε . . . ἀλλ' ὅμως 14 A. Cp. καὶ γὰρ . . . ἀλλ' ὅμως 13 E. / οὐδέ γε 13 A. / δὲ δή 3 E, 4 B, 4 E, 7 C, 13 B.
δείδω 12 B.
δεῖν, Attic for δέον, 4 D.
δέομαι, 'want,' with παρά and gen., 14 D, 14 E.
δέος (example) 12 B.
δεσμά, τά, (only occurrence of this plural in Plato) 9 A.
δή (scornful) 9 A. / δή with imv. 5 D, 7 A, 10 A, 12 D (*bis*), 13 E (*bis*). / δὴ οὖν καί 4 D. / οὗτοι δὴ . . . γε 2 A. / γὰρ δή 12 A. / πῶς δή 10 D.
δῆλον ὅτι 3 A, 7 A, 9 B, 13 E (*bis*).
δῆλος εἶ asyndetic 14 B.
δημότης 2 B n.
δήμων (τῶν) Πιτθεύς 2 B.
δήπου 8 D.
διὰ βραχυτέρων 14 B.
διακελεύομαι 6 D.
διακρίνω 7 C.
διαπράττομαι 13 B.
διατριβή 2 A.
διατρίβω 2 A.
διαφέρω with gen. and dat. 4 E. / διαφέρομαι with dat. 7 B, 8 B (*bis*). / διαφέρομαι, ὡς οὐ, 8 B. See ἀμφισβητῶ, ὡς οὐ.
διαφθείρω, play on two senses of, 5 B.
διαφορά 7 B, 7 D.
διηγοῦμαι 6 C (*bis*).
δισχυρίζομαι 5 C.
δικάζομαι with dat. 4 E.

δίκαιον, τό, the genus to which τὸ ὅσιον belongs, 11 E.
δίκαιος φόνος 4 B n.
δίκη *vs.* γραφή 2 A n. / δίκη δημοσία 2 A n. / δίκη ἰδία 2 A n. / δίκην διδόναι 8 B ff. / δίκην διώκω, φεύγω, 3 E.
διὸ δή [? δι' ἃ δή] 6 A App.
διότι 10 B f.
διχοτομία 12 D n.
διωκάθω 15 D.
διώκω, in two senses, 4 A. / διώκω δίκην 3 E.
δοκῶ = δοκεῖ μοι 7 B. / δοκῶ without εἶναι 11 D, 11 E.
δόξα πονηρίας 12 C.
δοῦλος 13 D.
δρῶ epanaleptic 8 B.
δυσμαθέστερος 9 B.
δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι 6 A.
δωροῦμαι 14 C.
δωροφορῶ 14 E.

ἐὰν μόνον 9 E.
ἐάνπερ 9 C. / ἐάνπερ . . . γε 9 B.
ἐάντε . . . ἐάντε . . . ἐάντε 5 D.
ἐγκωμιάζω ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ 9 B.
εἰ after verbs of feeling 4 D n. / εἰ ἄρα 5 B. / εἴ γε . . . εἰ μὲν . . . εἰ δέ 10 E. / εἰ καί 4 D. / εἰ μή 14 E. / εἰ δὲ μή 5 B. / εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα 4 D, 9 C. / εἰ οὕτω . . . καὶ οὕτω 6 E. / εἰ βούλει 9 C. / εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον 11 B. / εἰ οὕτως ἥδιόν σοι ὀνομάζειν 14 E. / ἰδὲ γὰρ εἰ 11 E. / τὸ σὸν σκόπει, εἰ, 9 D. Cp. 7 D.
εἶδος not hypostatic 6 D.
εἶεν 13 D.
εἶναι, 'to be true,' 12 B.
εἴπερ 8 D, 8 E. / εἴπερ . . . γε 8 C. / εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων 15 D.
εἶπον ἄν where imperf. was to be expected 12 D, 14 B.
εἰς αὖθις 6 C, 15 E.
εἴτε . . . εἴτε 4 B (*bis*). / εἴτε . . . εἴτε ὁτιδὴ πάσχει 11 B. / εἴτ' οὖν . . . εἴτε 3 D.
ἑκάστοτε 3 B.
ἐκεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν 4 C.
ἐκεῖνος with subst. virtually in appos. 5 B. / ἐκεῖνος and αὐτοῦ referring to the same object 6 E (ἐκεῖνος first), 14 D (ἐκεῖνος second, as usual).
ἐκκεχυμένως 3 D.
ἔκτεινεν ὁ κτείνας, legal archaism, 4 B.
ἐκτέμνω 6 A.
ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου 14 D.
ἑκὼν εἶναι 15 C.
ἐλεγκτικός 2 A n.
ἐλπὶς . . . ὡς . . . ὅτι 15 E.
ἐμεμαθήκη 14 C.
ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ, 7 C.
ἐμπορική τις τέχνη ἡ ὁσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ' ἀλλήλων 14 E.
ἐναντίος with gen. 7 E, 14 B. / τὸ ἐναντιώτατον 7 A. / τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ 6 A. / ἐναντίον ἤ 12 A. / ἐναντίως ἔχετον 11 A.
ἐνδεής εἰμι ἔτι σμικροῦ τινος 13 A.
ἐνδείκνυμι 9 A, 9 B (*bis*), 15 E.
ἐνδεικτικός 2 A n.
ἐν δίκῃ 4 B (*bis*).
ἕνεκα ἐμοῦ 11 D.
ἐννοῶ 2 B, 9 C, 9 E, 15 C. Cp. νῷ ἔχω.
ἐντίθημι 11 C.
ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν 15 C.
ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν 15 C. Cp. πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς 11 B.
ἐξευρίσκω 12 D.
ἐξηγητής (*sc.* τῶν ὁσίων) 4 C, 4 D, 9 A.
ἔοικεν in answers 8 A, 10 D, 15 C.
ἐπεί with imv. 5 E. / ἐπεὶ . . . γε 4 C, 8 D, 9 B (*bis*), 11 D.
ἐπειδή 11 E, 14 C. / ἐπειδήπερ 13 E.
ἐπεκδιδάσκω (following διδάσκω 6 E) 7 A.

ἐπεξέρχομαι (*sive* ἐπεξιέναι) τινὶ τινὸς 4 B, 4 D, 4 E. / ἐπεξιέναι τινί (*alicui rei*) 4 C.
ἐπι- in comp. 2 B n. / ἐπὶ λογισμὸν (τὸ μετρεῖν, τὸ ἱστάναι) ἔρχεσθαι 7 B, 7 C (*bis*). / ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι 7 C. / ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινι . . . καὶ ὠφελίᾳ 13 B, 13 C. Cp. ἐπὶ βλάβῃ 13 C. / ἐπ' αὐτῷ εἶναι 14 C. / ἐπὶ σχολῆς 6 C.
ἐπίγρυπος 2 B.
ἐπιδείκνυμι 9 B.
ἐπιθυμητὴς τῆς σῆς σοφίας 14 D.
ἐπίσιμος 2 B n.
ἐπισκήπτομαι with gen. and dat. 9 A.
ἐπισκοπῶ 9 E.
ἐπιστήμη τις τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι τὸ ὅσιον 14 C. / ἐπιστήμη αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως θεοῖς ὁσιότης 14 C.
ἐπιτρέπω 5 E.
ἐπιτυχών, ὁ, 4 A.
ἐπίχαρις 2 B n.
ἐπιχειρῶ 15 D.
ἕπομαι 12 A, 12 C.
ἐργασία (following ἀπεργασία 13 E) 14 A.
ἐργαστῖναι 6 C n.
ἔργον 13 D, 13 E. / ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον 13 E. / οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον 9 B. / πλείονος ἔργου 14 A. / τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα 11 C.
ἔρξαντα, τόν, 12 A.
ἔρομαι 6 C.
ἐρωτώμενος (? ἐρώμενος) 14 C App.
ἐρωτῶν (? ἐρῶν) 14 C App.
ἕτερος with gen. 10 A (*bis*), 10 D, 11 A. / ἕτερος = ἄλλος 2 B. / δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα 6 A.
εὐγένειος 2 B.
εὐδιάβολος 3 B.
Εὐθρύφρων . . . παρ' Εὐθύφρονος 9 C.
εὖ λέγειν 9 B.
εὖ μάλα 4 A.
εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι 6 C.
εὐσέβεια 13 B.
εὐσεβής = ὅσιος 12 E (*bis*).
εὔχομαι 14 B, 14 C (*bis*).
ἔχειν = οὕτως ἔχειν 9 E.
ἔχθρα καὶ ὀργαί 7 B.

Ζεὺς φίλιος 6 B n.
ζητητικός 2 A n.

ἦ γάρ 7 E, 8 D, 8 E, 13 A. / ἦ που 4 A.
ἤ, 'or rather,' withdrawing the previous quest., 11 E. / ἢ δῆλα δή 4 B.
ᾗ 10 A.
ἡγεῖσθαι θεούς *vs.* νομίζειν θεούς 3 B n.
ἤδη 3 E.
ἥντινα in answer, retaining the case-form of the quest., 2 C.
Ἡράκλεις (exclamation) 4 A.

θεομισής 9 C (*bis*).
θεοφιλής 9 C, 10 D (four times), 10 E (*bis*), etc.
θεραπεία, ἡ τῶν θεῶν = τὸ ὅσιον 12 E.
θεραπεύω 13 A.
θής 15 D.
θητεύω 4 C, 9 A.
θύω 14 B, 14 C (*bis*).

ἰατρός (example) 13 D.
ἰδὲ γὰρ εἰ 11 E. Cp. σκόπει εἰ 7 D, 9 D.
ἰδέα (not hypostatic) 5 D, 6 D.
ἱδρύομαι 11 B, 11 D.
ἴθι with imv. 8 E, 9 A.
ἵνα, 'where,' 12 B ff. / ἵναπερ 12 C. / ἵνα γε 12 B.
ἵνα καί 12 E.
ἱππική, ἡ, (example) 13 A.
ἱππικός, ὁ, (example) 13 A.
ἵππος (example) 13 A f.
ἰσοσκελής ⟨*sc.* ἀριθμός⟩ 12 D.

καθαρτικός 2 A n.
καθορᾶν *vs.* ὁρᾶν 5 C.
καί with imv. 3 A. / καὶ μάλα 14 C. / καὶ αὐτός 6 B. / καὶ ἄλλοθι καί 8 C. / καὶ ἄλλος πού τις καί 5 C. / καὶ . . . καὶ . . . τε . . . καὶ . . . τε . . . καὶ δὴ καί 6 B. / καὶ δὴ καί 2 D, 6 C, 16 A. / καὶ . . . δή 10 B. / καὶ γάρ 6 D, 12 A, 14 B. / καὶ γὰρ . . . ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως 13 E. Cp. καίτοι . . . ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως 3 C. / καὶ . . . γάρ τοι 3 B. / καὶ μὴν . . . γε 12 A. / καὶ δῆτα 11 D. For καὶ . . . γε and καὶ . . . γέ που, *vide s.v.* γε.
καινοτομῶ 3 B, 5 A, 16 A.
καίτοι . . . ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως 3 C. Cp. καὶ γὰρ . . . ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως 13 E.
κακῶς εἰδότες 4 E.
καλῶς = ὀρθῶς, ἀληθῶς, 9 E (*bis*), 12 E, 15 C. Cp. παγκάλως.
κατα- in composit., with γιγνώσκω, 2 B, γελῶ 3 C (*bis*), βάλλω 4 C, 5 E, ποικίλλω 6 C, ὁρῶ 5 C. / κατὰ νοῦν 3 E. / κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον 7 E. / κατὰ τὰ αὐτά 8 B.
κατάδηλον 10 B.
κατανοῶ 12 A.
καταπίνω 6 A.
Κεκροπίς (tribe) 2 B n.
κεφάλαιον, τό, adv., 8 E. / τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν 14 A. Cp. τοῦτο τῆς τέχνης 11 D. / τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς ἐργασίας 14 A. Cp. τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν τῆς ἀπεργασίας 14 A.
κεχαρισμένος, adj., 14 B (*bis*), 15 A.
κινδυνεύω = δοκῶ 2 C, 8 A, 11 A, 11 D.
κύκλῳ περιέναι 15 B.
κυνηγετική, ἡ, (example) 13 A.
κυνηγετικός, ὁ, (example) 13 A.
κύων (example) 13 A.

λαγχάνω δίκην 5 B.
λέγω, 'command,' 12 E. / λέγομέν τι κτλ. in introducing a new subject 10 A.
λόγος, ὁ, ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἥκει 15 B.
Λύκειον 2 A.

μὰ Δι᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε 13 C (*bis*).
μαιευτικός 2 A n.
μάλιστά γε 15 B. / εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα 4 D, 9 C. / πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον 15 B.
μανθάνω 13 D. / μανθάνω· ὅτι 3 B, 9 B. / μανθάνω παρά with gen. 15 E.
μάντις 3 E.
μέλλω 5 D.
μέν *solitarium* 3 C, 8 E, 9 C. / μὲν γὰρ . . . ἀλλὰ γάρ 9 C. / μὲν οὖν 3 D, 8 C, 12 C, 12 D.
μέντοι νἦ Δία 4 B.
μέρος (logical subdivision) 12 D ff. / τὸ ποῖον μέρος 12 D, 12 E. / ποῖον μέρος 12 D. / μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου 12 D.
μὴ οὔ after verbs of fearing 15 D. / μὴ ὁσιότης 5 D App. / μὴ μόνον γε . . . ἀλλά 6 C.
μηδέν for οὐδέν with inf. after *verba sentiendi et declarandi* 6 B, 12 B.
μίασμα 4 C.
μόνα for μόνον 6 C App.
μόριον (logical subdivision) 12 C.

ναί 8 E, 10 D, 10 E, 13 A, 13 B, 13 E. / ναὶ μὰ Δία 5 B.
ναυπηγός (example) 13 D.
νεώτερον 2 A. Cp. *Protag.* 310 B.
νίκη ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ (example) 14 A.
νομίζω 3 B, 5 E.
νόμιμος 5 E (see App.).
νουθετῶ 5 B.
νοῶ 11 B.
νυν, illative, 8 E.
νῦν δέ 11 A, 11 C, 14 C. / νῦν δὲ

. . . γάρ 11 C, 14 C. / νῦν δή 3 D.
νυνί 9 E.
νῷ ἔχειν = ἐννοεῖν 2 B.

οἷα ποιεῖς 15 E.
οἴει (? parenthetical) 15 A.
οἰκία (example) 13 E.
οἰκοδόμος (example) 13 E.
οἶκος, ὁ ἴδιος, 14 B.
οἶμαι δὲ καί 3 E. Cp. οἴει 15 A.
οἷον *velut* 12 D, 13 A. / οἷον τοιόνδε 13 B. / οἷον τετανότριχα = τοιοῦτον, οἷος τετανόθριξ ἐστίν 2 B.
οἷον φιλεῖσθαι 11 A (*bis*).
οἱόσπερ καί 13 A.
ὀλίγον ἔργον 9 B.
ὀλίγον πρότερον 14 A.
ὀλιγορῶ with gen. 4 D.
ὁμόσε ἰέναι 3 C.
ὁμοτράπεζος 4 B.
ὅμως with part. 8 C.
ὄν omitted with τυγχάνω 8 A.
ὅπερ οὖν καί 4 D.
ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται 3 E.
ὁπότερα πλείω 7 B.
ὅπως with fut. indic. 2 D. / ὅπως μή with verb of fearing 4 E.
ὀργαί 7 B.
ὀργίζομαι with dat. 4 C, 7 B, 7 C.
ὀρθῶς νομίζειν 5 B.
ὁρίζω 9 C, 9 D.
ὅς γε, causal, 4 A, 6 B.
ὅσιον, τό, *vid. s.v. Piety*. / οὐ ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον, τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ 7 A. / ἆρα τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ὅσιόν ἐστιν φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι φιλεῖται ὅσιόν ἐστιν; 10 A. / μόριον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον 12 D. / τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μή 9 C, 15 E (*bis*). / τὰ . . . ὅσια καὶ τὰ μή 12 E.
ὁσιότης, ἡ, 13 B, 13 C, 13 D, 14 C (*bis*). / ὁσιότης without the art. 14 D.
ὅστις in indir. quest. 13 A. / ὅστις (indir. rel., instead of interr., used in repeating a quest.) 2 C.
ὁστισοῦν 5 E.
ὅταν γιγνώμεθα = ἑκάστοτε 7 D.
ὅτι with superl. 2 D, 4 D, 9 C. / ὅτι introducing *orat. recta* 5 A. / ὅτι after verbs of feeling 4 D. / ὅτι δή 3 B.
οὐκ, ἀλλά 10 B, 10 D. / οὐκ . . . ἀλλὰ . . . οὐ μέντοι 12 C. / οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως 15 D. / οὐ πάνυ 2 B, 3 D. Cp. οὐδ' . . . πάνυ τι 2 B. / οὐκ ἐλάττονι ἤ = τοσούτῳ 12 A.
οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γε 8 C.
οὐδ' αὐτός 2 B. Cp. καὶ αὐτός. / οὐδέ, 'neither,' 12 A. / οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν 5 C.
οὐδέν (an emphatic οὐ) 8 C. / οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴρηκα 3 C. Cp. τοῦτο ἀληθὲς λέγεις 8 E. / οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα 3 E, 4 D. / οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἂν μὴ ἐκεῖνοι ⟨sc. οἱ θεοὶ⟩ δῶσιν 14 E. / οὐδὲν ἥδιον ἔμοιγε 14 E.
οὐδέτερα ἢ ἀμφότερα 9 D.
οὐσία 11 A.
οὗτος in the pred. 7 D. / οὗτος scornful 5 C. / οὗτος epanaleptic 7 B, 8 B, 10 B, 14 B. / τοῦτο τῆς τέχνης 11 D.
οὕτω epanaleptic 6 A, 9 D. / οὕτω with part. condit. 5 E. / οὕτω = *sic temere* 3 B, 9 E. / οὕτω as an answer 8 A, 13 A. / οὕτω μὲν οὖν 7 A.
οὑτωσί 4 E.
οὐχί 14 C, 15 B.
ὄφελος, οὐδέν, 4 E.

παγκάλως 7 A.
πάθος . . . ὅτι πέπονθε 11 A.
πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς 11 B. Cp. ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν 15 C.
πάμπολλα 8 C.
Παναθήναια, τὰ μεγάλα, 6 C.

παντάπασιν 11 A.
πανταχοῦ 12 D.
πάντως δήπου 5 D.
πάνυ γε 2 B, 7 E, 8 E, 9 B (*bis*), 10 B, 10 C, 12 B (*bis*), 12 C, 13 A, 13 B, 14 A, 15 C.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν 7 A, 13 D.
παρά with pers. dat. 4 C. / *παρά* with pers. gen., *e.g.* with *δέομαι*, 'need,' 14 D, 14 E; with *λαμβάνω* 14 E, 15 A (*ter*); with *μανθάνω* 9 C, 12 E, 14 C; with *σοφὸς γίγνομαι* 15 E.
παράδειγμα 6 E.
παρακινδυνεύω 15 D.
παροινῶ 4 C.
πᾶς, various forms of plur., *e.g.* *πάντες θεοί* 9 C; *θεοὶ πάντες* 10 D; *πάντες οἱ θεοί* 9 D; *οἱ θεοὶ ἅπαντες* 9 C. / *πᾶν τοὐναντίον* 5 D. / *πᾶν* (*πάντα*) *ποιω* 8 C (*bis*). / *παντὶ τρόπῳ* 15 D. / *παντὸς μᾶλλον* 9 A. / *πάντων γε μάλιστα φίλον* (*not* a strengthened superl.) 15 B.
πάσχω, denoting the *passive* relation, 10 C (*ter*). / *πάσχω ὑπό του* 10 C.
παύομαι with part. 8 C, 9 B.
πειραστικός 2 A n.
πελάτης 4 C.
πέπλος 6 C. Cp. Hom. Z 90.
περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι with inf. 5 A.
περιέρχομαι 11 B.
περιιέναι 11 C, 15 B (*bis*).
περιττόν, τό, as a subdivision of *ἀριθμός*, 12 C.
πετόμενόν τινα διώκω (proverb) 4 A.
Πιτθεύς, belonging to the deme *Πίτθος*, 2 B.
πλέον (*ἐπί*), of logical extension, 12 C.
πλεονεκτῶ with pers. gen. 15 A.
πλοῖον (example) 13 E.
πλοῦτος τῆς σοφίας 12 A.
ποιητής, ὁ, 12 A.
ποίκιλμα 6 C.
ποῖός τις 5 C. / *ποῖον μέρος* 12 D. / *τὸ ποῖον μέρος* 12 D, 12 E.
πολιτικά, τά, 2 C.
πολύ, hyperbaton of, 5 C, 14 B. / *πολλὴ ἀνάγκη*, in answer, 7 D. / *πολλὰ καὶ καλά* 13 E. / *πολλοῦ καὶ δέω* 13 C. / *πολλοῦ γε δεῖ* with inf. 4 A.
πονηρία 12 C.
πόρρω σοφίας ἐλαύνων 4 B.
ποτε, after interr. pronouns and adverbs, 3 D n.
πρᾶγμα, 'act,' 'deed,' 4 E.
πρίν with inf. aor. 4 D, 9 A. / *πρὶν ἄν* with subjunct. 15 C, 15 D.
πρό, temp., 5 A.
προαποκάμνω 11 E.
πρόθυμος 14 B. / *προθύμως* 11 B.
προκαλοῦμαι 5 A, 5 B.
πρός with acc. = *apud* 2 A, 3 B. / *πρός* with acc. = 'with,' 'with reference to,' 5 A, 7 B. / *πρός* with *dat. rei* = 'in addition to,' 11 D (*bis*). / *πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοπῶ* 9 C. / *πρὸς Διός* 4 E, 5 C, 13 E. / *πρὸς Φιλίου* 6 B.
προσέχω τὸν νοῦν 14 D, 15 D.
προσφιλές, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς, 6 E ff.
πρότερον ἤ = *μᾶλλον ἤ* (cp. *ἀντ' ἐμοῦ* 5 B) 5 B, 5 C.
προτίθεμαι 11 B.
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 10 A, 10 D. / *πῶς δ' οὔ*; 13 C, 14 A.

ῥᾷστα 9 D.

σαθρός 5 C.
σαφής 9 A. / *σαφῶς* 15 D.
-σθων, imperatives ending in, 9 D App.
σκαληνός ⟨sc. *ἀριθμός*⟩ 12 D.
σκοπῶ πρὸς ἐμαυτόν 9 C. / *τὸ σὸν σκόπει, εἰ* 9 D.
σκῶμμα 11 C.
σοφία, 'skill,' 11 D.

σοφός, 'skillful,' 11 D. / *σοφὸς γίγνομαι παρά τινος* 15 E.
σπάνιον αὐτὸν παρέχειν 3 D.
σπεύδω 15 E.
στασιάζω with dat. pers. 7 E, 8 A.
στοά, ἡ τοῦ βασιλέως, 2 A.
στρατηγός (example) 14 A.
συγγένειαν (κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου) 11 C.
συγχωρῶ 10 C, 13 C.
συμπροθυμοῦμαι, ὅπως 11 E.
συνδέω 4 C, 9 A (*bis*).
συνδοκεῖ ταῦτα καὶ σοί 6 A.
συνειδώς 4 C.
συνέστιος 4 B.
συνίημι 13 A, 14 D.
συντείνω 12 A.
σχεδόν τι 11 C.
σῴζω 14 B.

ταῦτα = διὰ ταῦτα 4 D.
τάχα βέλτιον εἰσόμεθα 9 E.
τε . . . δέ 3 E. / *τε . . . καί* uniting similars 5 B, 7 A, etc. / *τε . . . καί* uniting opposites 4 E (*bis*), etc.
τεκμήριον 5 E.
τετανόθριξ 2 B.
τεχνικός 14 E, 15 B.
τί δέ 4 A, 7 D, 8 B, 13 D. / *τί δὲ δή* 14 A. / *τί δή* 13 D, 14 C. / *τί δὴ οὖν* 10 C. / *τί δήποτε* 15 A. / *τί γὰρ κωλύει* 9 D. / *τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν* 6 B. / *τί καὶ ποιῶν* 3 A. / *τί λέγομεν* 7 A. / *τί λέγει ὁ λέγων* 9 E. / *τίνα κρίσιν = τίνος κρίσιν* 7 C. / *τί νεώτερον* 2 A.
τιμή, 'sacrifice,' 15 A.
τὸ βαρύτερόν τε καὶ κουφότερον = 'weight' (example) 7 C.
τὸ δέ τι 12 A.
τὸ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον = 'size' (example) 7 C.
τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο 12 D.
τὸ πρότερον 6 D.
τὸ σόν 9 D.
τοίνυν 6 E, 12 C, 15 E. / *τοίνυν* introduces definitions 5 D, 6 E, 12 E.
τοιοῦτος referring vaguely to what precedes 3 C, 4 C, 4 D, 6 B. / *δι' ἕτερα τοιαῦτα* 6 A.
τοσούτῳ, ὅσῳ 11 D.
τοῦτο ἀληθὲς λέγεις 8 E.
τροφή, ἡ ἐκ τῆς γῆς, (example) 14 A.
τρυφῶ 11 E, 12 A.
τυγχάνω without part. 8 A.
τῷ ὄντι 6 B.

ὑγίεια (example) 13 D.
ὑπάγω 14 C.
ὑπέρ 4 B, 15 D.
ὑπηρέτης 13 E.
ὑπηρετική adj. 13 D, 13 E. / *ὑπηρετικὴ εἴς τι* 13 D ff. / *ὑπηρετική, ἡ*, 13 D (*bis*). / *ὑπηρετική τις* (? *θεραπεία*) 13 D.
ὑπό with gen. of agent after intrans. verbs 3 D, 4 B, 4 D, 12 A, 13 B (*ter*), 16 A.
ὑπόθεσις 11 C.
ὑποτίθεμαι 9 D.

φέρε δή 7 A.
φεύγω ⟨δίκην⟩ 3 E.
φησί repeated 3 B.
φθάνω with aor. part. 9 A.
φιλανθρωπία 3 D.
φοβοῦμαι 12 B.
φόνος δίκαιος 4 B n.
φροντίζω ὑπέρ τινος 4 D. Cp. *οὐδὲν αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν* 3 C.
φυλάττω, 'regard,' 'consider,' 4 B.
φυτεύω 12 A.

χαλεπαίνω, ὅτι 6 A.
χαμαὶ πεσεῖν (proverb) 14 D.
χάρις, 'sacrifice,' 15 A.
χρῶμαι with pred. dat. 6 E, 13 E.

ὦ ἄριστε 7 B, 13 E. / *ὦ βέλτιστε* 4 A. /

ὦ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρον 15 E. / ὦ 'γαθέ 9 E. / ὦ γενναῖε Εὐθύφρον 7 D. / ὦ ἑταῖρε 6 D, 11 D, 15 E. / ὦ Εὐθύφρον 2 A (see App.). / ὦ θαυμάσιε 3 B, 8 A, 8 D. / ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐθύφρον 5 A. / ὦ μακάριε 12 A. / ὦ φίλε 14 A, 14 D. / ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε 5 C. / ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον 10 E. / ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρον . . . ἀλλά 3 C.
ὧδε 7 B.
ὥρα with inf. 15 E.
ὡς circumstantial with imperf. 4 C. / ὡς with pres. part. 3 B, 12 E. / ὡς with fut. part. 3 B. / ὡς . . . ὅτι 15 E. / ὡς ἄρα 11 C. / ὡς restrictive, ὡς σὺ λέγεις 10 D, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος 10 D, ὥς φησι 2 C, 3 A, 3 B, ὥς γε τὸ εἰκός 3 A, ὡς οὕτω γ' ἀκοῦσαι 3 B. / ὡς οὐ 8 B, 8 C, 8 D.
ὡς ἀληθῶς 6 B, 7 A App.
ὥσπερ εἰκός 2 D.
ὥστε, in transitions, 8 A, 9 C.
ὠφέλιμος 15 B.
ὠφελοῦμαι (pass.) 13 B.

ENGLISH INDEX

Abstract subst. in plur. 7 B, 13 A.
Accusative abs. following dependent part. in gen. 4 D. / acc. of part. depending on antecedent dat. 5 A. / acc. as subj. of inf., although the same as that of main verb, *ἐμέ* 3 E. / adv. acc. *τίνα τρόπον* 2 C, *τὸ ἐναντίον* 10 B, *τοσοῦτον* 15 A. / cognate acc. 2 B, 5 B, 16 A. / inner acc. 5 A, 7 D. / inner acc. with pass. verb *τί ὠφελοῦνται* 15 A.
Active and passive, as categories, 10 A ff.
Adverb in attrib. position 5 A, 12 D.
Anacoluthon 13 A. See 9 D App.
Answer, retaining case-form of question, *ἤντινα; οὐκ ἀγεννῆ* 2 C.
Anytus 2 B n.
Aorist with *ἄν*, where imperf. was expected, *εἶπον ἄν* 12 D, *εἶπες ἄν* 14 B.
Archon Basileus 2 A.
Arithmetic, Greek, largely geometrical, 12 D n.
Article with whole clause 8 D. / art. wanting with abstract subst. *ὁσιότης* 14 D. / art. repeated or omitted in series 7 C, 7 D. / art. with proper name 11 D, 15 B, 15 D. / art. omitted with epexegetic inf. 5 D, 11 A.
Asyndeton 8 E, 9 C, 14 C.
Attraction *οἷον* 2 B, *ὅσῳ* 11 D.

Bloodguiltiness. See *μίασμα*.

City, the, as Mother, 2 C.
Cleruchs, Athenian, 4 C n.
Comparative adj. used absolutely *νεώτερον* 2 A.
Comparisons 2 C.
Compound followed by simple subst. *ἀπεργασία . . . ἐργασία* 14 A.
Conditions, mixed, 3 D, 5 B, 9 C.
Conversion of propositions 10 E ff.
Cronus 6 A, 8 B.
Cypria, the, 12 A n.

Daedalus 11 C, 11 D, 11 E, 15 B.
Dative, clause virtually in, 3 D. / in pred. 5 A, 13 E. / after subst. *ὑπηρετική* 13 D, *δόσις* 14 D, *δῶρα* 15 A, *ὑπηρεσία* 14 D. / dat. followed by *διά* with acc. 3 D. / dat. of time *τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις* 6 C.
Direct and indirect discourse interchanged 5 A f., 15 E f.

Epexegetic infinitive without article *ἐπεξιέναι* 5 D, *φιλεῖσθαι* 11 A.
Euthyphro, Introd. § 3.
Euthyphro, the, — contents, Introd. § 4. / place of, in the economy of Plato's works, Introd. § 5. / the import of, Introd. § 6. / relation of, to the *Apology*, Introd. §§ 5, 6. / date of, Introd. § 5.
Examples, illustrative, *τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν*, 7 D; *φερόμενόν τι καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ*

ἄγον καὶ ὁρώμενον καὶ ὁρῶν 10 A. See also *αἰδώς, ἀριθμός, βοηλατική, βοῦς, γεωργός, δέος, ἰατρός, ἱππική, ἱππικός, ἵππος, κυνηγετική, κυνηγετικός, κύων, ναυτηγός, οἰκία, οἰκοδόμος, πλοῖον, στρατηγός, τὸ βαρύτερόν τε καὶ κουφότερον, τὸ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον, τροφή, ὑγίεια.*

Future, jussive, *διηγήσει* 6 C. / fut. mid. *σπουδάσονται* 3 E.

Genitive with verbs of judicial action 2 C. / gen. abs. with *γε*, marking conditional force, 4 D. / gen. abs. with *ὡς* 3 B.
Geometry, Greek, and Arithmetic, 12 D n.

Hephaestus 8 B.
Here 8 B.
Hestia 3 A.
Hiatus 10 C.
Holiness defined 5 D, 6 E, 9 E, 12 E (13 D), 14 B (14 C, 14 D, 14 E, 15 B).
Homicide, justifiable, 4 B n.
Hyperbaton *πολύ* 5 C, 14 B, *τούτοις* 11 C, *αὐτῶν* 14 A. Cp. 6 A, 9 B.

Ideas, the definitional essence, not hypostatic, 5 D, 6 D, 6 E.
Imperative, making concession for the sake of argument, 9 D. / Attic forms of 3d person plural 9 D App.
Imperfect of repeated action *κατέπινεν* 6 A. / imperf. of verbs of saying 6 D, 15 A.
Infinitive abs. 3 B, 15 C. / articular inf. as subj. 2 C. / epexegetic inf. without art. 5 D, 11 A, 15 D.

Litotes *οὐκ ἀγεννῆ* 2 C, *οὐ φαῦλον* 2 C, *οὐ σφόδρα* 3 C, *κακῶς εἰδότες* 4 E, *οὐκ ὀλίγον ἔργον* 9 B.
Lyco 2 B n.

Middle future *σπουδάσονται* 3 E.
Miletus 2 B, 12 E, 15 E.
Monotheism, Introd. § 6.

Naxus 4 C.
Nominative in enumeration 15 A.

Odd and even, as constituent parts of number, 12 C.
Optative future after verbs of fearing 15 D.
Oratio recta and *obliqua* interchanged 5 A f., 15 E f.

Palindromic constructions 3 C, 12 C, 13 C.
Paronomasia *ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος* 2 B, *Μέλητος . . . ἐπιμεληθείς* 2 D, 5 C, *ἔκτεινεν ὁ κτείνας* 4 B, *πρᾶγμα πράττων* 4 E, *Δαιδάλου . . . Ταντάλου* 11 E, *ὁ ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὃ ποιήσας* 12 A.
Participle omitted with *τυγχάνω* 8 A. / part. pres. with part. aor. 9 A. / part. pres. conative 8 C. / part. with *οὕτω* = cond. clause 5 E. / part. in gen. agreeing with possess. adj. 2 C. / part. fut. of purpose with *ὡς* 3 B; without *ὡς* 2 C, 4 C.
Particular for general in definitions 5 D.
Passive and active, as categories, 10 A f.
Perfect for fut. perf. *μεμάθηκα* 9 C.
Periphrasis by part. and *εἰμί* 10 B ff.
Person, third, changing to first 5 A.
Piety. See Holiness and *ὅσιον*.
Plato, Introd. § 1.
Pluperfect indic. ending in *-κη* 14 C.
Plural for singular *ἦ δῆλα δή* 4 B, *οὐδέτερα* 9 D.
Poetic color *τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας* 3 A, *ποιητὴν θεῶν* 3 B.

Polyptoton τοῦτο τούτου 10 D, τούτοις τοῦτο 11 C.
Possessive adj. postponed for emphasis σός 5 A, 5 C.
Preposition repeated in comparison 2 C.
Present for imperf. ὃ λέγω 12 A. / conative pres. 8 C.
Prolepsis 4 E (*bis*), 5 E, 13 A, 14 B.
Proteus 15 D.
Proverbs ἀφ' Ἑστίας ἄρχεσθαι 3 A, πετόμενον διώκειν 4 A, χαμαὶ πεσεῖν 14 D.
Punctuation, new, 7 D, 14 A.

Question asked by a part. τί καὶ ποιοῦντα 3 A, τί δρῶν 8 D.

Religion, philosophy of, Introd. §§ 5, 6.
Repetition in question, denoting surprise, ὁ σός 4 A.

Socrates, Introd. § 2.
Stasinus(?), author of the *Cypria*, 12 A.
State, the, as Mother, 2 C.
Substantive used as adj. θήs 15 D, πρεσβύτης 15 D. / simple subst., following a compound (as with verbs), ἀπεργασία . . . ἐργασία 14 A. / verbal subst. governing a case. See Dative.

Tantalus 11 E.
Thrasyllus 2 A n.
Titles of Platonic dialogues 2 A n.

Uranus 6 A, 8 B.

Verb omitted ὡς σὺ ἕτερον 2 B, ἀλλα σὲ ἄλλος 2 B, τίς οὗτος 2 B, οὐκ ἀγεννῆ 2 C, τίνες οἱ διαφθείροντες 2 C, ὀρθῶς 2 C, ὥσπερ σὺ φῂς σαυτοῦ 3 D, etc.
Verbals in -τέος: ἀφετέος 15 D, δοτέος 8 D, 8 E, σκεπτέος 9 E (*bis*), 15 C.
Virtue as knowledge, Introd. § 2.
Vocative, beginning the clause, disregarded by the conj. 3 C.

Zeus 5 E, 8 B, 12 A.

Hadley and Allen's Greek Grammar

By JAMES HADLEY (Yale)

REVISED BY

FREDERIC DE FOREST ALLEN (Harvard)

Cloth, 12mo, 422 pages . . . . . Price, $1.50

This standard Grammar not only presents the latest and best results of Greek studies, but also treats the language in the light received from comparative philology. Its comprehensive treatment of the principles and forms of the Greek language, together with its clear, analytic method, has made it at once an authoritative and exhaustive treatise for reference and at the same time a practical and popular text-book for class use. The fact that during all these years it has held its place and maintained its widespread popularity and extensive use in the leading classical schools and colleges of the country is in itself sufficient evidence of the excellence of the original work.

Professor Hadley's Greek Grammar was published in 1860, and was founded on the scholarly and exhaustive work of the eminent German professor, Curtius, of the University of Kiel.

Professor Allen brought to the work of revision the enthusiasm and critical method of an accomplished scholar, combined with the experience and skill of a successful teacher, and the result of his labors is gratifying alike to the publishers and friends of the Grammar.

In its present form it is a practical work for beginners. Clearness of statement, accuracy of definition, and judicious arrangement recommend it for elementary classes; yet at the same time it is a complete and comprehensive manual for the advanced student.

Copies of Hadley's Greek Grammar will be sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price by the Publishers:

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

Pearson's Greek Prose Composition

By HENRY CARR PEARSON, A.B. (Harvard)

Flexible Binding, 12mo, 187 pages . . . . Price, 90 cents

The purpose of this book is to combine a thorough and systematic study of the essentials of Greek syntax with abundant practice in translating connected Idiomatic English into Greek, and to afford constant practice in writing Greek at sight.

Part I contains, in graded lessons, the principal points of Greek syntax which require especial emphasis in Second Year Greek. These lessons are designed to serve as a partial review of the first year's work and as an introduction to the composition work in connection with the reading of Xenophon's Anabasis.

Part II contains short, simple English sentences, based on Books I–IV of the Anabasis, designed to be used in connection with the reading of the text.

Part III contains connected English prose, based on Books I–IV of the Anabasis.

Review Lessons are introduced at intervals, containing a list of the important words and an enumeration of the principal constructions used in the preceding sentences.

The book is provided with an English-Greek Vocabulary and contains a selection of recent college entrance examination papers in Greek prose composition, for the purpose of supplying further material for practice and of familiarizing the student with the nature of the examinations set by the various colleges.

Copies sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price.

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

Orations of Lysias

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND APPENDICES

BY WILLIAM H. WAIT, Ph.D.
University of Michigan

Cloth, 12mo, 240 pages . . . . . Price, $1.25
Text Edition . . . . . 30 cents

The ten Orations contained in this book have been selected in the first place with reference to their merit, variety, and interest, and in the second place to illustrate the peculiar qualities and characteristics of Lysias as a rhetorician.

The Notes, historical, critical, and grammatical, are very full and comprehensive. The latter, especially on the first two or three orations, have been made so advisedly. In many colleges Lysias is the first Greek author read. Hence it is believed that, at the start, such grammatical help will in no way be found harmful to the best prepared, and very useful and encouraging to those less fortunate in their preparation.

The Introduction presents a brief account of the Life of Lysias, followed by a discussion of the style of his writing, the structure of his speeches, works, manuscripts, etc. A bibliography of helpful works in the study of Lysias is also given. Each of the orations included in the book is preceded by an introduction explaining its occasion and purpose.

The Map at the beginning and the Biographical Index near the close of the book are intended to answer questions on geography and biography that arise in the reading of the orations.

Copies sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price.

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

Greek Dictionaries

LIDDELL AND SCOTT'S GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON

Revised and Enlarged. Compiled by HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL, D.D., and ROBERT SCOTT, D.D., assisted by HENRY DRISLER, LL.D. Large Quarto, 1794 pages. Sheep . . . $10.00

The present edition of this great work has been thoroughly revised, and large additions made to it. The editors have been favored with the co-operation of many scholars and several important articles have been entirely rewritten.

LIDDELL AND SCOTT'S GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON—Intermediate

Revised Edition. Large Octavo, 910 pages.
Cloth, $3.50; Half Leather, $4.00

This Abridgment is an entirely new work, designed to meet the ordinary requirements of instructors. It differs from the smaller abridged edition in that it is made from the last edition of the large Lexicon, and contains a large amount of new matter.

LIDDELL AND SCOTT'S GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON—Abridged

Revised Edition. Crown Octavo, 832 pages. Half Leather $1.25

This Abridgment is intended chiefly for use by students in Secondary and College Preparatory Schools.

THAYER'S GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

Being Grimm's Wilke's Clavis Novi Testamenti. Translated, Revised, and Enlarged by JOSEPH HENRY THAYER, D.D., LL.D. Royal Quarto, 727 pages . Cloth, $5.00; Half Leather, $6.50

This great work embodies and represents the results of the latest researches in modern philology and biblical exegesis. It traces historically the signification and use of all words used in the New Testament, and carefully explains the difference between classical and sacred usage.

YONGE'S ENGLISH-GREEK LEXICON

By C. D. YONGE. Edited by HENRY DRISLER, LL.D.
Royal Octavo, 903 pages. Sheep $4 50

AUTENRIETH'S HOMERIC DICTIONARY

Translated and Edited by ROBERT P. KEEP, Ph.D. New Edition. Revised by ISAAC FLAGG, Ph.D.
12mo, 312 pages. Illustrated. Cloth $1.10

Copies sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

Classical Dictionaries

HARPER'S DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL LITERATURE AND ANTIQUITIES

Edited by H. T. PECK, Ph.D., Professor of the Latin Language and Literature in Columbia University.

Royal Octavo, 1716 pages. Illustrated.

One Vol. Cloth . .	$6.00	Two Vols. Cloth . .	$7.00
One Vol. Half Leather .	8.00	Two Vols. Half Leather .	10.00

An encyclopaedia, giving the student, in a concise and intelligible form, the essential facts of classical antiquity. It also indicates the sources whence a fuller and more critical knowledge of these subjects can best be obtained. The articles, which are arranged alphabetically, include subjects in biography, mythology, geography, history, literature, antiquities, language, and bibliography. The illustrations are, for the most part, reproductions of ancient objects. The editor in preparing the book has received the co-operation and active assistance of the most eminent American and foreign scholars.

SMITH'S DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES

Edited by WILLIAM SMITH, Ph.D. Revised by CHARLES ANTHON, LL.D. Octavo, 1133 pages. Illustrated. Sheep $4.25

Carefully revised, giving the results of the latest researches in the history, philology, and antiquities of the ancients. In the work of revision, the American editor has had the assistance of the most distinguished scholars and scientists.

STUDENTS' CLASSICAL DICTIONARY

A Dictionary of Biography, Mythology, and Geography. Abridged. By WILLIAM SMITH, D.C.L., LL.D.

12mo, 438 pages. Cloth $1.25

Designed for those schools and students who are excluded from the use of the larger Classical Dictionary, both by its size and its price. All names have been inserted which one would be likely to meet with at the beginning of classical study.

Copies sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price.

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

Latin Literature of the Empire

Selected and Edited with Revised Texts and Brief Introductions

By ALFRED GUDEMAN, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Classical Philology, University of Pennsylvania

In Two Volumes. Cloth, 12mo. Per Volume, $1.80

VOL. I—PROSE. Selections from Velleius, Curtius, Seneca Rhetor, Justinus (Trogus Pompeius), Seneca, Petronius, including Cena Trimalchionis, Pliny the Elder, Quintilian, Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, Suetonius, Minucius Felix Octavius, Apuleius—Ammianus Marcellinus, and Boethius.

VOL. II—POETRY. Pseudo Vergiliana, Aetna, Manilius, Calpurnius, Nemesianus, Phaedrus, Lucan, Valerius Flaccus, Seneca, the Octavia (anonymous), Persius, Statius, Silius Italicus, Martial, Juvenal, Pervigilium Veneris, Ausonius, and Claudianus.

The works of Latin Literature of the post-Augustan period have hitherto, with a few notable exceptions, been virtually excluded from the classical curricula of colleges and universities.

The present collection has been made primarily for the use of students in higher classes in colleges. The selections will be found useful as collateral reading in connection with lectures on classical literature, and will also furnish suitable material for sight reading.

The selections themselves contain nothing that is not eminently worthy of perusal. They are in every case sufficiently extensive to give a continuous and coherent story, which at the same time exhibits the author at his best. The text follows the best modern editions, the deviations from the standard texts being briefly recorded in critical appendices.

Copies sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price.

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

Introduction to the Study of Latin Inscriptions

By JAMES C. EGBERT, Jr., Ph.D.
Adjunct Professor of Latin, Columbia University

Half Morocco, large 12mo, 468 pages. With numerous illustrations and exact reproductions of inscriptions . . . . Price, $3 50

This work is designed as a text-book for the use of students in Universities and Colleges, and also to furnish an account of this branch of archaeological study for general readers. It has been prepared in the belief that a knowledge of epigraphy forms an essential part of the equipment of a teacher of the classics, and that the subject itself has become so important as to justify its introduction, in elementary form at least, into the curriculum of undergraduate studies.

A distinctive feature of the book is the number and character of its illustrations,—there being over seven hundred cuts and diagrams of inscriptions, for the purpose of illustrating the text, and for practice in reading. Of these, over one hundred are photographic reproductions, showing the forms of the letters and the arrangement of the inscriptions. The work is also supplied with an exhaustive bibliography and valuable tables of abbreviations, archaisms, etc.

Copies of Egbert's Latin Inscriptions will be sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price by the Publishers:

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

Roman Life in Latin Prose and Verse

ILLUSTRATIVE READINGS FROM LATIN LITERATURE

SELECTED AND EDITED BY

H. T. PECK, PH.D.
Professor of the Latin Language and Literature in Columbia University.

AND

ROBERT ARROWSMITH, PH.D.

Cloth, 12mo, 256 pages . . . . . Price, $1.50

This work gives a representative survey of Latin Literature, intended to be read in advanced academic or college work, as supplementary to a regular course in Latin Literature, or to be itself the fundamental work in such a course. The selections range from the popular songs which antedate written literature, to the Christian hymns of the third century, covering the early dramatists, historians, orators, philosophers, the writers of satire and epigram, the lyric and epic poets, the collectors of anecdotes, letter writers, and authors of prose works, and including other material of a popular nature, such as lampoons, parodies, epitaphs, advertisements, announcements of ball games, theatrical and gladiatorial notices, etc. To each selection is prefixed a concise account of the author, when known, and of his works, with a brief bibliography. For convenience in sight reading the text is provided with a translation of the more difficult words, and is followed by a fuller commentary on special points of interest.

Copies of Roman Life in Latin Prose and Verse will be sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price by the Publishers:

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

Cicero's Laelius De Amicitia

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

JOHN K. LORD, PH.D.
Professor of Latin, Dartmouth College.

REVISED EDITION

Flexible cloth, 12mo, 109 pages . . . . Price, 70 cents

In this Revised Edition of Cicero's Laelius the editor's aim in preparing the notes has been to furnish all explanations that seem necessary for the clear understanding of points of grammar, history, biography, and ancient customs occurring in the book. In addition to this, the attention of the student has been called by translation and remark upon special passages, to the literary character of the essay and to the clear and happy development of the subject.

The Introduction gives an interesting historical sketch of Cicero's life which cannot fail to impart a clear appreciation of the man and his work. This is followed by an analysis and summary of the Laelius which will prepare the student for an intelligent study of the text.

Its convenient form and arrangement especially adapt this Revised Edition for use as a text-book.

Copies of Lord's Cicero's Laelius De Amicitia will be sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price by the Publishers:

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

(269)

Mythology

GUERBER'S MYTHS OF GREECE AND ROME
Cloth, 12mo, 428 pages. Illustrated $1.50

GUERBER'S MYTHS OF NORTHERN LANDS
Cloth, 12mo, 319 pages. Illustrated 1 50

GUERBER'S LEGENDS OF THE MIDDLE AGES
Cloth, 12mo, 340 pages. Illustrated 1.50

By H. A. GUERBER, Lecturer on Mythology.

These companion volumes present a complete outline of Ancient and Mediaeval Mythology, narrated with special reference to Literature and Art. They are uniformly bound in cloth, and are richly illustrated with beautiful reproductions of masterpieces of ancient and modern painting and sculpture.

While primarily designed as manuals for the use of classes in schools where Mythology is made a regular subject of study and for collateral and supplementary reading in classes studying literature or criticism, they are equally well suited for private students and for home reading. For this purpose the myths are told in a clear and charming style and in a connected narrative without unnecessary digressions. To show the wonderful influence of these ancient myths in literature, numerous and appropriate quotations from the poetical writings of all ages, from Hesiod's "Works and Days" to Tennyson's "Oenone," have been included in the text in connection with the description of the different myths and legends.

Maps, complete glossaries, and indexes adapt the manuals for convenient use in schools, libraries, or art galleries.

Copies of the above books will be sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price by the Publishers:

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

Outlines of Roman History

FOR THE USE OF HIGH SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

By WILLIAM C. MOREY, Ph.D.
Professor of History and Political Science, University of Rochester

Cloth, 12mo, 348 pages . . . . . Price, $1.00

In this history the rise, progress, and decay of the Roman Empire have been so treated as to emphasize the unity and continuity of the narrative: and the interrelation of the various periods is so clearly shown that the student appreciates the logical and systematic arrangement of the work.

The scope of the book covers the whole period of Roman history from the foundation of the city to the fall of the Western Empire, all relevant and important facts having been selected to the exclusion of minute and unnecessary details.

The work is admirably adapted to the special kind of study required by high school and academy courses, and avoids the two extremes which are sometimes found in text-books,—on the one hand, a too elementary and superficial treatment of the subject, suited only for children ; and on the other hand, a too elaborate and critical treatment, such as should be reserved for college classes.

The character of the illustrative material is especially worthy of close examination. This is all drawn from authentic sources, and comprises—maps showing the location of every place mentioned in the text; plans of some of the most important battles; the more noted specimens of Roman architecture; and portraits of the most distinguished men of Rome, reproduced from authentic busts and statues and including an unusually complete collection of effigies of the Roman emperors.

Copies sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of price by the Publishers:

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

(136)

Handbook of Greek and Roman History

By GEORGES CASTEGNIER, B.S., B.L.

Flexible Cloth, 12mo, 110 pages . . . . Price 50 cents

The purpose of this little handbook is to assist the student of Greek and Roman History in reviewing subjects already studied in the regular text-books and in preparing for examinations. It will also be found useful for general readers who wish to refresh their minds in regard to the leading persons and salient facts of ancient history.

It is in two parts, one devoted to Greek, and the other to Roman history. The names and titles have been selected with rare skill, and represent the whole range of classical history. They are arranged alphabetically, and are printed in full-face type, making them easy to find. The treatment of each is concise and gives just the information in regard to the important persons, places, and events of classical history which every scholar ought to know and remember, or have at ready command.

Its convenient form and systematic arrangement especially adapt it for use as an accessory and reference manual for students, or as a brief classical cyclopedia for general readers.

Copies of Castegnier's Handbook of Greek and Roman History will be sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price by the Publishers:

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

Latin Dictionaries

HARPER'S LATIN DICTIONARY

Founded on the translation of "Freund's Latin-German Lexicon." Edited by E. A. ANDREWS, LL.D. Revised, Enlarged, and in great part Rewritten by CHARLTON T. LEWIS, Ph.D., and CHARLES SHORT, LL.D.

Royal Octavo, 2030 pages . Sheep, $6.50; Full Russia, $10 00

The translation of Dr. Freund's great Latin-German Lexicon, edited by the late Dr. E. A. Andrews, and published in 1850, has been from that time in extensive and satisfactory use throughout England and America. Meanwhile great advances have been made in the science on which lexicography depends. The present work embodies the latest advances in philological study and research, and is in every respect the most complete and satisfactory Latin Dictionary published.

LEWIS'S LATIN DICTIONARY FOR SCHOOLS

By CHARLTON T. LEWIS, Ph.D.

Large Octavo, 1200 pages . Cloth, $4 50; Half Leather, $5.00

This dictionary is not an abridgment, but an entirely new and independent work, designed to include all of the student's needs, after acquiring the elements of grammar, for the interpretation of the Latin authors commonly read in school.

LEWIS'S ELEMENTARY LATIN DICTIONARY

By CHARLTON T. LEWIS, Ph.D.

Crown Octavo, 952 pages. Half Leather $2.00

This work is sufficiently full to meet the needs of students in secondary or preparatory schools, and also in the first and second years' work in colleges.

SMITH'S ENGLISH-LATIN DICTIONARY

A Complete and Critical English-Latin Dictionary. By WILLIAM SMITH, LL.D., and THEOPHILUS D. HALL, M.A., Fellow of University College, London. With a Dictionary of Proper Names.

Royal Octavo, 765 pages. Sheep $4.00

Copies sent, prepaid, to any address on receipt of the price.

American Book Company

New York • Cincinnati • Chicago

184P718eu
Plato's Euthyphro
1144 00071515 0

184
P718eu

354423

Plato.
Plato's Euthyphro.

354423

184
P718eu

Plato.
Plato's Euthyphro.

WITHDRAWN

DREW UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
MADISON, NEW JERSEY

S0-GGJ-754